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Incident Response Playbook: Public Resources Exposure - S3

This document is provided for informational purposes only. It represents the current product offerings and practices from Amazon Web Services (AWS) as of the date of issue of this document, which are subject to change without notice. Customers are responsible for making their own independent assessment of the information in this document and any use of AWS products or services, each of which is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind, whether express or implied. This document does not create any warranties, representations, contractual commitments, conditions, or assurances from AWS, its affiliates, suppliers, or licensors. The responsibilities and liabilities of AWS to its customers are controlled by AWS agreements, and this document is not part of, nor does it modify, any agreement between AWS and its customers.

© 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This AWS Content is provided subject to the terms of the AWS Customer Agreement available at http://aws.amazon.com/agreement or other written agreement between the Customer and either Amazon Web Services, Inc. or Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL or both.

Points of Contact

Author: Author Name
Approver: Approver Name
Last Date Approved:

Executive Summary

This playbook outlines the process to identify owners of public resources, determine who may have accessed those while they were exposed, determine impact of revoking access to the resource, and determine root cause of public accessibility.

Potential Indicators of Compromise

  • Public Access warning from AWS service dashboard
  • CloudTrail GetPublicAccessBlock, DeletePublicAccessBlock, GetObjectAcl, PutObjectAcl
  • Notification from Security Researcher about public access to resources
  • Deletion of resources from public internet protocol (IP) address

Potential AWS GuardDuty Findings

  • Discovery:S3/MaliciousIPCaller
  • Discovery:S3/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom
  • Discovery:S3/TorIPCaller
  • Exfiltration:S3/MaliciousIPCaller
  • Exfiltration:S3/ObjectRead.Unusual
  • Impact:S3/MaliciousIPCaller
  • PenTest:S3/KaliLinux
  • PenTest:S3/ParrotLinux
  • PenTest:S3/PentooLinux
  • Policy:S3/AccountBlockPublicAccessDisabled
  • Policy:S3/BucketAnonymousAccessGranted
  • Policy:S3/BucketBlockPublicAccessDisabled
  • Policy:S3/BucketPublicAccessGranted
  • Stealth:S3/ServerAccessLoggingDisabled
  • UnauthorizedAccess:S3/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom
  • UnauthorizedAccess:S3/TorIPCaller

Objectives

Throughout the execution of the playbook, focus on the desired outcomes, taking notes for enhancement of incident response capabilities.

Determine:

  • Vulnerabilities exploited
  • Exploits and tools observed
  • Actor's intent
  • Actor's attribution
  • Damage inflicted to the environment and business

Recover:

  • Return to original and hardened configuration

Enhance CAF Security Perspective components:

AWS Cloud Adoption Framework Security Perspective

  • Directive
  • Detective
  • Responsive
  • Preventative

Image

Response Steps

  1. [PREPARATION] Create an account Asset Inventory
  2. [PREPARATION] Create an S3 Bucket Inventory
  3. [PREPARATION] Enable Logging as Appropriate
  4. [PREPARATION] Identify what type of data is in each bucket
  5. [PREPARATION] Identify, document, and test escalation Procedures
  6. [PREPARATION] Implement training to address DoS/DDoS attacks
  7. [DETECTION AND ANALYSIS] Perform S3 Bucket Checks
  8. [DETECTION AND ANALYSIS] Review CloudTrail: Public S3 Bucket
  9. [DETECTION AND ANALYSIS] Review CloudTrail: Public S3 Object
  10. [DETECTION AND ANALYSIS] Review VPC Flow Logs
  11. [DETECTION AND ANALYSIS] Review Endpoint / Host Based
  12. [CONTAINMENT] S3 Block Public Access
  13. [ERADICATION] S3 Remove Unrecognized / Unauthorized Objects
  14. [RECOVERY] Perform recovery procedures as appropriate

***The response steps follow the Incident Response Life Cycle from NIST Special Publication 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

Image***

Incident Classification & Handling

  • Tactics, techniques, and procedures: AWS Service Public Access
  • Category: Public Access
  • Resource: S3
  • Indicators: Cyber Threat Intelligence, Third Party Notice, Cloudwatch Metrics
  • Log Sources: S3 Server Logs, S3 Access Logs, CloudTrail, CloudWatch
  • Teams: Security Operations Center (SOC), Forensic Investigators, Cloud Engineering

Incident Handling Process

The incident response process has the following stages:

  • Preparation
  • Detection & Analysis
  • Containment & Eradication
  • Recovery
  • Post-Incident Activity

Preparation

This playbook references and integrates, where possible, with Prowler which is a command line tool that helps you with AWS security assessment, auditing, hardening and incident response.

It follows guidelines of the CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark (49 checks) and has more than 100 additional checks including related to GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, ISO-27001, FFIEC, SOC2 and others.

This tool provides a rapid snapshot of the current state of security within a customer environment. Additionally, AWS Security Hub provides for automated compliance scanning and can integrate with Prowler

Asset Inventory

Identify all existing resources and have an updated asset inventory list coupled with who owns each

S3 Bucket Inventory

  • Use the AWS API list-buckets to display the names of all your Amazon S3 buckets (across all regions): aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets[].Name"

Enable Logging

  • Check if S3 buckets have Server-level logging enabled in CloudTrail: ./prowler -c extra718
  • Check if S3 buckets have Object-level logging enabled in CloudTrail: ./prowler -c extra725

Identify what type of data is in each bucket

Option A

  • To see all files of an S3 bucket use command: aws s3 ls s3://your_bucket_name --recursive
    • NOTE This API call is limited to the first 1000 matches and will not include objects over that threshold
  • Manually categorize which buckets and objects are important to the company
  • Add tags to critical buckets so that metadata will exist for future reference

Option B

  • Amazon Macie is a fully managed data security and data privacy service that uses machine learning and pattern matching to discover and protect your sensitive data in AWS. Amazon Macie uses machine learning and pattern matching to cost efficiently discover sensitive data at scale.

Training

  • What training is in place for analysts within the company to become familiar with AWS API (command-line environment), S3, RDS, and other AWS services?

Opportunities here for Threat Detection and incident response include:
AWS RE:INFORCE
Self-Service Security Assessment

  • Which roles are able to make changes to services within your account?
  • Which users have those roles assigned to them? Is least privilege being followed, or do super admin users exist?
  • Has a Security Assessment been performed against your environment, do you have a known baseline to detect "new" or "suspicious" things?

Communication Technology

  • What technology is used within the team/company to communicate issues? Is there anything automated?

Telephone
E-mail
AWS SES
AWS SNS
Slack
Chime
Other?

Detection

S3 Bucket Checks

  • Ensure S3 bucket access logging is enabled on the CloudTrail S3 bucket: ./prowler -c check26
  • Ensure there are no S3 buckets open to Everyone or Any AWS user: ./prowler -c extra73
  • Identify the resources in your organization and accounts; such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles; that are shared with an external entity: ./prowler -c extra769
  • Find resources exposed to the internet: ./prowler -g group17

Escalation Procedures

  • Who is monitoring the logs/alerts, receiving them and acting upon each?
  • Who gets notified when an alert is discovered?
  • When do public relations and legal get involved in the process?
  • When would you reach out to AWS Support for help?

Analysis

It is highly recommended to export logs to a security incident event management (SIEM) solution (such as Splunk, ELK stack, etc.) to aide in viewing and analyzing a variety of logs for a more complete attack timeline analysis.

CloudTrail: Public S3 Bucket

By default, CloudTrail logs API calls that were made in the last 90 days, but not log requests made to objects. You can see bucket-level events on the CloudTrail console. However, you can't view data events (Amazon S3 object-level calls) there—you must parse or query CloudTrail logs for them.

  1. Navigate to your CloudTrail Dashboard
  2. In the left-hand margin select Event History
  3. In the drop-down change from Read-Only to Event Name
  4. Review CloudTrail logs for the eventnames GetPublicAccessBlock and DeletePublicAccessBlock

CloudTrail: Public S3 Object

You can also get CloudTrail logs for object-level Amazon S3 actions. To do this, enable data events for your S3 bucket or all buckets in your account. When an object-level action occurs in your account, CloudTrail evaluates your trail settings. If the event matches the object that you specified in a trail, the event is logged.

  1. Navigate to your CloudTrail Dashboard
  2. In the left-hand margin select Event History
  3. In the drop-down change from Read-Only to Event Name
  4. Review CloudTrail logs for the eventnames GetObjectAcl and PutObjectAcl

VPC Flow Logs

VPC Flow Logs is a feature that enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. This can be useful for IP addresses discovered within CloudTrail to determine the types of external connections to any public resources.

For further information and steps, including querying with Athena, please refer to the AWS Documentation for VPC Flow Logs. It is recommended that Athena analysis be included in a separate playbook and linked to other relavent items.

Endpoint / Host Based

  1. Navigate to your CloudTrail Dashboard
  2. In the left-hand margin select Event History
  3. In the drop-down change from Read-Only to Event Name
  4. Review CloudTrail for PutObject and DeleteObject requests from public IP addresses

  • Review EC2 operating system and application logs for inappropriate logins, installation of unknown software, or the presence of unrecognized files.

  • It is highly recommended to have a third-party host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) solution (such as OSSEC, Tripwire, Wazuh, Amazon Inspector, other)

Containment

S3 Block Public Access

aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket bucket-name-here --public-access-block-configuration "BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true"

You can also review Blocking public access to your Amazon S3 storage for additional details on blocking public S3 access across your account.

Eradication

S3 Remove Unrecognized / Unauthorized Objects

Remove any unrecognized objects from buckets

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/
  2. In the Bucket name list, choose the name of the bucket that you want to delete an object from.
  3. Choose the name of the object that you want to delete.
  4. To delete the current version of the object, choose Latest version, and choose the trash can icon.
  5. To delete a previous version of the object, choose Latest version, and choose the trash can icon beside the version that you want to delete.

Recovery

Same procedures as those listed for Eradication

Preventative Actions

S3 Prowler Checks

Encryption

  • Check if S3 buckets have default encryption (SSE) enabled: ./prowler -c extra734

Disaster Recovery

  • Check if S3 buckets have object versioning enabled: ./prowler -c extra763

S3 Service Actions

Prevent Users from Modifying S3 Block Public Access Settings

Regularly review bucket access and policies on a monthly basis and utilize CloudWatch Events or Security Hub for automated detections

Using versioning in S3 buckets to mitigate accidental or intentional deletion of top level objects

Managing access with ACLs to limit unauthorized access to resources on a bucket and object level

AWS Config

AWS Config has multiple automated rules to protect against public access including s3-bucket-level-public-access-prohibited.

Overall Security Posture

Execute a Self-Service Security Assessment against the environment to further identify other risks and potentially other public exposure not identified throughout this playbook.

Lessons Learned

This is a place to add items specific to your company that do not need "fixing", but are important to know when executing this playbook in tandem with operational and business requirements.

Addressed Backlog Items

  • As an Incident Responder I need a runbook on how to mitigate resources that are incorrectly made public
  • As an Incident Responder I need to be able to detect public resources(AMIs, EBS Volumes, ECR Repos, etc)
  • As an Incident Responder I need to know which roles are capable of making critical changes within AWS
  • As an Incident Responder I need a playbook on mitigating a public bucket exposure and required escalation points
  • As an Incident Responder I need documentation on logs required for different bucket classifications

Current Backlog Items