原文信息：
- 标题：1984 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1985-02-25
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Yoan
- 校译：Yoan
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1984 was $152.6 million, or $133 per share. This sounds pretty good but actually it’s mediocre. Economic gains must be evaluated by comparison with the capital that produces them. Our twenty-year compounded annual gain in book value has been 22.1% (from $19.46 in 1964 to $1108.77 in 1984), but our gain in 1984 was only 13.6%.
本公司 1984 年的账面价值增加了 1.526 亿 美金，每股约 133 美金，这个数字看起来似乎还不错，不过若考虑所投入的资本，实际上只能算一般。从 1965 年的 19.46 美元到 1984 年的 1,108.77 美元，20 年来我们的账面价值年化增长率约 22.1%，但 1984 年的股东回报率只有 13.6%（标普 6.1%）。
As we discussed last year, the gain in per-share intrinsic business value is the economic measurement that really counts. But calculations of intrinsic business value are subjective. In our case, book value serves as a useful, although somewhat understated, proxy. In my judgment, intrinsic business value and book value increased during 1984 at about the same rate.
如同我们去年讨论过的，真正重要的经济衡量标准是每股内在商业价值的增长。不过由于其涉及太多主观的意见而难以计算，所以以我们的情况，通常用帐面价值当作近似代替，尽管有些低估。在我看来，1984 年内在价值与帐面价值增加的程度可谓相当。
Using my academic voice, I have told you in the past of the drag that a mushrooming capital base exerts upon rates of return. Unfortunately, my academic voice is now giving way to a reportorial voice. Our historical 22% rate is just that - history. To earn even 15% annually over the next decade (assuming we continue to follow our present dividend policy, about which more will be said later in this letter) we would need profits aggregating about $3.9 billion. Accomplishing this will require a few big ideas - small ones just won’t do. Charlie Munger, my partner in general management, and I do not have any such ideas at present, but our experience has been that they pop up occasionally. (How’s that for a strategic plan?)
过去我曾从学术的角度跟各位提到，资本规模的迅速增加必将拖累资本的回报率。不幸的是，今年我们以报导新闻的方式跟各位报告：过去 22% 的增长率已成历史，为了达到 15% 的增长率，接下来十年我们要赚约 39 亿美金(假设我们仍维持目前的股利政策，后面我会详加讨论)。想要顺利达成目标，必需要有一些极棒的点子，小创意可不大行，我跟我的执行合伙人查理·芒格目前并无任何好点子，不过我们的经验是有时它会突然冒出来。(但这要怎么做战略计划啊？)
The table on the following page shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire’s net ownership interest in many of the constituent businesses changed at midyear 1983 when the Blue Chip merger took place. Because of these changes, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.
下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的来源，由于年中与蓝筹印花合并致使我们在一些长期投资的股权发生变动，在 1983 年中，伯克希尔和蓝筹印花合并，许多公司股权结构发生了一些变化，所以，表格前两列更能体现这些业务的基本情况。
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.)
各个公司的因出售股权的非经常性损益并不包含在经营收益内，而是汇总于底部"已实现出售证券利得"一栏。（我们认为，单一年度的资本利得并无太大意义，但加总累计的已实现和未实现总额却相当重要。）
Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is set forth as a separate item.
至于商誉的摊销不计入对应业务而单独列示，原因我在 1983 年年报附录中已详加说明了：
| Earnings Before Income Taxes | Earnings Before Income Taxes | Earnings Before Income Taxes | Earnings Before Income Taxes | Net Earnings After Tax | Net Earnings After Tax | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Total | Berkshire Share | Berkshire Share | Berkshire Share | Berkshire Share | |
| (000s omitted) | 1984 | 1983 | 1984 | 1983 | 1984 | 1983 |
| Operating Earnings: | ||||||
| Insurance Group: | ||||||
| Underwriting | $ (48,060) | $ (33,872) | $ (48,060) | $ (33,872) | $ (25,955) | $ (18,400) |
| Net investment income | 68,903 | 43,810 | 68,903 | 43,810 | 62,059 | 39,114 |
| Buffalo News | 27,328 | 19,352 | 27,328 | 16,547 | 13,317 | 8,832 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (1) | 14,511 | 3,812 | 11,609 | 3,049 | 5,917 | 1,521 |
| See’s Candies | 26,644 | 27,411 | 26,644 | 24,526 | 13,380 | 12,212 |
| Associated Retail Stores | (1,072) | 697 | (1,072) | 697 | (579) | 355 |
| Blue Chip Stamps (2) | (1,843) | (1,422) | (1,843) | (1,876) | (899) | (353) |
| Mutual Savings and Loan | 1,456 | (798) | 1,166 | (467) | 3,151 | 1,917 |
| Precision Steel | 4,092 | 3,241 | 3,278 | 2,102 | 1,696 | 1,136 |
| Textiles | 418 | (100) | 418 | (100) | 226 | (63) |
| Wesco Financial | 9,777 | 7,493 | 7,831 | 4,844 | 4,828 | 3,448 |
| Amortization of Goodwill | (1,434) | (532) | (1,434) | (563) | (1,434) | (563) |
| Interest on Debt | (14,734) | (15,104) | (14,097) | (13,844) | (7,452) | (7,346) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (3,179) | (3,066) | (3,179) | (3,066) | (1,716) | (1,656) |
| Other | 4,932 | 10,121 | 4,529 | 9,623 | 3,476 | 8,490 |
| Operating Earnings | 87,739 | 61,043 | 82,021 | 51,410 | 70,015 | 48,644 |
| Special GEICO Distribution | -- | 19,575 | -- | 19,575 | -- | 18,224 |
| Special Gen. Foods Distribution | 8,111 | -- | 7,896 | -- | 7,294 | -- |
| Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets | 104,699 | 67,260 | 101,376 | 65,089 | 71,587 | 45,298 |
| Total Earnings - all entities | $ 200,549 | $ 147,878 | $ 191,293 | $ 136,074 | $ 148,896 | $ 112,166 |
(1) 1983 figures are those for October through December.
(1) 内布拉斯家具 1983 年只有 3 个月数据。
(2) 1984 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were transferred in the mid-year 1983 merger of Blue Chip Stamps.
(2) 蓝筹印花因合并 1984 年与 1983 年不具有可比性
Sharp-eyed shareholders will notice that the amount of the special GEICO distribution and its location in the table have been changed from the presentation of last year. Though they reclassify and reduce “accounting” earnings, the changes are entirely of form, not of substance. The story behind the changes, however, is interesting.
眼尖的股东可能会发现 GEICO 保险特别股利的金额与其分类的位置有变动，虽然会计收益在数字上有所减少，但实质上并无太大差别，但背后的故事却相当有趣。
As reported last year: (1) in mid-1983 GEICO made a tender offer to buy its own shares; (2) at the same time, we agreed by written contract to sell GEICO an amount of its shares that would be proportionately related to the aggregate number of shares GEICO repurchased via the tender from all other shareholders; (3) at completion of the tender, we delivered 350,000 shares to GEICO, received $21 million cash, and were left owning exactly the same percentage of GEICO that we owned before the tender; (4) GEICO’s transaction with us amounted to a proportionate redemption, an opinion rendered us, without qualification, by a leading law firm; (5) the Tax Code logically regards such proportionate redemptions as substantially equivalent to dividends and, therefore, the $21 million we received was taxed at only the 6.9% inter-corporate dividend rate; (6) importantly, that $21 million was far less than the previously-undistributed earnings that had inured to our ownership in GEICO and, thus, from the standpoint of economic substance, was in our view equivalent to a dividend.
如同去年我报告过的，(1)1983 年中 GEICO 保险宣布收购要约回购自家股票，(2)我们签署合约同意 GEICO 保险按比例回购我们手中的股份，(3)最后我们按比例交付给 GEICO 保险 35 万股，并收到 2,100 万现金，并保持持股比例不变，(4)GEICO 保险与我们的交易相当于按比例赎回，律师事务所给予无保留意见，(5)税法在逻辑上认为这种按比例赎回基本上相当于股息，因此，我们收到的 2,100 万现金仅按 6.9% 的公司间股息率征税，(6)最重要的是这 2,100 万现金远低于我们拥有的未分配的收益，所以就经济实质而言，我们认为这相当于股息。
Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable quarterly report and in this section of the annual report. Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection, concurred with our dividend presentation1.
由于这笔交易很重要且并不常见，所以在去年季报与年报中我们特别加以说明，并且经过了我们的本地签证会计师认可同意1。
In 1984, we had a virtually identical transaction with General Foods. The only difference was that General Foods repurchased its stock over a period of time in the open market, whereas GEICO had made a “one-shot” tender offer. In the General Foods case we sold to the company, on each day that it repurchased shares, a quantity of shares that left our ownership percentage precisely unchanged. Again our transaction was pursuant to a written contract executed before repurchases began. And again the money we received was far less than the retained earnings that had inured to our ownership interest since our purchase. Overall we received $21,843,601 in cash from General Foods, and our ownership remained at exactly 8.75%.
1984 年通用食品也发生同样的交易，不同的是，通用食品直接自公开市场中回购，而 GEICO 是要约收购。所以我们每天卖出一点股份以使我们在通用食品的持股比例维持不变，我们的交易是根据回购开始前的书面合同进行的，同样，我们收到的现金比我们在该公司未认列的未分配收益少得多，总计我们收到 21,843,601 现金，而持股比例则维持在 8.75% 不变。
At this point the New York office of Peat Marwick came into the picture. Late in 1984 it indicated that it disagreed with the conclusions of the firm’s Omaha office and Chicago reviewing partner. The New York view was that the GEICO and General Foods transactions should be treated as sales of stock by Berkshire rather than as the receipt of dividends. Under this accounting approach, a portion of the cost of our investment in the stock of each company would be charged against the redemption payment and any gain would be shown as a capital gain, not as dividend income. This is an accounting approach only, having no bearing on taxes: Peat Marwick agrees that the transactions were dividends for IRS purposes.
这时会计师事务所纽约总部的人来了，否决了其奥马哈办事处和芝加哥审查合伙人的结论，他们认定我们与 GEICO 保险与通用食品之间的回购交易属于股权买卖而非股利分配，在这种情况下，我们所收到的现金被认定为出售股票收益，在扣除原始投资成本后，应列示为资本利得而不是股息收益，但这只是会计上的处理与税务无关，他们同意交易属于税收优惠目的的股息。
We disagree with the New York position from both the viewpoint of economic substance and proper accounting. But, to avoid a qualified auditor’s opinion, we have adopted herein Peat Marwick’s 1984 view and restated 1983 accordingly. None of this, however, has any effect on intrinsic business value: our ownership interests in GEICO and General Foods, our cash, our taxes, and the market value and tax basis of our holdings all remain the same.
虽然我们从经济实质和适当会计的角度并不认同纽约方面的看法，但为免会计师出具保留意见，我们在此采纳了事务所 1984 年的观点，并相应重申了 1983 年的观点。然而，这些都对内在商业价值没有任何影响，我们在这两家公司的权益、帐上的现金、所得税以及持股市值和税收基础都保持不变。
This year we have again entered into a contract with General Foods whereby we will sell them shares concurrently with open market purchases that they make. The arrangement provides that our ownership interest will remain unchanged at all times. By keeping it so, we will insure ourselves dividend treatment for tax purposes. In our view also, the economic substance of this transaction again is the creation of dividend income. However, we will account for the redemptions as sales of stock rather than dividend income unless accounting rules are adopted that speak directly to this point. We will continue to prominently identify any such special transactions in our reports to you.
今年我们又与通用食品签订类似的协议，我们将在他们进行公开市场回购的同时出售持股，以维持我们的所有权权益保持不变，通过保持这种安排，我们将确保自己的股息待遇是出于税收目的。但在我们看来，这种交易的经济实质就是股息分配。除非出现明确的会计规定，否则我们仍将回购记为股票卖出而不是股息收益进行核算，并在未来报告中特别强调此类特殊交易。
While we enjoy a low tax charge on these proportionate redemptions, and have participated in several of them, we view such repurchases as at least equally favorable for shareholders who do not sell. When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases.
虽然我们对按比例的赎回享受低税收并参与几次类似的交易，但我们觉得此类回购对不卖出股份的股东同样有利，当一家经营绩效良好且财务基础健全的公司发现自家的股价远低于其内在价值时，买回自家股票是保障股东权益最好的方法了。
(Our endorsement of repurchases is limited to those dictated by price/value relationships and does not extend to the “greenmail” repurchase - a practice we find odious and repugnant. In these transactions, two parties achieve their personal ends by exploitation of an innocent and unconsulted third party. The players are: (1) the “shareholder” extortionist who, even before the ink on his stock certificate dries, delivers his “your-money-or-your-life” message to managers; (2) the corporate insiders who quickly seek peace at any price - as long as the price is paid by someone else; and (3) the shareholders whose money is used by (2) to make (1) go away. As the dust settles, the mugging, transient shareholder gives his speech on “free enterprise”, the muggee management gives its speech on “the best interests of the company”, and the innocent shareholder standing by mutely funds the payoff.)
我们对于回购的认可仅限于那些基于价值角度的回购，并不包括那种令人厌恶不道德的「绿邮讹诈」回购，在这类交易中，双方为自身私利协议剥削不知情的第三方。「股东勒索者」(Corporate Raider 公司狙击手)在买下足以对公司控制权构成威胁的股份之后，便对公司管理层发出要钱或是要命的勒索公告，即敌意收购。「公司管理层」为自保让恶意股东退出，愿意高价买回其股票，只要这个钱不要是管理层出的就好。「无辜的股东」的资金被「公司管理层」用来打发「股东勒索者」。随着交易尘埃落定，抢劫公司的恶意股东说是为了自由企业，被抢劫的公司管理层则说是为了公司最佳利益，而不知情的股东只能呆呆的被宰还不自知。
(译者注：绿邮讹诈 Greenmail Repurchase：1980 年代的美国是公司恶意并购狂潮席卷的时代。"绿色邮件"通常被定义为先购买一家公司足够多的股份后以威胁收购取得控制权，然后利用这种影响力迫使目标公司管理层以溢价回购这些股份以放弃收购的做法。)
The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurhases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons - one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.
当价格和价值之间存在巨大差异时，我们重大仓位投资的公司都进行了大规模的股票回购，对于股东而言，有两点好处：第一点很明显，是一个简单的数学问题，以远低于每股内在商业价值的价格进行的重大回购会以非常显著的方式立即增加每股价值，等于花1美元的代价便能够获得2美元的价值。而企业并购计划从来没有这么美好，大量案例令人沮丧，每花掉的1美元根本无法获得1美元的回报。
The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?)
第二点比较微妙，不太容易去精确计算，但时间一长其效果一样明显。管理层通过以远低于内在价值的价格买回自家的股票的行为，向股东宣示其重视股东利益的态度，而不是专注于扩张其经营业务的版图，因为后者往往不利于股东的利益。如此一来，原股东与潜在股东将会对公司的前景更具信心，这种向上修正趋势会使市场价格符合企业内在商业价值，使其价格趋为合理。投资者应该给那些有维护股东利益倾向管理层管理的企业更高的估值，而不是那些自私自利、沉迷各种吹捧的管理层管理的企业。(说得极端一点，你愿意花多少钱，成为罗伯特·韦斯科(Robert Wesco)控股的通用食品公司的少数股东？)
The key word is “demonstrated”. A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as “maximizing shareholder wealth” (this season’s favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth - and, after a while, neither will the market.
不要看他说什么，得看他做什么。当回购显然是为了维护股东利益时，一个总是拒绝回购的管理层所揭示的动机远比他所知道的要多。无论他多么频繁或多么雄辩地说些为维护公共关系而炮制的说辞，如本年度最受欢迎的：股东财富最大化，市场都会正确地估值他们所管理的资产。总是说一套做一套，一段时间后，市场就会用脚投票弃之而去。
We have prospered in a very major way - as have other shareholders - by the large share repurchases of GEICO, Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings. (Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we have only recently established our position.) In each of these companies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain prices. We feel very comfortable owning interests in businesses such as these that offer excellent economics combined with shareholder-conscious managements.
我们最大的三大持股：GEICO保险、通用食品与华盛顿邮报，都大量回购自家股票，我们的持股很大程度上增加了内在价值。（我们的第四大持股埃克森石油也积极回购股票，只是因为我们是最近才建立仓位，所以影响不大。）这些公司通过低价回购，使股东对这些优秀企业的投资得到了实质性的增强。我们对于投资这种具竞争优势同时拥有注重股东权益意识的管理层的优质企业感到相当安心。
The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
下表是我们在1984年底主要的投资部位(所有数字已扣除Wesco等公司的少数股权)：
| No. of Shares | Company | Cost (000s omitted) |
Market (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 690,975 | Affiliated Publications, Inc. | $ 3,516 | $ 32,908 |
| 740,400 | American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. | 44,416 | 46,738 |
| 3,895,710 | Exxon Corporation | 173,401 | 175,307 |
| 4,047,191 | General Foods Corporation | 149,870 | 226,137 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation | 45,713 | 397,300 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman | 27,318 | 38,662 |
| 818,872 | Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. | 2,570 | 28,149 |
| 555,949 | Northwest Industries | 26,581 | 27,242 |
| 2,553,488 | Time, Inc. | 89,327 | 109,162 |
| 1,868,600 | The Washington Post Company | 10,628 | 149,955 |
| $ 573,340 | $ 1,231,560 | ||
| All Other Common Stockholdings | 11,634 | 37,326 | |
| Total Common Stocks | $ 584,974 | $ 1,268,886 |
It’s been over ten years since it has been as difficult as now to find equity investments that meet both our qualitative standards and our quantitative standards of value versus price. We try to avoid compromise of these standards, although we find doing nothing the most difficult task of all. (One English statesman attributed his country’s greatness in the nineteenth century to a policy of “masterly inactivity”. This is a strategy that is far easier for historians to commend than for participants to follow.)
符合我们的企业价值评估定性标准，又符合我们的价值与价格定量标准的企业，最近十年来实在很难找得到。我们尽量避免降格以求，但我们发现什么事都不做才是最困难的。（有一位英国政治家将该国十九世纪的伟大归功于统治者的无为而治，这种策略历史学家称赞起来很容易，但后继统治者却很难真正做到。）
In addition to the figures supplied at the beginning of this section, information regarding the businesses we own appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 42-47. An amplified discussion of Wesco’s businesses appears in Charlie Munger’s report on pages 50-59. You will find particularly interesting his comments about conditions in the thrift industry. Our other major controlled businesses are Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s, Buffalo Evening News, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.
除了先前曾提到的数字，有关Wesco的经营理念在查理·芒格写的报告中会详加描述，你会发现他对储蓄行业状况的评论特别有趣。此外我们实际掌控的企业，如内布拉斯加家具店、喜诗糖果、布法罗日报与保险业务集团的经营，将在稍后加以说明。
Last year I introduced you to Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her family. I told you they were terrific, and I understated the case. After another year of observing their remarkable talents and character, I can honestly say that I never have seen a managerial group that either functions or behaves better than the Blumkin family.
去年我曾介绍过B夫人跟她的家族的优异表现，不过事实上我还低估他们的管理才能与人格特质，老实说，我从未见过一个管理团队的运作或行为比Blumkin家族更好。
Mrs. B, Chairman of the Board, is now 91, and recently was quoted in the local newspaper as saying, “I come home to eat and sleep, and that’s about it. I can’t wait until it gets daylight so I can get back to the business”. Mrs. B is at the store seven days a week, from opening to close, and probably makes more decisions in a day than most CEOs do in a year (better ones, too).
董事长B夫人现年91岁，最近当地报纸援引她的话说："我回家只是吃饭睡觉，仅此而已。我迫不及待地想等到天亮，这样我才能重新开始工作。"B夫人每周七天都在店里，从开店到关店，她一天做出的决定可能比大多数CEO一年做的决定还多(更好的决策也是如此)。
In May Mrs. B was granted an Honorary Doctorate in Commercial Science by New York University. (She’s a “fast track” student: not one day in her life was spent in a school room prior to her receipt of the doctorate.) Previous recipients of honorary degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary, then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and, most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)2
5月，B夫人荣获纽约大学颁赠商科荣誉博士学位，(她是个跳级生，在她获得这个学位之前，从来没有到学校上过一天课)，此前获颁这项殊荣的有埃克森石油总裁Clifton Garvin、花旗银行总裁Walter Wriston、IBM总裁Frank Cary、通用汽车总裁Thomas Murphy、美联储主席Paul Volcker等杰出企业人士2。
The Blumkin blood did not run thin. Louie, Mrs. B’s son, and his three boys, Ron, Irv, and Steve, all contribute in full measure to NFM’s amazing success. The younger generation has attended the best business school of them all - that conducted by Mrs. B and Louie - and their training is evident in their performance.3
有其母必有其子，B夫人的儿子Louie跟他三个小孩Ron、Irv和Steve，都为NFM惊人的成功做出了巨大贡献。从他们的业绩中可以看出，年轻一代就读于由B夫人和Louie教授的最好的商学院3。
Last year NFM’s net sales increased by $14.3 million, bringing the total to $115 million, all from the one store in Omaha. That is by far the largest volume produced by a single home furnishings store in the United States. In fact, the gain in sales last year was itself greater than the annual volume of many good-sized successful stores. The business achieves this success because it deserves this success. A few figures will tell you why.
去年NFM总销售额达到1.15亿美元，净增加1430万美金，全部来自奥马哈的一家商店，这是迄今为止美国一家家居用品店销售的最大规模。事实上，仅去年的销售增长额就超过了许多规模较大的成功门店的一整年销量。它的成功不是没有道理的，以下数字说明一切。
In its fiscal 1984 10-K, the largest independent specialty retailer of home furnishings in the country, Levitz Furniture, described its prices as “generally lower than the prices charged by conventional furniture stores in its trading area”. Levitz, in that year, operated at a gross margin of 44.4% (that is, on average, customers paid it $100 for merchandise that had cost it $55.60 to buy). The gross margin at NFM is not much more than half of that. NFM’s low mark-ups are possible because of its exceptional efficiency: operating expenses (payroll, occupancy, advertising, etc.) are about 16.5% of sales versus 35.6% at Levitz.
全美最大的独立家居用品专业零售商莱维茨家具(ttz Furniture)在1984年的财报自夸其所卖价格要比当地所有传统家具店要便宜的多，但Levitz的毛利率却高达44.4%，亦即消费者每付100元所买的货品，公司的成本只要55.6元。而NFM的毛利却不到Levitz的一半，其低加成所凭借的是极高的效率：运营费用(工资、租金、广告费等)约占销售额的16.5%，而Levitz则为 35.6%。(译者注：沃尔玛20%左右)
None of this is in criticism of Levitz, which has a well-managed operation. But the NFM operation is simply extraordinary (and, remember, it all comes from a $500 investment by Mrs. B in 1937). By unparalleled efficiency and astute volume purchasing, NFM is able to earn excellent returns on capital while saving its customers at least $30 million annually from what, on average, it would cost them to buy the same merchandise at stores maintaining typical mark-ups. Such savings enable NFM to constantly widen its geographical reach and thus to enjoy growth well beyond the natural growth of the Omaha market.
我们不是要批评Levitz，事实上该公司经营亦颇出色，只是NFM的表现实在是过于出色了，而且这一切的一切都是从B夫人1937年的500块投资开始的，靠着无与伦比的效率，成本的精打细算以及精明的大规模采购的成本优势，NFM赚取丰厚的资本回报的同时，平均每年为客户节省至少3000万美元，而在保持典型加价的商店购买相同商品这些成本是要支付的。这使NFM能够不断扩大其市场范围，从而享受远超奥马哈市场自然增长之外的增长。
I have been asked by a number of people just what secrets the Blumkins bring to their business. These are not very esoteric. All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism their area of special competence and act decisively on all matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4) unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal with. (Mrs. B boils it down to “sell cheap and tell the truth”.)
人们常常问我Blumkins家族到底有什么经营诀窍，其实说穿了也不是什么深奥的道理，他们整个家族：(1)对事业充满热情与活力，踏实肯干，其程度让Ben Franklin与儿童小说家Horatio Alger Jr.看起来像半途而废；(2)脚踏实地的确定他们专业的能力圈，并对其中的事项采取非常果断的决定，(3)而在专业能力圈之外，对任何最具诱惑力的提议也不予理会，(4)对待所有人皆能保持高尚的人格。（B夫人将其归结为"便宜卖，讲实话"。）
Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was demonstrated when we purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never had an audit and we did not request one; we did not take an inventory nor verify the receivables; we did not check property titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gave us her word. That made for an even exchange.
我们购买公司90%股份的过程可以看出我们对Blumkin家族人格的信任：NFM从未进行过审计，我们也没有要求进行审计；我们没有盘点存货或核实应收账款以及固定资产。我们给了B夫人一张5500万美元的支票，而她给了我们一句口头的承诺。
You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.
与Blumkin家族合作是你我的荣幸。
Below is our usual recap of See’s performance since the time of purchase by Blue Chip Stamps:
下表是喜诗自从被蓝筹印花买下后，对其表现的回顾：
| 52-53 Week Year Ended About December 31 | Sales Revenues | Operating Profits After Taxes | Number of Pounds of Candy Sold | Number of Stores Open at Year End |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | $ 135,946,000 | $ 13,380,000 | 24,759,000 | 214 |
| 1983 (53 weeks) | 133,531,000 | 13,699,000 | 24,651,000 | 207 |
| 1982 | 123,662,000 | 11,875,000 | 24,216,000 | 202 |
| 1981 | 112,578,000 | 10,779,000 | 24,052,000 | 199 |
| 1980 | 97,715,000 | 7,547,000 | 24,065,000 | 191 |
| 1979 | 87,314,000 | 6,330,000 | 23,985,000 | 188 |
| 1978 | 73,653,000 | 6,178,000 | 22,407,000 | 182 |
| 1977 | 62,886,000 | 6,154,000 | 20,921,000 | 179 |
| 1976 (53 weeks) | 56,333,000 | 5,569,000 | 20,553,000 | 173 |
| 1975 | 50,492,000 | 5,132,000 | 19,134,000 | 172 |
| 1974 | 41,248,000 | 3,021,000 | 17,883,000 | 170 |
| 1973 | 35,050,000 | 1,940,000 | 17,813,000 | 169 |
| 1972 | 31,337,000 | 2,083,000 | 16,954,000 | 167 |
This performance has not been produced by a generally rising tide. To the contrary, many well-known participants in the boxed-chocolate industry either have lost money in this same period or have been marginally profitable. To our knowledge, only one good-sized competitor has achieved high profitability. The success of See’s reflects the combination of an exceptional product and an exceptional manager, Chuck Huggins.
要知道这种表现并不是由行业普遍上升的趋势产生的，相反，盒装巧克力行业的许多知名参与者在同一时期要么亏损，要么利润微薄。据我们所知，只有一家规模较大的竞争对手实现了高盈利。而See's的成功要归功于优秀的产品与杰出的经营人才Chuck Huggins.
During 1984 we increased prices considerably less than has been our practice in recent years: per-pound realization was $5.49, up only 1.4% from 1983. Fortunately, we made good progress on cost control, an area that has caused us problems in recent years. Per-pound costs - other than those for raw materials, a segment of expense largely outside of our control - increased by only 2.2% last year.
尽管在1984年我们产品价格的涨幅不若以往，仅比1983年上涨约1.4%，每磅卖5.49美元。不过还好我们在过去几年一直困扰我们的成本控制问题上大有进展，除了我们无法控制的原材料成本外，每磅成本仅较去年增加2.2%。
Our cost-control problem has been exacerbated by the problem of modestly declining volume (measured by pounds, not dollars) on a same-store basis. Total pounds sold through shops in recent years has been maintained at a roughly constant level only by the net addition of a few shops annually. This more-shops-to-get-the-same-volume situation naturally puts heavy pressure on per-pound selling costs.
我们的成本控制问题因单店销售量(以英镑而非美元衡量)适度下降的问题而恶化。近年来，单店销售的总磅数一直保持在大致恒定的水平，只是每年新增几家商店。这种销量仅靠店铺扩张而单店不增长的情况，自然给每磅的销售成本带来了沉重的压力。
In 1984, same-store volume declined 1.1%. Total shop volume, however, grew 0.6% because of an increase in stores. (Both percentages are adjusted to compensate for a 53-week fiscal year in 1983.)
1984年，单店销售量下降了1.1%。然而，由于店铺数量的增加，总店铺销量增长了0.6%。(数据经过调整以弥补1983年53周的差异)
See’s business tends to get a bit more seasonal each year. In the four weeks prior to Christmas, we do 40% of the year’s volume and earn about 75% of the year’s profits. We also earn significant sums in the Easter and Valentine’s Day periods, but pretty much tread water the rest of the year.4 In recent years, shop volume at Christmas has grown in relative importance, and so have quantity orders and mail orders. The increased concentration of business in the Christmas period produces a multitude of managerial problems, all of which have been handled by Chuck and his associates with exceptional skill and grace.
喜诗糖果的销售受到季节因素的影响越来越大，在圣诞节到来的前一个月，销量占全年40%而利润占75%，此外复活节与情人节期间的业绩也特别好，但剩下的时间就不尽如人意了4。近年来圣诞节期间的店铺销量增长变得相对重要，团购订单和邮购订单也是如此。圣诞节期间业务的日益集中产生了大量的管理问题，所有这些问题都由Chuck和他的同事以非凡的技巧优雅处理。
Their solutions have in no way involved compromises in either quality of service or quality of product. Most of our larger competitors could not say the same. Though faced with somewhat less extreme peaks and valleys in demand than we, they add preservatives or freeze the finished product in order to smooth the production cycle and thereby lower unit costs. We reject such techniques, opting, in effect, for production headaches rather than product modification.
但他们绝不会向服务质量或产品质量妥协。我们大多数较大的竞争对手都不敢这么说。尽管面临着比我们更少的极端需求高峰和低谷，但他们添加防腐剂或使用冷冻成品，以平滑生产周期，从而降低单位成本。我们拒绝使用此类技术，我们宁愿选择去解决生产难题而不是去改变产品。
Our mall stores face a host of new food and snack vendors that provide particularly strong competition at non-holiday periods. We need new products to fight back and during 1984 we introduced six candy bars that, overall, met with a good reception. Further product introductions are planned.
在非节假日期间，我们在商场的门店面临着许多新的食品和小吃供应商的激烈竞争，所幸在1984年我们推出六款糖果棒加以反击，其效果颇佳广受好评，目前我们计划进一步推出新产品。
In 1985 we will intensify our efforts to keep per-pound cost increases below the rate of inflation. Continued success in these efforts, however, will require gains in same-store poundage. Prices in 1985 should average 6% - 7% above those of 1984. Assuming no change in same-store volume, profits should show a moderate gain.
1985年，我们将更加努力，使每磅成本的增长低于通货膨胀率，当然这必须要单店销量的增长来加以配合，1985年每磅售价将会提高6-7%，即使单店销量没有增加，利润应该会出现温和增长。
Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than we expected. As at See’s, excellent progress was made in controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the industry.
1984年该报的利润远超我们的预期，与喜诗一样在控制成本方面颇具成效。不包括在新闻编辑室的工作时间，总工作时间减少了约2.8%。随着生产力的提高，总成本仅增加了4.9%。Stan Lipsey与其经营团队的表现堪称业界之最。
However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984 we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for a large “catch-up” wage increase. This catch-up is entirely appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the unprofitable 1977-1982 period was an important factor in our success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express. Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might well have been different.
然而，我们现在面临着成本的加速增长。在年中我们与工会签订一项数年的工作合约，使得工资大幅调涨，基于过去1977-1982年该报亏损时，工会员工同公司命运共进退合作的态度，是使我们在保持成本竞争力方面战胜Courier-Express的关键因素，如果当时我们不降低成本，现在的结局可能完全相反。
Because our new union contracts took effect at varying dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984 costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985 and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors, we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.
由于这项薪资调整系分阶段进行，所以对1984年的影响有限，明年此时便会全数反应，届时单位劳动力成本将以远高于行业的速度增长。我们希望可以努力提高生产力作为缓解，但1985年单位劳动成本将不可避免的大幅增加，并且新闻纸的价格预估也将增加，由于这两项不利因素，明年毛利将略微下滑。
Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major economic importance:
在新闻界有两个重要的经济因素对我们有利：
(1) Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers. “Regional” newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on the other hand, have a significant portion of their circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are offering to sell via a classified ad - nor for the grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area. “Wasted” circulation - as the advertisers call it - hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are determined largely by gross circulation while advertising revenues (usually 70% - 80% of total revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation;
(1) 本报发行区域非常集中在广告效用极高的布法罗地区，相对于更大的区域性报纸，其很大一分部分发行量对广告主的效用基本可以忽略不计，一个几百英里远的订户对于仅在市区开设商店的广告主来说一点效用也没有。正如广告商所说，「浪费」的发行量损害了盈利能力：对于一家报社来说，收入主要取决于总发行量，而通常占总营收70-80%的广告收入却要依靠实际有效的发行量。
(2) Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their potential customers using only the News.
(2) 我们对布法罗地区零售市场的渗透非常出色，广告主只要凭着这份报纸，几乎能触达所有潜在的客户。
Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance: among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)
去年我曾告诉各位该报优异的读者接受度：在全美最大100家报纸中，我们渗透率在日报排名第一、而周日版则排第三。最新的资料显示日报渗透率仍维持第一、而周日版则跃居第二位。不过，布法罗地区家庭数量下降了，所以我们日报的订户数有所减少，但周末版没有变化。
I told you also that one of the major reasons for this unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in our size range. In 1984 our “news hole” ratio was 50.9%, (versus 50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35% - 40%. We will continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again, will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.
我还告诉过你，读者如此不寻常地接受的主要原因之一是，我们向他们传递的新闻内容不寻常：在相同规模的报纸中，我们提供的新闻量是最多的，1984年的新闻版块占比是50.9%，比1983年50.4%略有提升，比主流的报纸35-40%高出许多，而我们也会继续维持比率在50%以上。另外去年我们虽然减少其他部门的工作时数，但编辑部门时数却维持不变，未来还会继续如此。虽然编辑部门的开支增长9.1%，远超过总成本4.9%增长。
Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference between “high” and “low” news costs at papers of comparable size runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins are often ten times that amount.
我们的新闻政策耗费了我们大量额外的新闻纸费用。因此我们的新闻成本(新闻纸成本加上新闻编辑部门的工资和日常开支)占总收入的百分比高于类似规模的大多数报纸。即便如此，我们的报纸或其他占主导地位的报纸都有足够的利润空间来维持这些成本：在同等规模的报纸上，新闻成本高低之间的差异可能达到3%，但税前利润率往往是这一数字的十倍。
The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better - as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.
一家占主导地位的报纸的经济效益极为出色，在整个商业界都名列前茅。老板通常相信他们出色的盈利能力是源于努力地推出最好的产品，但这个舒适的理论在一个不舒服的事实面前显得苍白无力5，当一流的报纸维持高获利时，三流报纸所赚得的钱却一点也不逊色，有时甚至更多，只要该报纸能在当地占据主导地位，当然产品的品质对于一家报纸提高市场占有率极为关键，而我们相信在布法罗晚报也是如此，而且有Alfred Kirchhofer这样的前辈领导也是重要原因。
Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its “bulletin board” value. Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command the attention of advertisers.
一旦某一家报纸媒体在某个地区占据了市场主导地位，内容质量是高是低就要全凭自觉了，市场对此毫无办法。无论内容质量是高是低，这家报纸都能卖出去。大多数生意却并非如此：一般来说，更差的产品质量往往带来更差的经济回报。一份质量很差的报纸对大多数市民来说还是很划算的，之所以会这样，仅仅是因为报纸自身具备的「布告栏」价值。在其他条件相同的情况下，内容质量较差的报纸其读者水平无法媲美一流报纸。但是，对大多数市民来说，哪怕报纸质量较差，这份报纸对他们来说依然是必不可少的。一份能够吸引大多数市民注意力的报纸，自然也会吸引广告商的注意力。6
Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace, management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above-average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.
因为市场对于报纸品质的要求水准并不高，因此管理层必须自己提高自己的标准。我们的报纸对高于行业水平的新闻版面的承诺代表了一个重要的量化标准。我们也相信Stan Lipsey和Murray Light将继续应用其他更重要的质量标准。查理与我相信报业是社会上非常特殊的机构，我们相当引以为傲，也期待将来更上一层楼。
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
下表列出了保险业的两个关键数据：
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) | Combined Ratio after Policy-holder Dividends | |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 10.2 | 96.2 |
| 1973 | 8.0 | 99.2 |
| 1974 | 6.2 | 105.4 |
| 1975 | 11.0 | 107.9 |
| 1976 | 21.9 | 102.4 |
| 1977 | 19.8 | 97.2 |
| 1978 | 12.8 | 97.5 |
| 1979 | 10.3 | 100.6 |
| 1980 | 6.0 | 103.1 |
| 1981 | 3.9 | 106.0 |
| 1982 | 4.4 | 109.7 |
| 1983 (Revised) | 4.5 | 111.9 |
| 1984 (Estimated) | 8.1 | 117.7 |
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages
数据来源：Best’s Aggregates and Averages
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
Best的统计数据反映了几乎整个行业的状况。综合比率代表总保险成本(发生的损失加上费用)与保费收入之比，低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示亏损。
For a number of years, we have told you that an annual increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance policy.
多年来我们一直重申，要使综合比率基本保持不变，保险行业每年必须将保费提高10%。我们提出这一政策时，假设运营费用占保费金额的百分比将保持相对稳定，理赔损失将以每年约10%的速度增长，这是因为承保规模增加、通货膨胀和扩大保险单承保范围的司法裁决的综合影响。
Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in 1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year percentage change in industry premium volume.
令人沮丧的事实证明，我们的观点非常准确，从1979-1984年间，我们保费总增长61%，年均增长10%，1984年的综合比率几乎与1979年的100.6相同。相反，同业保费增加只有30%，综合比率则变成117.7。今天我们仍相信保费金额的年增长率是承保获利趋势的关键指标。
It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a “normal” level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually), five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly-competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios in the 108-113 range.
目前来看1985年的保费增长将超过10%，因此，假设灾难处于正常水平，我们预计综合比率将在年底前开始下降。然而，根据我们全行业的损失假设(即每年增加10%)，需要五年每年15%的保费增长才能使综合比率恢复到100。这意味着1989年时行业保费须翻一番，这似乎是不太可能。所以，我们预期保费每年将增长略高于10%，在激烈价格战竞争的情况下，行业综合比率将维持在108-113之间。
Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much additional detail, including the effect of discontinued operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average results during the past several years, and that circumstance has begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some. With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of 1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines with little loss of business.
我们自己在1984年的综合比率是可怜的134，我们在报告此比率时，不包括结构化结算和损失准备金假设。这是连续第三年我们的表现比同业水准差，我们预期1985年综合比率会有所改善，而且改善程度会比同业要好。Mike Goldberg自从从我手中接下保险业务后已纠正了不少我先前所犯下的错误。此外，过去几年我们的业务集中在一些表现不如预期的业务保单上，这种情况开始压制竞争同业甚至淘汰一些出局，随着竞争局势的打破，我们在1984年下半年开始提高部分业务的保费价格，并且不怕流失客户。
For some years I have told you that there could be a day coming when our premier financial strength would make a real difference in the competitive position of our insurance operation. That day may have arrived. We are almost without question the strongest property/casualty insurance operation in the country, with a capital position far superior to that of well-known companies of much greater size.
多年来我一再告诉各位，我们卓越的财务实力可能有一天将有助于我们取得保险营运的竞争优势，而这一天可能已经来临，毫无疑问我们是全美最强大的财产意外险保险公司，资本状况远远优于规模更大的知名公司。
Equally important, our corporate policy is to retain that superiority. The buyer of insurance receives only a promise in exchange for his cash. The value of that promise should be appraised against the possibility of adversity, not prosperity. At a minimum, the promise should appear able to withstand a prolonged combination of depressed financial markets and exceptionally unfavorable underwriting results. Our insurance subsidiaries are both willing and able to keep their promises in any such environment - and not too many other companies clearly are.
同样重要的是，我们的战略便是要保持这种优势，保单购买者用钱所换到的只是一纸承诺，而这纸承诺的价值必须要经得起所有可能的逆境的考验，而非顺境。最少，它必须要能够经得起长期低迷金融市场和特别不利的承保状况的双重考验，我们保险子公司，有意愿也有能力，确保其承诺在任何状况下兑现，这显然没有太多保险公司能做到。
Our financial strength is a particular asset in the business of structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions that we reported on last year. The claimant in a structured settlement and the insurance company that has reinsured loss reserves need to be completely confident that payments will be forthcoming for decades to come. Very few companies in the property/casualty field can meet this test of unquestioned long-term strength. (In fact, only a handful of companies exists with which we will reinsure our own liabilities.)
我们的财务实力，对于去年曾提过的结构化结算(分阶段赔付)与损失准备提列业务来说，是一项特殊资产。结构化结算中，理赔人与申请再保的保险公司，必须要百分之百确定在往后的几十年内能顺利获得支付，很少有财产意外险公司能够符合这种要求，事实上只有少数几家公司能让我们有信心将我们自己的风险再保出去。
We have grown in these new lines of business: funds that we hold to offset assumed liabilities grew from $16.2 million to $30.6 million during the year. We expect growth to continue and perhaps to greatly accelerate. To support this projected growth we have added substantially to the capital of Columbia Insurance Company, our reinsurance unit specializing in structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions. While these businesses are very competitive, returns should be satisfactory.
我们在这方面的业务取得增长，我们持有用以弥补假设负债的资金从1620万增长至3060万美元，我们预期这项业务将继续增长，并大大加速。为了支持这一预期增长，我们向旗下哥伦比亚保险公司大幅增资，该公司是我们的再保险部门，专门从事结构化结算和损失准备金假设，虽然竞争颇为激列但获利却也令人满意。
(译者注：伯克希尔1969年底出售科恩零售后，于1970年成立了内布拉斯加州再保险公司，后改名为哥伦比亚保险公司，并将国民保险的再保险业务纳入其中。)
At GEICO the news, as usual, is mostly good. That company achieved excellent unit growth in its primary insurance business during 1984, and the performance of its investment portfolio continued to be extraordinary. Though underwriting results deteriorated late in the year, they still remain far better than those of the industry. Our ownership in GEICO at yearend amounted to 36% and thus our interest in their direct property/casualty volume of $885 million amounted to $320 million, or well over double our own premium volume.
盖可保险与往常一样多是好消息，该公司1984年在其主要业务的投保客户大幅增加，而其投资部们的表现一样优异，虽然年末承销业绩转差，但仍远好于同业，截至去年底我们拥有该公司36%的权益，若以其产险总保费收入8.85亿美元计，我们的权益约有3.2亿美元左右，大约是我们自己承保量的二倍。
I have reported to you in the past few years that the performance of GEICO’s stock has considerably exceeded that company’s business performance, brilliant as the latter has been. In those years, the carrying value of our GEICO investment on our balance sheet grew at a rate greater than the growth in GEICO’s intrinsic business value. I warned you that over performance by the stock relative to the performance of the business obviously could not occur every year, and that in some years the stock must under perform the business. In 1984 that occurred and the carrying value of our interest in GEICO changed hardly at all, while the intrinsic business value of that interest increased substantially. Since 27% of Berkshire’s net worth at the beginning of 1984 was represented by GEICO, its static market value had a significant impact upon our rate of gain for the year. We are not at all unhappy with such a result: we would far rather have the business value of GEICO increase by X during the year, while market value decreases, than have the intrinsic value increase by only 1/2 X with market value soaring. In GEICO’s case, as in all of our investments, we look to business performance, not market performance. If we are correct in expectations regarding the business, the market eventually will follow along.
过去几年给大家汇报过，盖可保险的股价涨幅明显超越其本业的表现，虽然业绩表现也非常出色，盖可保险在我们公司的帐面价值成长幅度超过该公司本身内在价值的成长幅度，而我同时也警告各位，股票相对于业务表现的过度上涨显然不可能每年都发生，总有一天其股价的表现将逊于本业。这句话在1984年应验了，去年盖可保险在伯克希尔的帐面价值没什么变动，不过其公司的内在价值却大幅增加，而由于盖可保险代表着伯克希尔27%的净值，当其市场价值迟滞不前，直接便影响到伯克希尔净值成长的表现，对于这样的结果，我们一点也不会感到不满，我们宁愿要盖可保险的企业价值增加X倍而股价却在下跌，也不要公司内在价值减半而股价飙升。就盖可保险而言，与我们所有的投资一样，我们关注的是业务表现，而不是市场表现。如果我们对业务的预期正确，市场终将反映。
You, as shareholders of Berkshire, have benefited in enormous measure from the talents of GEICO’s Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder, and Lou Simpson. In its core business - low-cost auto and homeowners insurance - GEICO has a major, sustainable competitive advantage. That is a rare asset in business generally, and it’s almost non-existent in the field of financial services. (GEICO, itself, illustrates this point: despite the company’s excellent management, superior profitability has eluded GEICO in all endeavors other than its core business.) In a large industry, a competitive advantage such as GEICO’s provides the potential for unusual economic rewards, and Jack and Bill continue to exhibit great skill in realizing that potential.
所有的伯克希尔股东皆从盖可保险管理团队的才华中获益匪浅。他们是Jack Byrne、Bill Snyder与Lou Simpson，在他们的核心业务低成本的汽车与房屋住宅保险，盖可保险拥有显著且持续的竞争优势，这在商业上是一种罕见的资产，在金融服务领域更是几乎不存在。盖可保险本身就说明了这一点：尽管该公司拥有卓越的管理，除核心业务之外，盖可保险在其他领域的所有努力都无法实现卓越的盈利能力。在保险行业中，像盖可保险这样的竞争优势提供了异常资本回报的潜力，并且Jack和Bill继续展现出实现这一潜力的高超技巧。
Most of the funds generated by GEICO’s core insurance operation are made available to Lou for investment. Lou has the rare combination of temperamental and intellectual characteristics that produce outstanding long-term investment performance. Operating with below-average risk, he has generated returns that have been by far the best in the insurance industry. I applaud and appreciate the efforts and talents of these three outstanding managers.
盖可保险核心业务所产生的资金，大部分皆交由路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)来投资，路易是一个智慧与理性兼具的罕见人才，这项人格特征产生了出色的长期投资业绩。以低于平均水平的低风险，产生了迄今为止保险业中最好的回报。我对以上三位杰出经理人表达赞赏与感谢之意。
Any shareholder in a company with important interests in the property/casualty insurance business should have some understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the reporting of current earnings in that industry. Phil Graham, when publisher of the Washington Post, described the daily newspaper as “a first rough draft of history”. Unfortunately, the financial statements of a property/casualty insurer provide, at best, only a first rough draft of earnings and financial condition.
我认为所有在财产/意外险业务有重大投资的股东，都应该对财务报告中利润的固有盲点有所了解。Phil Graham在担任华盛顿邮报的发行人时曾说："新闻日报是攥写历史的第一手草稿"。不幸的是，财产险所提供的财务报告，充其量只是该公司收益和财务状况的初稿。
The determination of costs is the main problem. Most of an insurer’s costs result from losses on claims, and many of the losses that should be charged against the current year’s revenue are exceptionally difficult to estimate. Sometimes the extent of these losses, or even their existence, is not known for decades.
主要的问题在于成本的确定，保险公司的大部分成本来自索赔损失，而对于当年的保费收入未来会发生多少索赔损失实在是难以估计，有时损失的发生以及其损害程度要在好几十年之后才会明朗。
The loss expense charged in a property/casualty company’s current income statement represents: (1) losses that occurred and were paid during the year; (2) estimates for losses that occurred and were reported to the insurer during the year, but which have yet to be settled; (3) estimates of ultimate dollar costs for losses that occurred during the year but of which the insurer is unaware (termed “IBNR”: incurred but not reported); and (4) the net effect of revisions this year of similar estimates for (2) and (3) made in past years.
一般来说，产险业当年度认列的损失主要包含有下列几项：(1)赔付支出：当年已发生且支付的损失，(2)未决赔款准备金A：对于已发生且已提报，但仍未结清的损失，(3)未决赔款准备金B：对于已发生但尚未提报，亦即保险业者尚不知情案件所作的估计损失 (IBNR：发生了但尚未提报)，(4)今年对于过去几年前述(2)(3)项估计损失所作的修正影响。
Such revisions may be long delayed, but eventually any estimate of losses that causes the income for year X to be misstated must be corrected, whether it is in year X + 1, orX + 10. This, perforce, means that earnings in the year of correction also are misstated. For example, assume a claimant was injured by one of our insureds in 1979 and we thought a settlement was likely to be made for $10,000. That year we would have charged $10,000 to our earnings statement for the estimated cost of the loss and, correspondingly, set up a liability reserve on the balance sheet for that amount. If we settled the claim in 1984 for $100,000, we would charge earnings with a loss cost of $90,000 in 1984, although that cost was truly an expense of 1979. And if that piece of business was our only activity in 1979, we would have badly misled ourselves as to costs, and you as to earnings.
此类修正可能会推迟很久，但最终导致先前在X年收入误报的任何损失都必须更正，不论是在X+1或是X+10年，而这无可避免地导致修正年度的损益数字也被扭曲。例如，假设一位索赔人在1979年被我们一位投保户所伤，而承保时估计的理赔金额为一万美元，所以我们在当年损益表提列了一万美元的损失准备。而在1984年双方以十万美元合解，我们必须在1984年另行认列九万美元的赔付损失，尽管该项损失属于1979年的成本。如果假设这笔业务是在1979年的唯一经营 活动，则我们会在成本上严重误导自己，而在收益上误导你们。
The necessarily-extensive use of estimates in assembling the figures that appear in such deceptively precise form in the income statement of property/casualty companies means that some error must seep in, no matter how proper the intentions of management. In an attempt to minimize error, most insurers use various statistical techniques to adjust the thousands of individual loss evaluations (called case reserves) that comprise the raw data for estimation of aggregate liabilities. The extra reserves created by these adjustments are variously labeled “bulk”, “development”, or “supplemental” reserves. The goal of the adjustments should be a loss-reserve total that has a 50-50 chance of being proved either slightly too high or slightly too low when all losses that occurred prior to the date of the financial statement are ultimately paid.
在汇总财产险损益表中极具欺骗性但看似精确的数字时，必须广泛使用估计值，这意味着无论管理层的意图多么正确，都必然渗入许多错误的估计值。而为了减少这类错误，大多数的保险公司运用各种统计方法来调整成千上万的被保险人的损失评估(被称为案例准备金)，这些评估作为估计损失准备金总额的基础数据。调整产生的额外储备被标记为"损失准备金、未决赔付的、补充性的"不同类目，调整的目标应该是当财务报表日期之前发生的所有损失最终得到支付时，损失准备金高估部分VS低估部分最终接近相抵。
At Berkshire, we have added what we thought were appropriate supplemental reserves but in recent years they have not been adequate. It is important that you understand the magnitude of the errors that have been involved in our reserving. You can thus see for yourselves just how imprecise the process is, and also judge whether we may have some systemic bias that should make you wary of our current and future figures.
在伯克希尔，我们已经增加了我们认为适当的损失补充储备金，但近年来这些储备并不充足。重要的是，你必须了解我们的过去所涉及的损失准备提列错误的严重程度。因此，你可以亲眼看到整个过程有多不精确，也可以判断我们是否可能存在一些系统性偏见，以让你对我们当前和未来的数据保持警惕。
The following table shows the results from insurance underwriting as we have reported them to you in recent years, and also gives you calculations a year later on an “if-we-knew-then-what-we think-we-know-now” basis. I say “what we think we know now” because the adjusted figures still include a great many estimates for losses that occurred in the earlier years. However, many claims from the earlier years have been settled so that our one-year-later estimate contains less guess work than our earlier estimate:
下表第一列显示过去五年我们跟各位报告的保险承销业绩，同时并提供一年之后以"如果当时我们知道那么我们认为我们现在知道什么"的基础下的估算数字，而所谓地"我们认为我们现在知道什么"系因为这其中还包含许多对以前发生的损失所作的估计调整，然而，由于前几年的许多索赔过去一年已经得到解决，因此我们对一年后的估计值中所包含的猜测工作要比之前的要少：
| Year | Underwriting Results as Reported to You | Corrected Figures After One Year’s Experience |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 | $ 6,738,000 | $ 14,887,000 |
| 1981 | 1,478,000 | (1,118,000) |
| 1982 | (21,462,000) | (25,066,000) |
| 1983 | (33,192,000) | (50,974,000) |
| 1984 | (45,413,000) | ? |
Our structured settlement and loss-reserve assumption businesses are not included in this table. Important additional information on loss reserve experience appears on pages 43-45.
上表不包含结构性结算与损失准备金假设业务
To help you understand this table, here is an explanation of the most recent figures: 1984’s reported pre-tax underwriting loss of $45.4 million consists of $27.6 million we estimate that we lost on 1984’s business, plus the increased loss of $17.8 million reflected in the corrected figure for 1983.
为了帮助各位进一步理解上表，让我们用最新的数据加以解释：1984年报告的税前承保损失为4，540万，其中2，760万为1984年度我们估计将会发生的损失，加上1983年度1，780万新增加的损失修正数字。
As you can see from reviewing the table, my errors in reporting to you have been substantial and recently have always presented a better underwriting picture than was truly the case. This is a source of particular chagrin to me because: (1) I like for you to be able to count on what I say; (2) our insurance managers and I undoubtedly acted with less urgency than we would have had we understood the full extent of our losses; and (3) we paid income taxes calculated on overstated earnings and thereby gave the government money that we didn’t need to. (These overpayments eventually correct themselves, but the delay is long and we don’t receive interest on the amounts we overpaid.)
正如上表你所看到的，我跟各位报告的数字与实际所发生的数字有很大的出入，而且这几年的报告的数字比实际的要好，这让我觉得非常地懊恼，因为(1)我一向希望你能相信我说过的话，(2)毫无疑问我和保险经理人若早点发现估计不足造成承保损失的严重性一定会及时采取行动，(3)我们低估损失夸大了收入，相当于多缴了本来不应该付的税金。虽然这些税金早晚会修正回来，只是时间拉得越长，我们损失的利息就越多。
Because our business is weighted toward casualty and reinsurance lines, we have more problems in estimating loss costs than companies that specialize in property insurance. (When a building that you have insured burns down, you get a much faster fix on your costs than you do when an employer you have insured finds out that one of his retirees has contracted a disease attributable to work he did decades earlier.) But I still find our errors embarrassing. In our direct business, we have far underestimated the mushrooming tendency of juries and courts to make the “deep pocket” pay, regardless of the factual situation and the past precedents for establishment of liability. We also have underestimated the contagious effect that publicity regarding giant awards has on juries. In the reinsurance area, where we have had our worst experience in under reserving, our customer insurance companies have made the same mistakes. Since we set reserves based on information they supply us, their mistakes have become our mistakes.
由于我们业务的侧重于意外险与再保险业务，比起专注财产保险的公司，我们在估计损失成本上存在更多问题。当你承保的一栋建筑物烧毁了，你可以很快地在损失成本上作反应，而如果向你投保的雇主发现他一名退休的员工，在几十年前因工作关系感染某种疾病，你反应则繁琐很多。即便如此，但我仍然觉得我们的错误令人尴尬。在直接承保部分，我们大大低估了法院及陪审团不顾事实真相与过去判例对损害赔偿的认定，而要求我们这些所谓深口袋付钱的群起效应(deep pocket即口袋深有大钱的金主儿)，我们也低估了一般大众对于受伤者应获得巨额补偿对陪审团的传染效应。在再保险部分，我们提列准备金不足方面有最糟糕的经验，向我们寻求再保的保险公司也犯了相同的错误，由于我们提列储备是依据对方提供的资料，他们的错误就变成了我们的错误。
I heard a story recently that is applicable to our insurance accounting problems: a man was traveling abroad when he received a call from his sister informing him that their father had died unexpectedly. It was physically impossible for the brother to get back home for the funeral, but he told his sister to take care of the funeral arrangements and to send the bill to him. After returning home he received a bill for several thousand dollars, which he promptly paid. The following month another bill came along for $15, and he paid that too. Another month followed, with a similar bill. When, in the next month, a third bill for $15 was presented, he called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh”, she said. “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”
最近我听到的一则故事可以用来说明我们保险会计问题，一个人海外旅行期间接到姐姐电话，父亲因意外去世了，由于一时无法赶回国内参加丧礼，他便交待姐姐处理一切丧葬事宜并允诺负责所有费用。当他回国后不久，收到一张几千美金的帐单，他立即就付了钱。接下来一个月又收到一张15美元的帐单，他也付了钱。又过一个月又收到类似的帐单，当第三张15美元账单出现时，他终于忍不住打电话问出了什么事，电话那头表示："噢！ 我忘了告诉你。我用租来的衣服埋葬了爸爸。"
If you’ve been in the insurance business in recent years - particularly the reinsurance business - this story hurts. We have tried to include all of our “rented suit” liabilities in our current financial statement, but our record of past error should make us humble, and you suspicious. I will continue to report to you the errors, plus or minus, that surface each year.
如果近几年你是从事保险业务，尤其是再保险业务的话，这段故事可能会让你很心痛。尽管我们已尽可能在当期的财务报表上包含所有类似「西装租金式」的负债，但过去几年的报表却令我们感到汗颜，也足以让各位的起疑，以后年报中我将持续跟你们报告每年出现的错误，不论是有利或是不利的。
Not all reserving errors in the industry have been of the innocent-but-dumb variety. With underwriting results as bad as they have been in recent years - and with managements having as much discretion as they do in the presentation of financial statements - some unattractive aspects of human nature have manifested themselves. Companies that would be out of business if they realistically appraised their loss costs have, in some cases, simply preferred to take an extraordinarily optimistic view about these yet-to-be-paid sums. Others have engaged in various transactions to hide true current loss costs.
当然不是所有愚蠢的准备金不当的错误都是无心之过，随着承保绩效持续恶化，管理层在损失准备提列乃至于财务报表表达上有很大的自由裁量权，所以人性黑暗的一面便彰显出来，有些公司若真正认真去评估其可能发生的损失成本的话，那些即将倒闭的公司不得不对这些尚未支付的潜在赔偿持非常乐观的看法。其他有些则从事一些可以将损失暂时隐藏起来的交易行为。
Both of these approaches can “work” for a considerable time: external auditors cannot effectively police the financial statements of property/casualty insurers. If liabilities of an insurer, correctly stated, would exceed assets, it falls to the insurer to volunteer this morbid information. In other words, the corpse is supposed to file the death certificate. Under this “honor system” of mortality, the corpse sometimes gives itself the benefit of the doubt.
这两种方法都可以在相当长的时间内发挥作用：外部独立的审计师也很难有效地对这类行为加以规范制止，当一家保险公司的负债实际上大于资产时，通常公司自己应该宣告破产，在这种羞于破产的制度下，尸体本身通常会一再给自己翻案复活的机会。
In most businesses, of course, insolvent companies run out of cash. Insurance is different: you can be broke but flush. Since cash comes in at the inception of an insurance policy and losses are paid much later, insolvent insurers don’t run out of cash until long after they have run out of net worth. In fact, these “walking dead” often redouble their efforts to write business, accepting almost any price or risk, simply to keep the cash flowing in. With an attitude like that of an embezzler who has gambled away his purloined funds, these companies hope that somehow they can get lucky on the next batch of business and thereby cover up earlier shortfalls. Even if they don’t get lucky, the penalty to managers is usually no greater for a $100 million shortfall than one of $10 million; in the meantime, while the losses mount, the managers keep their jobs and perquisites.
当然，在大多数企业中，资不抵债的公司会耗尽现金。但保险公司的情况却非如此，虽已破产但还手握重金。因为保费是从保户一开始投保时便收到，但理赔款却是在损失发生之后许久才须支付，所以一家保险公司可能要在耗尽净值之后许久才会真正耗完现金。而事实上这些所谓行尸走肉，通常会铤而走险，卯尽全力不计成本来吸收保单，只为现金持续流入，这些公司的态度就好象一个挪用公款的人把偷来的资金输掉了一样，期望下一次能够幸运的捞回本钱以弥补以前的亏空。即使他们不走运亏损持续扩大，反正亏一亿跟亏一千万对管理层的惩罚差别不大，但管理层却能继续保有原来的职位与待遇。
The loss-reserving errors of other property/casualty companies are of more than academic interest to Berkshire. Not only does Berkshire suffer from sell-at-any-price competition by the “walking dead”, but we also suffer when their insolvency is finally acknowledged. Through various state guarantee funds that levy assessments, Berkshire ends up paying a portion of the insolvent insurers’ asset deficiencies, swollen as they usually are by the delayed detection that results from wrong reporting. There is even some potential for cascading trouble. The insolvency of a few large insurers and the assessments by state guarantee funds that would follow could imperil weak-but-previously-solvent insurers. Such dangers can be mitigated if state regulators become better at prompt identification and termination of insolvent insurers, but progress on that front has been slow.
伯克希尔对其他财产/意外险公司的损失准备金错误的关注超过了学术界的兴趣。我们不但身受那些活死人不惜一切代价的竞争之痛，当他们真的倒闭时，我们也要跟着倒霉，因为许多州政府设立的偿债基金系依照保险业经营状况来征收，伯克希尔最后被迫要来分担这些损失的一部分，且由于这些错误通常要很晚才会发现，事件会远比想象中严重，甚至产生连锁效应，那些原本体质较弱但不致倒闭的小公司可能因几家大型保险公司的破产而殃及倒闭，最后如滚雪球一般，一发不可收拾。如果监管当局能对那些烂公司迅速识别并强制破产，则可以减轻此类危险，但目前这方面进展缓慢。
From October, 1983 through June, 1984 Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries continuously purchased large quantities of bonds of Projects 1, 2, and 3 of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”). This is the same entity that, on July 1, 1983, defaulted on $2.2 billion of bonds issued to finance partial construction of the now-abandoned Projects 4 and 5. While there are material differences in the obligors, promises, and properties underlying the two categories of bonds, the problems of Projects 4 and 5 have cast a major cloud over Projects 1, 2, and 3, and might possibly cause serious problems for the latter issues. In addition, there have been a multitude of problems related directly to Projects 1, 2, and 3 that could weaken or destroy an otherwise strong credit position arising from guarantees by Bonneville Power Administration.
1983年10月至1984年6月，伯克希尔的保险子公司持续买进大笔的华盛顿公用供电系统的一、二、三期债券，1983年7月1日，WPPSS用以兴建四、五期电厂(现已放弃)而发行的22亿美元债券违约。虽然这两类债券在义务人、承诺事项与抵押担保品上有极大不同，但四、五期项目的问题给一、二、三期债券蒙上一层阴影，且有可能对后续发行债券产生重大影响。此外一、二、三期本身还存在的一些问题也可能摧毁Bonneville电力管理局担保产生的信用基础。
Despite these important negatives, Charlie and I judged the risks at the time we purchased the bonds and at the prices Berkshire paid (much lower than present prices) to be considerably more than compensated for by prospects of profit.
尽管有这些负面因素，但查理跟我判断，以我们买进时所承担的风险与当初购买的价格(已远低于当前价格)相比，其预期报酬远远超过所要承担的风险。
As you know, we buy marketable stocks for our insurance companies based upon the criteria we would apply in the purchase of an entire business. This business-valuation approach is not widespread among professional money managers and is scorned by many academics. Nevertheless, it has served its followers well (to which the academics seem to say, “Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory.”) Simply put, we feel that if we can buy small pieces of businesses with satisfactory underlying economics at a fraction of the per-share value of the entire business, something good is likely to happen to us - particularly if we own a group of such securities.
如你所知，我们为保险子公司买进上市公司股票的标准与我们买下整家企业的标准并无二致，然而这种企业评价模式并未广为基金经理人所应用，甚至受到许多学者的蔑视，尽管如此，对于那些追随者来说却颇为受用，对此有些学者会说：嗯，在实践中可能没问题，但理论上永远行不通。简而言之，若我们能以合理的价格买到优质企业的一小部分经济利益，特别是拥有一个这样的投资组合的话，对我们来说就是一件美妙的事。
We extend this business-valuation approach even to bond purchases such as WPPSS. We compare the $139 million cost of our yearend investment in WPPSS to a similar $139 million investment in an operating business. In the case of WPPSS, the “business” contractually earns $22.7 million after tax (via the interest paid on the bonds), and those earnings are available to us currently in cash. We are unable to buy operating businesses with economics close to these. Only a relatively few businesses earn the 16.3% after tax on unleveraged capital that our WPPSS investment does and those businesses, when available for purchase, sell at large premiums to that capital. In the average negotiated business transaction, unleveraged corporate earnings of $22.7 million after-tax (equivalent to about $45 million pre-tax) might command a price of $250 - $300 million (or sometimes far more). For a business we understand well and strongly like, we will gladly pay that much. But it is double the price we paid to realize the same earnings from WPPSS bonds.
而我们甚至把这种企业评价模式延伸至债券投资之上，比如WPPSS，我们对WPPSS的1.39 亿美元投资成本与同样金额的股权投资进行了比较，前者可产生2270万美元的税后收益(通过支付债券利息)，且都是现金，只有少数企业每年可赚得16.3%的非杠杆的税后资本回报率，就算有，其股票价格也高得吓人。对一般并购交易来说，一家无财务杠杆每年可赚得2270万的税后收益(相当于税前约4500万)的公司，大约要价2.5-3亿美元甚至更高。当然对于我们了解且特别偏爱的公司很乐意支付这么多，但那毕竟是我们购买WPPSS价钱的两倍。
However, in the case of WPPSS, there is what we view to be a very slight risk that the “business” could be worth nothing within a year or two. There also is the risk that interest payments might be interrupted for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the most that the “business” could be worth is about the $205 million face value of the bonds that we own, an amount only 48% higher than the price we paid.
就WPPSS而言，我们认为存在非常轻微的潜在风险，即公司在一两年内可能一文不值，同时利息还可能中断暂时付不出。但业务最大的价值是我们拥有的债券面值是2.05亿美元，仅比我们持有成本高出48%。
This ceiling on upside potential is an important minus. It should be realized, however, that the great majority of operating businesses have a limited upside potential also unless more capital is continuously invested in them. That is so because most businesses are unable to significantly improve their average returns on equity - even under inflationary conditions, though these were once thought to automatically raise returns.
获利空间的上限不大是债券投资的一大负面因素，但各位必须了解，大部分的经营性企业，除非持续投入更多资金，否则他们的获利潜力也是有限的，这是因为大部分的企业无法有效地提高其股本回报率，即使在通胀条件下也是如此，尽管这曾被认为会自动提高回报率。
(Let’s push our bond-as-a-business example one notch further: if you elect to “retain” the annual earnings of a 12% bond by using the proceeds from coupons to buy more bonds, earnings of that bond “business” will grow at a rate comparable to that of most operating businesses that similarly reinvest all earnings. In the first instance, a 30-year, zero-coupon, 12% bond purchased today for $10 million will be worth $300 million in 2015. In the second, a $10 million business that regularly earns 12% on equity and retains all earnings to grow, will also end up with $300 million of capital in 2015. Both the business and the bond will earn over $32 million in the final year.)
让我们对债券当作企业投资的个案作进一步说明，若你选择通过将息票收益买入更多12%报酬的债券，那么，该债券业务的收益增长率与大多数保留收益用于再投资的企业一样。就前者而言，如果今天以1000万买入30年期、0息票、票面利率为12%的债券，则2015年价值约3亿美元。而后者，若你同样投资1000万、资本回报率为12%、且保留所有收益用以实现增长的企业，2015 年也将最终获得 3 亿美元的资本。该企业和债券在最后一年的收益都将超过3200万美元。
Our approach to bond investment - treating it as an unusual sort of “business” with special advantages and disadvantages - may strike you as a bit quirky. However, we believe that many staggering errors by investors could have been avoided if they had viewed bond investment with a businessman’s perspective. For example, in 1946, 20-year AAA tax-exempt bonds traded at slightly below a 1% yield. In effect, the buyer of those bonds at that time bought a “business” that earned about 1% on “book value” (and that, moreover, could never earn a dime more than 1% on book), and paid 100 cents on the dollar for that abominable business.
换句话说，我们投资债券就好象把它当成一种特殊的企业投资，它具备有利的因素，也有不利的因素，然而我们认为，如果投资者从商人的角度看待债券投资，他们的许多惊人错误是可以避免的。例如，在1946年，20年期AAA级的免税债券以不到1%的收益率交易，事实上买进这些债券的投资人相当于是投资一家资本回报率不足1%的企业，而且，为账面价值回报率ROE永远超不过1%的生意支付了100%的账面价值。
If an investor had been business-minded enough to think in those terms - and that was the precise reality of the bargain struck - he would have laughed at the proposition and walked away. For, at the same time, businesses with excellent future prospects could have been bought at, or close to, book value while earning 10%, 12%, or 15% after tax on book. Probably no business in America changed hands in 1946 at book value that the buyer believed lacked the ability to earn more than 1% on book. But investors with bond-buying habits eagerly made economic commitments throughout the year on just that basis. Similar, although less extreme, conditions prevailed for the next two decades as bond investors happily signed up for twenty or thirty years on terms outrageously inadequate by business standards. (In what I think is by far the best book on investing ever written - “The Intelligent Investor”, by Ben Graham - the last section of the last chapter begins with, “Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” This section is called “A Final Word”, and it is appropriately titled.)
若这些投资人有一点商业头脑，面对这样的投资条件，他一定会大笑地摇头走开。因为与此同时，大量具有大好前景且每年可赚得税后10%、12%甚至15%的公司，却可能以接近帐面价值的价格买到。1946年，美国可能没有一家公司以帐面价值过手，因为买家认为该账面价值没有能力赚取超过1%的收益。但是，整个1946年，这些习惯买卖债券的投资人，都以这样的基准进行着债券的买卖。类似的在接下来的20 年里，虽然情况没有当初那么夸张，债券投资人能持续地以从商业角度来看完全不合理的条件，买下长达20-30年期的债券。（在我认为是迄今为止写的最好的一本关于投资的书——Ben Graham写的《聪明的投资者》，书中最后一章的最后一节说到，最聪明的投资是从商业的角度来看待投资，本节标题是"最后的话"，非常恰当。）
We will emphasize again that there is unquestionably some risk in the WPPSS commitment. It is also the sort of risk that is difficult to evaluate. Were Charlie and I to deal with 50 similar evaluations over a lifetime, we would expect our judgment to prove reasonably satisfactory. But we do not get the chance to make 50 or even 5 such decisions in a single year. Even though our long-term results may turn out fine, in any given year we run a risk that we will look extraordinarily foolish. (That’s why all of these sentences say “Charlie and I”, or “we”.)
我们必须再次强调投资WPPSS无疑是具有一定风险的，且很难对风险加以具体评估，如果查理和我一生要处理50次类似的评估，我们希望我们的判断能够被证明是令人满意的。但我们根本没有机会在一年内做出50次甚至5次这样的决定。虽然长期累积下来的成绩应该会不错，但在任何一年中，我们都会冒着看起来非常愚蠢的风险。（那也是为什么前面所有的句子开头是查理跟我或是我们的原因。）
Most managers have very little incentive to make the intelligent-but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot decision. Their personal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if an unconventional decision works out well, they get a pat on the back and, if it works out poorly, they get a pink slip. (Failing conventionally is the route to go; as a group, lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad press.)
大多数管理层几乎没有动力做出明智但有可能看起来像白痴的决定。他们个人的得失利弊太明确不过了：如果一个非常规的决定成功了，上头可能只是表扬一下，但万一要是失败，却可能是要卷铺盖走人。特立独行的失败不被接纳，因循守旧的失败就是一条可行之路。（就整个群体而言，旅鼠的形象可能很糟，但群体中却没有一只单独的旅鼠会受到责难。）
Our equation is different. With 47% of Berkshire’s stock, Charlie and I don’t worry about being fired, and we receive our rewards as owners, not managers. Thus we behave with Berkshire’s money as we would with our own. That frequently leads us to unconventional behavior both in investments and general business management.
但我们的方式不同，拥有伯克希尔47%的股份，查理跟我不怕被炒鱿鱼，我们是以老板而非伙计的身份来获得报酬，所以我们把伯克希尔的钱当作自己的钱一样看待，这常常使得我们在投资行为与管理风格上异于常规。
We remain unconventional in the degree to which we concentrate the investments of our insurance companies, including those in WPPSS bonds. This concentration makes sense only because our insurance business is conducted from a position of exceptional financial strength. For almost all other insurers, a comparable degree of concentration (or anything close to it) would be totally inappropriate. Their capital positions are not strong enough to withstand a big error, no matter how attractive an investment opportunity might appear when analyzed on the basis of probabilities.
我们不默守成规的作法还表现在保险资金集中投资的程度上，包括WPPSS债券投资，而这种专注集中是有道理的，这是基于我们具备特别雄厚的财务实力的基础上进行的。对其它保险公司来说，相同程度的集中持股可能是完全不合适的，因为它们的资金实力可能无法承受任何重大错误的发生，不管那个投资机会从概率的分析上是多么的吸引人。
With our financial strength we can own large blocks of a few securities that we have thought hard about and bought at attractive prices. (Billy Rose described the problem of over-diversification: “If you have a harem of forty women, you never get to know any of them very well.”) Over time our policy of concentration should produce superior results, though these will be tempered by our large size. When this policy produces a really bad year, as it must, at least you will know that our money was committed on the same basis as yours.
以我们的财务实力，那些我们经过深思熟虑的少数股票，我们可以以有吸引力的价格买下一大笔。Bill Rose这样描述过度多样化的问题：如果你的后宫有四十个女人，你永远都不会对她们中的任何一个非常了解(If you have a harem of forty women， you never get to know any of them very well)。随着时间的推移，我们集中持股的策略终会显现出它的优势，虽然多少会受到越来越大的规模拖累。即使将来某一年度业绩表现得特别糟，至少你会知道我们的钱和你的钱是基于同样的基础投入的。
We made the major part of our WPPSS investment at different prices and under somewhat different factual circumstances than exist at present. If we decide to change our position, we will not inform shareholders until long after the change has been completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and even a modest amount of added competition on either side can cost us a great deal of money. Our WPPSS purchases illustrate this principle. From October, 1983 through June, 1984, we attempted to buy almost all the bonds that we could of Projects 1, 2, and 3. Yet we purchased less than 3% of the bonds outstanding. Had we faced even a few additional well-heeled investors, stimulated to buy because they knew we were, we could have ended up with a materially smaller amount of bonds, purchased at a materially higher price. (A couple of coat-tail riders easily could have cost us $5 million.) For this reason, we will not comment about our activities in securities - neither to the press, nor shareholders, nor to anyone else - unless legally required to do so.
我们投资WPPSS大部分是在不同的价格和与目前实际情况有所不同的时点下进行的。若我们决定要调整仓位，可能要在变动完全结束后很久才会知会各位。在你阅读本年报时，我们也可能正在买入或卖出。由于股票的买卖是属于竞争激烈的零和游戏，哪怕是买卖的任何一方竞争稍有增加，都会使我们付出巨大的代价。我们投资的WPPSS债券可作为范例，从1983年10月到1984年6月间，我们试着买进所有第一、二、三期的债券，但我们买到的流通债券也只有3%。如果我们再碰到一个有钱的投资人，知道我们要大量买进而跟着进场，结果可能导致我们以更高的价格买到更少的债券，随便一个搭便车都可能让我们多花500万美金。基于这项理由，我们不会透露我们在股票市场上的活动，不论是对媒体还是对股东，甚至对任何人，除非法令上有特别要求。
One final observation regarding our WPPSS purchases: we dislike the purchase of most long-term bonds under most circumstances and have bought very few in recent years. That’s because bonds are as sound as a dollar - and we view the long-term outlook for dollars as dismal. We believe substantial inflation lies ahead, although we have no idea what the average rate will turn out to be. Furthermore, we think there is a small, but not insignificant, chance of runaway inflation.
最后我们对WPPSS债券的最后心得是：大部分情况下，我们不喜爱购买长期的债券。事实上近几年来也很少购买，那是因为债券就像美元一样稳固，而我们对于美元长期的前景看淡。我们认为未来会出现大幅通胀，尽管我们不知道平均利率会是多少。我们认为通胀失控的可能性虽然很小，但是影响不容小觑。
Such a possibility may seem absurd, considering the rate to which inflation has dropped. But we believe that present fiscal policy - featuring a huge deficit - is both extremely dangerous and difficult to reverse. (So far, most politicians in both parties have followed Charlie Brown’s advice: “No problem is so big that it can’t be run away from.”) Without a reversal, high rates of inflation may be delayed (perhaps for a long time), but will not be avoided. If high rates materialize, they bring with them the potential for a runaway upward spiral.
考量到目前通胀已经下降到不高的水平，这种可能性似乎是不可能的。我们认为以目前以巨额赤字为特征的财政政策相当危险且很难加以改善，到目前为止，两党的政治人物多听从Charlie Brown的建议："没有什么问题是无法加以控制的。"但若不能加以改善，通胀或许暂时会延迟，但却无法完全避免。高利率一旦成为现实，就会失控一样加快速度向上飙涨。
While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks (as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range, runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a small but unacceptable “wipe out” risk, and we require any purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely to be few and far between.
当通胀维持在5-10%之间，其实投资股票或债券并无太多分别，但失控的通胀可就完全是另外一回事了，在高利率时代，多元化的股票投资组合几乎肯定会遭受巨大的实际价值损失，未偿付债券却可能更惨，所以我们认为所有目前流通在外的债券组合事实上隐含着极大的风险，所以我们对于债券投资特别谨慎。只有当债券投资明显优于其他商业机会时，我们才会参与其中，而事实上这种情况少之又少。
Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A company will say something like, “Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI”. And that’s it - no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is, we believe managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.
一般公司都会跟股东报告股利政策，但通常不会详加解释。有的公司会说：我们的目标是发放40-50%的收益，同时以至少等于CPI上涨的速度增加股利。就是这样而已，没有任何分析解释为何这类的政策会对股东有利，然而资本配置对于企业与投资管理来说是至关重要，因此我们认为经理人与所有权人应该仔细考虑，在什么情况下应该保留收益，以及在什么情况下应该分配收益。
The first point to understand is that all earnings are not created equal. In many businesses particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios - inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion - let’s call these earnings “restricted” - cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.
首先要了解的是，并非所有的利润都是生而平等的。在许多企业尤其是那些资本密集型(资产/利润比例高)的公司，通胀往往使得报告收益变的虚无缥缈，这种「受限制的收益」(Restricted earnings)往往无法被当作真正的股利来发放，而必须加以保留再投资以维持原有的经济地位，如果勉强发放，将会使得公司在以下几方面失去竞争优势：维持原有销售规模的能力，维持其长期竞争优势，维持其原有财务实力。所以不论其股息率是如何保守，一家持续分配受限收益的公司注定面临淘汰，除非以其他方式不断融资。
Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company’s stock to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value. But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners. Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, “Dig We Must”.)
「受限制的收益」也并非毫无价值，但它们的折现值通常少得可怜。事实上不管它们可产生的经济效益有多差，企业离他又不行。这种不管前景多么不乐观一律保留的情况，在十年前由爱迪生联合电气公司(conEdison)，无意中以一种极具讽刺意味的方式传达出来。当时，一项惩罚性的监管政策使得公司的股价跌至帐面价值四分之一，即每一美元的保留收益用于再投资时，只会转化为25美分的市值。讽刺的是尽管这种黄金变成铅的现象一再发生，但大部分收益都被再投资于业务，而不是分红给股东。与此同时，公司在纽约的各个建筑工地上，标语自豪地宣告着公司口号"Dig We Must"(意指继续投资扩张)。
Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this dividend discussion. Let’s turn to the much-more-valued unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion, management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.
在这次股息讨论中对于受限制的收益就说到这，让我们将话题转到更有价值的不受限制的部分。所谓不受限制的收益亦即「自由盈余」是指，可以加以保留，也可以予以分配的部分。我们认为分配与否主要取决于管理层判断哪一种对公司股东更为有利。
This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders - to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect - backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future - that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners. This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.
当然这项原则并未广为大家所接受，基于某些理由管理层往往偏好将收益予以保留，以扩大个人统治的企业帝国，同时使公司的财务状况更为舒适。但对于股东来说，我们认为将收益保留只有一个合理的理由：公司所保留的每一美元收益至少应能创造一美元的市场价值。只有当企业有合理的前景时，才应保留不受限制的收益，最好有过去的历史成绩佐证，或是有对未来深思熟虑的分析。只有当保留的收益创造的增量收益高于一般股东自行运用所生的效益时，保留才是必要的。
To illustrate, let’s assume that an investor owns a risk-free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms; i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or-reinvest option. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest rate on long-term, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100 cents on the dollar. Under these circumstances, the investor wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that, he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest rates, not even those bondholders needing cash for living purposes.
为了说明这一点，假设有一位股东持有一种10%无风险永续债，这种债券有一个特点，那就是投资人每年有权可选择领取10%的债息或将此10%债息继续买进同类型的债券。例如，终身寿险和提供相同现金或再投资选择权的票据。假设其中有一年，长期无风险利率为是5%，则投资人应当不会笨到选择持有现金，而会将之继续买进同类型的10%债券，因为后者能够产生更高的价值。在这种情况下，想要获得现金的投资者应该将他的息票先转换成额外的债券，然后再立即出售。假设所有债券都由理性投资者持有，那么在利率为5%的时代，没有人会选择现金，即使是那些需要现金维持生活的债券持有人。
If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course - reinvestment of the coupon - would give an investor additional bonds with market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a large discount.
相反，若当时市场的利率是15%，没有理性的投资者希望以10%的利率去投资，投资者会直接选择现金，即使他根本不需要现金，因为息票再投资，其市场价值远低于他本可以选择的现金。如果他需要10%债券，他可以简单的用收到的现金去市场上购买，在那里可以以很大折扣买到。
An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a company’s unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out. Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are the likely outcome of reinvestment.
同样的道理也适用于股东思考公司的收益是否应该分配的问题之上，当然这时候的分析可能较为困难且容易出错，因为再投资的收益不像债券是白纸黑字的合同数字，而是一个波动数字。股东必须去判断，在可见的未来其平均的回报率是多少，而一旦数字能够确定下来的话，之后的分析就简单多了，若预期回报率高便可以再投资，反之则应要求加以分配自行安排投资。
Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to their parent company. At that level,. the managers have no trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions at the parent company level often are a different story. Here managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes of their shareholder-owners.
许多企业的经理人在确定子公司是否应该将收益分配给母公司时，会很理智地运用上述标准进行分析推理，在这个层面上，管理者可以毫不费力地像聪明的主人一样思考。但到了自己所掌管的母公司层面，可就完全是另外一回事了，他们很少会站在股东的立场为大家着想。
With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all available earnings in order that they may be invested in Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected to be 15%. The CEO’s business school oath will allow no lesser behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental capital is 5% - and market rates are 10% - he is likely to impose a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern. Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be retained in their operations rather than distributed to the parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.
通过这种类似精神分裂的方式，CEO一方面要求旗下每年只能产生5%回报率的子公司A分配所有收益，以便将其投资到每年可产生15%回报率的子公司B，这时他从不会忘记以前在商学院所学到的校训。但若他自己的增量资本的长期回报率只有5%，而市场上的平均回报率是10%时，他很可能会对母公司的股东实施股息政策，并依循公司历史上或者行业平均的股息率水平发放。此外，当他要求旗下子公司提出报告对其保留收益的比例作出解释的同时，他却从来不会想到，要对他母公司背后的股东作出任何类似的说明。
In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return (as was discussed in last year’s section on Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company’s overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incrementally invested in the core business. The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team’s best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.
在判断管理层是否应保留收益时，股东不应该只是单纯将过去几年的总增量收益和总增量资本作比较，因为这种比率会被核心业务的发展所扭曲，在高通胀的时代，某些具有特殊竞争力的核心业务能够运用少量的资金创造极高的回报率，如同去年我们商誉部分所述。除非他们正在经历销售规模的巨幅成长，否则一家好的企业定义上应该是指那些可以大量生产超额现金的公司。如果一家公司将大部分留存收益投入低回报的业务，那么该公司的留存资本的整体回报可能仍然很高，因为增量资本投资于核心业务的那一小部分会产生非凡的回报。这种情况类似于职业+业余配对的高尔夫球比赛，虽然大部分的业余选手的成绩一塌糊涂，但由于职业选手的高超表现，球队的最佳得分可能看起来还不错。
Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisitions of businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The managers at fault periodically report on the lessons they have learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.)
事实上，许多在股本和增量资本方面持续表现出良好回报的公司，把大部分的留存资金投在经济上缺乏竞争力甚至是灾难性的业务上。只是核心业务的持续增长掩盖了其他资本配置方面惨不忍睹的回报(这类资本配置通常是高价收购经济本质上平庸的企业)。而管理层也一再强调他们已从上一次并购失败中吸取了的教训，然后，马上物色下一次失败的机会。（这似乎是被失败冲昏了头脑。）
In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business, with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock (an action that increases the owners’ interest in the exceptional business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses). Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with low returns should be held to account for those allocation decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise is.
在这种情况下，如果留存收益只是为了扩大高回报业务，而剩余部分则用于分红或回购股票，股东的境况会好得多。回购是一种既可以增加股东权益，又可以避免公司乱花钱的好方法。高回报企业的管理层，如果一直将企业的大部分超额现金投向其他低回报的业务，都应该对这些烂分配决策负责，而不管企业整体利润有多高。
Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate outlook changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been unwisely retained.
以上的讨论，并不是证明公司的股利要随着每季收益或投资机会的波动而跟着变来变去。上市公司的股东一般偏好公司有一贯稳定的股利政策，因此，股利的发放应该要能够反应公司增量资本长期的收益预期。因为公司的长期前景通常变化不大，股利政策也应该如此。长期而言，被管理层拒绝分配的保留收益应该产生合理的回报，若一旦发现留存收益是错的，那么同样也表示现有管理层留下来也是错的。
Let’s now turn to Berkshire Hathaway and examine how these dividend principles apply to it. Historically, Berkshire has earned well over market rates on retained earnings, thereby creating over one dollar of market value for every dollar retained. Under such circumstances, any distribution would have been contrary to the financial interest of shareholders, large or small.
现在让我们回过头来检视一下伯克希尔的股利政策，看看这些股息原则如何适用于它。从历史上看，伯克希尔的留存收益的回报率远高于市场的平均回报率，即每一美元收益创造远大于一美元的市场价值。在这种情况下，任何发放股利的动作可能都不利于所有伯克希尔的大小股东。
In fact, significant distributions in the early years might have been disastrous, as a review of our starting position will show you. Charlie and I then controlled and managed three companies, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., and Blue Chip Stamps (all now merged into our present operation). Blue Chip paid only a small dividend, Berkshire and DRC paid nothing. If, instead, the companies had paid out their entire earnings, we almost certainly would have no earnings at all now - and perhaps no capital as well. The three companies each originally made their money from a single business: (1) textiles at Berkshire; (2) department stores at Diversified; and (3) trading stamps at Blue Chip. These cornerstone businesses (carefully chosen, it should be noted, by your Chairman and Vice Chairman) have, respectively, (1) survived but earned almost nothing, (2) shriveled in size while incurring large losses, and (3) shrunk in sales volume to about 5% its size at the time of our entry. (Who says “you can’t lose ‘em all”?) Only by committing available funds to much better businesses were we able to overcome these origins. (It’s been like overcoming a misspent youth.) Clearly, diversification has served us well.
事实上，公司在初期阶段发放大量的现金股利可能是灾难性的。回顾我们刚开始经营伯克希尔就能发现这一点，当时查理跟我掌控三家企业：伯克希尔、多元零售和蓝筹印花(现在已合并为一家公司)，蓝筹印花公司只发放少量股利而其余两家皆未发放，相反的若当时我们把所赚的钱统统发掉，我们现在可能赚不到什么钱，甚至连一点资本也没有了。这三家公司当初各自靠一个业务赚钱的：(1)伯克希尔的纺织，(2)多元零售的百货，(3)蓝筹印花的印花票生意。要知道这些基础事业是我跟查理精心挑选的，目前：(1)纺织业务幸存下来但根本没赚到钱，(2)零售业务规模萎缩亏损巨大，(3)印花销售大幅缩水，只剩当初买入时5%。谁说你不会失去所有？所以只有将资金投入到更好的业务，我们才能克服先天上的劣势，这就像补救一个错失的青春。显然多元化对我们很有助益。
We expect to continue to diversify while also supporting the growth of current operations though, as we’ve pointed out, our returns from these efforts will surely be below our historical returns. But as long as prospective returns are above the rate required to produce a dollar of market value per dollar retained, we will continue to retain all earnings. Should our estimate of future returns fall below that point, we will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe can not be effectively used. In making that judgment, we will look at both our historical record and our prospects. Because our year-to-year results are inherently volatile, we believe a five-year rolling average to be appropriate for judging the historical record.
我们预计将继续多元化并支持现有业务的成长，但正如我们所指出的那样，这些努力获得的回报肯定会低于我们的历史记录。但只要预期保留的每一美元收益能产生超过一美元市场价值，我们将继续保留所有收益。而一旦我们评估保留的收益无法达到前述的标准，我们一定会把所有多余的钱发还给股东、在作出判断前，我们将审视过去的记录与未来的前景，由于单一年度的变化颇大，我们认为五年滚动平均值适合来作判断。
Our present plan is to use our retained earnings to further build the capital of our insurance companies. Most of our competitors are in weakened financial condition and reluctant to expand substantially. Yet large premium-volume gains for the industry are imminent, amounting probably to well over $15 billion in 1985 versus less than $5 billion in 1983. These circumstances could produce major amounts of profitable business for us. Of course, this result is no sure thing, but prospects for it are far better than they have been for many years.
我们目前的计划是用保留收益来继续扩充保险业务，我们大部分的竞争对手财务状况过于糟糕而不愿大幅的扩张，然而此刻正值行业保费大幅成长之际，比起1983年的50亿，预计1985年将增长至150亿美元，这正是我们大幅扩张的难得良机，当然结果是不确定的，但前景比过去好的多。
This is the spot where each year I run my small “business wanted” ad. In 1984 John Loomis, one of our particularly knowledgeable and alert shareholders, came up with a company that met all of our tests. We immediately pursued this idea, and only a chance complication prevented a deal. Since our ad is pulling, we will repeat it in precisely last year’s form:
每年我都在这里发布我的"商业通缉令"小广告，去年John Loomis(我们一位知识渊博且机敏的股东)找到一家完全符合我们标准的公司，我们马上采取行动，可惜最后因为一项偶然且复杂的问题而功亏一篑。以下是跟去年一模一样的广告：
We prefer:
我们对具以下条件的公司有兴趣：
(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到500万美元；
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),
(2) 表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣；
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE；
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(4) 公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理；
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(5) 简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知；
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行恶意并购。我们承诺完全保密，并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向现金交易，但若公司内在价值跟我们付出的一致时也会考虑发行股份。我们欢迎潜在卖家通过联系过去与我们有业务往来的人来了解我们，对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们会提供一个好的归宿。
A record 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1984 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through this program were $3,179,000, and 1,519 charities were recipients. Our proxy material for the annual meeting will allow you to cast an advisory vote expressing your views about this program - whether you think we should continue it and, if so, at what per-share level. (You may be interested to learn that we were unable to find a precedent for an advisory vote in which management seeks the opinions of shareholders about owner-related corporate policies. Managers who put their trust in capitalism seem in no hurry to put their trust in capitalists.)
今年破记录的有97.2%的有效股权参与1984年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约3，179，000美元捐出的款项分配给1，519家慈善机构，股东会的资料包含一个可以让你表达对这项计划的意见，例如是否继续、每一股应捐赠多少等等。你可能会有兴趣知道事实上在此之前从未有一家公司是以股东的立场来决定公司捐款的去向，经理人在信任资本主义的同时，好象不太相信资本家。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 60 and 61. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street” name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1985 will be ineligible for the 1985 program.
我们建议新股东赶快阅读相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。未在 1985年9月30日前登记的股份将没有资格参加1985年的捐赠计划。
Our annual meeting will be on May 21, 1985 in Omaha, and I hope that you attend. Many annual meetings are a waste of time, both for shareholders and for management. Sometimes that is true because management is reluctant to open up on matters of business substance. More often a nonproductive session is the fault of shareholder participants who are more concerned about their own moment on stage than they are about the affairs of the corporation. What should be a forum for business discussion becomes a forum for theatrics, spleen-venting and advocacy of issues. (The deal is irresistible: for the price of one share you get to tell a captive audience your ideas as to how the world should be run.) Under such circumstances, the quality of the meeting often deteriorates from year to year as the antics of those interested in themselves discourage attendance by those interested in the business.
伯克希尔的股东年会预计于1985年5月21日在奥马哈举行，我希望各位届时都能参加。许多年会对于股东和管理层来说都是浪费时间，有时是因为管理层不愿公开深入讨论公司的实质问题，有时通常是因为一些股东只顾自己出风头而不是真正关心公司的事务，本来应该是经营业务的讨论会最后往往变成了演戏、发泄、宣传问题的闹场。这是件再划算不过的主意，只要买进一股，你就可以将你对世界应该如何运作的想法高谈阔论的告诉被俘虏的观众，最后往往是劣币驱逐良币，使得真正关心公司的股东避而远之，剩下一堆爱现的小丑。
Berkshire’s meetings are a different story. The number of shareholders attending grows a bit each year and we have yet to experience a silly question or an ego-inspired commentary. Instead, we get a wide variety of thoughtful questions about the business. Because the annual meeting is the time and place for these, Charlie and I are happy to answer them all, no matter how long it takes. (We cannot, however, respond to written or phoned questions at other times of the year; one-person-at-a time reporting is a poor use of management time in a company with 3000 shareholders.) The only business matters that are off limits at the annual meeting are those about which candor might cost our company real money. Our activities in securities would be the main example.
伯克希尔的股东年会是另一码事，虽然与会的股东一年比一年多，但至今我们却很少遇到什么蠢问题或是以自我为中心的言论。相反的，大家提出的都是一些有见地的商业问题，正因为大家开会的目的便在于此，因此不管要花多少时间我跟查理都很乐意为大家解答这类的问题。然而很抱歉，我们无法在其它的时候用书面或电话回答问题，因为以一家拥有3000名股东的公司，若一一回答的话实在是太没有效率了。而我们惟一无法回答的商业问题是那些坦率回答可能会让我们公司付出实际代价的事情，比如我们在股票市场上的进出。
We always have bragged a bit on these pages about the quality of our shareholder-partners. Come to the annual meeting and you will see why. Out-of-towners should schedule a stop at Nebraska Furniture Mart. If you make some purchases, you’ll save far more than enough to pay for your trip, and you’ll enjoy the experience.
最后我通常要花一点时间来吹嘘我们子公司的管理层有多好。欢迎来参加年会，你就晓得为什么了，外地来的可以考虑到内布拉斯加家具店逛逛，若你决定买些东西，你会发现你所省下的钱足够支付你这趟的旅费，相信你一定会觉得不虚此行的。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事长
February 25, 1985
1985年2月25日
Subsequent Event: On March 18, a week after copy for this report went to the typographer but shortly before production, we agreed to purchase three million shares of Capital Cities Communications, Inc. at $172.50 per share. Our purchase is contingent upon the acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. by Capital Cities, and will close when that transaction closes. At the earliest, that will be very late in 1985. Our admiration for the management of Capital Cities, led by Tom Murphy and Dan Burke, has been expressed several times in previous annual reports. Quite simply, they are tops in both ability and integrity. We will have more to say about this investment in next year’s report.
后续事项：3月18日，在报告付梓的一周之后，我们协议以每股172.5美金买进300万股大都会广播公司的股份Capital Cities Communications， Inc.，前提条件是大都会必须要能够成功并购ABC美国广播公司American Broadcasting Companies， Inc.，否则合约无效，但这最早也要到1985年底完成。在过去几年中我们多次表达对由汤姆·墨菲(Tom Murphy)和丹·柏克(Dan Burke)领导的大都会管理层表示钦佩，原因很简单，因为他们不管在个人能力还是人格魅力方面，皆是一流之选，明年的年报我将会详加说明这项投资案的始末。
Footnotes
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By Yoan @20230930
原文：Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable quarterly report and in this section of the annual report. Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection, concurred with our dividend presentation.
肖良版：由于它很重要且常见，所以在去年季报与年报中我们特别加以说明，此外，我们向我们的会计师事务所 Peat、Marwick、Mitchell & Co 解释了交易，他们无异议地同意我们的股息说明。
张志雄版：但由于这种情况并不常见且金额又不小，所以在去年季报与年报中我们特别加以分别列示，并且经过了我们的本地签证会计师认可同意。
unusual 意为不常见；综合两版的翻译，修改为：由于这笔交易很重要且并不常见，所以在去年季报与年报中我们特别加以说明，并且经过了我们的本地签证会计师认可同意。 ↩ ↩2
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By Yoan @20230930
原文：Previous recipients of honorary degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary, then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and, most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)
肖良版：纽约大学之前获颁商业荣誉学位殊荣的有：埃克森石油总裁Clifton Garvin、花旗银行总裁Walter Wriston、IBM总裁Frank Cary、通用汽车总裁Thomas Murphy、美联储主席Paul Volcker。
参照张志雄版，修改为：此前获颁这项殊荣的有埃克森石油总裁Clifton Garvin、花旗银行总裁Walter Wriston、IBM总裁Frank Cary、通用汽车总裁Thomas Murphy、美联储主席Paul Volcker等杰出企业人士。 ↩ ↩2
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By Yoan @20230930
原文： The younger generation has attended the best business school of them all - that conducted by Mrs. B and Louie - and their training is evident in their performance.
肖良版：年轻一代就读于他们中最好的商学院，由B夫人和Louie教授，他们的训练从他们的表现中可见一斑。
参照Deepl，略微调整语序，修改为：从他们的业绩中可以看出，年轻一代就读于由B夫人和Louie教授的最好的商学院。 ↩ ↩2
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By Yoan @20230930
原文：We also earn significant sums in the Easter and Valentine’s Day periods, but pretty much tread water the rest of the year.
肖良版：此外复活节与情人节期间的业绩也特别好，但剩下的时间里几乎都是踩水。
参照剑桥词典的释义，将踩水换为中文语境下同一意思的表达：不尽如人意。修改为：此外复活节与情人节期间的业绩也特别好，但剩下的时间就不尽如人意了。 ↩ ↩2
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By 纪璐 @20240108
原文：That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact.
共读版：但是这种令人舒服的理论却被无法令人舒服的事实打破
修改为：这个舒适的理论在一个不舒服的事实面前显得苍白无力 ↩
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By Ponge @20240120
原文：本段重译
共读版：一旦主宰当地市场，报纸本身而非市场将会决定这份报纸是好还是坏，不管好坏，都将大发横财。但在一般行业却不是这样，劣质品质的产品它的生意一定很差。但即使是一份内容差劲的报纸对一般民众来说也是便宜货，因为它仍具有布告栏的价值。在其他条件相同的情况下，差劲报纸不会触达顶流报纸所能触达的读者层次。然而，对大多数普通人来说，劣质产品仍是有需求的，而吸引他们的产品也将吸引相应广告商的注意力。
修改为：一旦某一家报纸媒体在某个地区占据了市场主导地位，内容质量是高是低就要全凭自觉了，市场对此毫无办法。无论内容质量是高是低，这家报纸都能卖出去。大多数生意却并非如此：一般来说，更差的产品质量往往带来更差的经济回报。一份质量很差的报纸对大多数市民来说还是很划算的，之所以会这样，仅仅是因为报纸自身具备的「布告栏」价值。在其他条件相同的情况下，内容质量较差的报纸其读者水平无法媲美一流报纸。但是，对大多数市民来说，哪怕报纸质量较差，这份报纸对他们来说依然是必不可少的。一份能够吸引大多数市民注意力的报纸，自然也会吸引广告商的注意力。 ↩