原文信息：
- 标题：1986 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1987-02-27
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：when breath becomes air
- 校译：
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or 26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually.Both the numerator and denominator are important in the per-share book value calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased less than 1%.
本公司1986年的账面价值增加了4.925亿美元，或增长了26.1%(标普18.6%)，自现任管理层接手的22年以来，每股账面价值由19.46美元增长到现在的2,073.06美元，年复合增长率为23.3%。在计算每股帐面价值时，分子与分母都很重要，过去22年公司帐面价值虽然增加106倍，但流通股却增加不到1%。
In past reports I have noted that book value at most companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however, book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.
在过去的年报中我多次提醒，大多数公司的帐面价值与其实际的内在价值存在极大的差异，内在价值对股东来说非常重要，在我们自身案例中，过去十多年来帐面价值可以作为内在价值一个合理偏保守的指标。也就是说伯克希尔的内在价值略微超越其帐面价值，两者之间的比率非常稳定。
The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say "probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments more than 10% apart.
好消息是，在1986年我们内在价值的增长可能超过帐面价值增长，我说"可能"是因为内在价值的判断较为模糊，就我们自己来说，两个同样完全了解本公司的人给出的估值可能会相差10%以上。
A large measure of our improvement in business value relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers - the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was substantial.
我们内在价值的增长要归功于旗下经理人的出色表现，他们是：家具业务的Blumkins家族，保险业务的Mike Goldberg，制服业务的Heldmans家族，糖果业务的Chuck Huggins，报纸业务的Stan Lipsey与制造业务的Ralph Schey等人，除了保险业外，这些企业在几乎没有新增资本投入的情况下，稳定地提高了公司的现金产出能力，这就是典型的经济价值商誉，虽然在我们资产负债表或每股账面价值里找不出来，但在1986年这一未被记录的收益却极为显著。
So much for the good news. The bad news is that my performance did not match that of our managers. While they were doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated.
讲完了好消息，接下来的坏消息是本人的表现与这些优秀的经理人不相匹配，当他们在各自的岗位上奋力生产现金，可是我却没能好好有效地利用。
Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult. Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing.
查理·芒格跟我平时主要只有两项工作，一个是吸引并留住优秀的经理人来管理我们的各项业务，这项工作并不太难，通常在我们买下一家企业时，其经理人便随同而来，早在我们认识他们之前便已在各自领域展现出他们的经营才华，我们主要贡献就是不妨碍到他们即可，这点非常重要，如果我的工作是管理一支职业高尔夫球队，若Jack Nicklaus或Arnold Palmer愿意替我效力，他们根本不会问我如何挥杆。
Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all aspects of their business absorbing.
其实我们一些经理人自己本身已经相当富有(当然我们希望所有的经理人都如此)，但这一点都不影响他们继续为公司效力，他们之所以工作是因为乐在其中，享受工作带来的成就感。他们皆站在老板的角度看事情，这是我们对这些经理人最高的恭维，而且你会为他们经营业务各方面成就所着迷。
(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?" Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")
(这种职业病有一个原型：一位天主教的裁缝省吃俭用了好几年，好不容易凑够盘缠去梵蒂冈朝圣，当他回来后，教友们特地集会争相想要了解他对教宗的第一手描述，赶快告诉我们，教宗到底是个怎么样的人，只见这位裁逢师，淡淡地说︰"四十四腰，中等身材。")
Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."
查理跟我都知道，好球员让任何球队经理人看起来都做的不错，就像是奥美广告创办人David Ogilvy曾说︰"如果我们都雇用比自己矮小的人，那么我们会变成一群株孺，相反地，我们能找到一群比我们更高大的人，我们将成为巨头。"
A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read management treatises that specify exactly how many people should report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us. When you have able managers of high character running businesses about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap. Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare qualities of the present ones.
我们的这种企业文化使得我们可以很容易地去扩展伯克希尔的业务版图，我们看过许多管理著作，讲述一个主管只能管辖一定人数的人员，对我们来说这些管理学一点意义都没有。当你手下有一群正直又能干的人才，在帮你经营一项他们深具感情的事业时，你大可以同时管理一打以上这样的人，而且还行有余力打个盹，相反地，若他们存心要欺骗你或是能力不够或是没有热情时，只要一个就够你操心的了。只要找对人，查理与我同时管理比现在多一倍的经理人都没有问题。
We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, it also ensures us an extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich.
我们将会继续维持这种与我们喜爱与敬佩的经理人合作的原则，这种原则不但可以确保经营的绩效极大化，也可以让我们能享受愉快的时光。仅仅为了赚点钱天天要与一些会令你反胃的人为共事，这感觉就像你本来就已经很有钱了，还为了钱跟不喜欢的人结婚一样，那绝对是疯了。
The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow. Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-allocation decisions, though still important, will change the company’s economics far more slowly.
查理跟我的第二项工作是处理资金的分配，相比大多数公司来说这对伯克希尔尤其重要，其主要原因有三：一是我们现金生产能力超过平均水平，二是我们赚的钱都保留下来而不分红，三是最重要的，我们旗下的业务几乎不需要额外投入资金便能保持竞争力与增长。显然，一家每年能赚23%且全数保留收益的公司，相比一家每年赚10%且只保留半数收益的公司，前者资金配置的任务对未来的业绩影响更大。如果将来伯克希尔以及旗下主要被投资公司GEICO保险、大都会/ABC公司等公司的资本配置不佳，则伯克希尔经营情况恶化的程度将会非常地快，而每年只有5%净值增长的公司其资金分配的工作对公司影响就要小的多。
Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros. Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.
在1986年伯克希尔资金分配的工作并不好干，我们确实是完成了一项并购案：收购了费区海默兄弟制服公司(Fechheimer Brothers)，后面我们还会有详细的描述。这家公司极具竞争力，而且是由那种我们喜欢交往的人在经营，不过就是规模小了点，仅运用了伯克希尔不到2%净值的资金。
Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986 were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth would slow significantly.
在此同时，我们从市场直接买进股权这方面也没有太大的进展，相较几年前我们可以很容易地用大笔资金以合理的价格买进许多不错的股票，而现在市场上这种机会却极少。因此，1986年我们主要的资本配置策略举措是偿还债务并囤积资金，虽然这比死掉还好一点，但却没有做到繁衍下一代的任务，如果查理跟我在往后的几年持续在资金配置交白卷，伯克希尔账面价值的增长将显著放缓。
We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it is to help our performance materially. Under current stock market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly - you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might happen.
我们会持续在市场上寻找符合我们标准的企业，幸运的是，每隔几年都能找到一家，但若想要对公司账面价值有明显助益，则收购规模必须够大，只是以目前的股票市场状况，我们实在很难为我们的保险公司找到合适的投资标的，当然市场终究会转变，总有一天会轮到我们上场，只是不清楚是什么时间。
It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes described in a later section of this report. If we are to achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2 billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big (and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.
即使在市场有利的条件下，我们的回报记录也肯定会因为规模扩大而下降，这一点再怎么说也不为过，我们希望平均股本回报率达到15%，并保持这一水准，尽管本报告后面部分描述了一些负面的税法变化。要实现我们的目标，净资产必须在未来十年增加72亿美元，我们将来需要找到一些又大又好的机会才能实现如此巨大的收益。查理和我不能保证实现，但我们向你保证，我们将把努力集中在我们的目标上。
The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. This table differs in several ways from the one presented last year. We have added four new lines of business because of the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions. In the case of Scott Fetzer, the two major units acquired were World Book and Kirby, and each is presented separately. Fourteen other businesses of Scott Fetzer are aggregated in Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing. SF Financial Group, a credit company holding both World Book and Kirby receivables, is included in "Other." This year, because Berkshire is so much larger, we also have eliminated separate reporting for several of our smaller businesses.
下表系伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，今年的表与前几年有几点不太一样的地方，由于收购斯科特费泽(Scott Fetzer)、费区海默制服，我们增加4条业务线：斯科特费泽，费区海默、柯比吸尘器(Kirby)、世界图书(World Book)。斯科特费泽其他14项较小的业务线汇总在「斯科特费泽制造集团」栏中。SF金融集团(SF Financial Group)是一家同时持有世界图书和柯比应收账款的信贷公司，被列入「其他」栏目。同时也由于伯克希尔整体规模扩大了许多，我们还取消了对几家小型企业的单独报告。
In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 Annual Report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A Compendium of earlier letters, including the Goodwill discussion, is available upon request.) Both the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions created accounting Goodwill, which is why the amortization charge for Goodwill increased in 1986.
在表中，商誉的摊销不计入特定业务，汇总为一个单独的项目，原因请参阅1983年的附录。斯科特费泽和费区海默的收购都产生了会计商誉，这是在1986年商誉的摊销费用增加的原因。
Additionally, the Scott Fetzer acquisition required other major purchase-price accounting adjustments, as prescribed by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP figures, of course, are the ones used in our consolidated financial statements. But, in our view, the GAAP figures are not necessarily the most useful ones for investors or managers. Therefore, the figures shown for specific operating units are earnings before purchase-price adjustments are taken into account. In effect, these are the earnings that would have been reported by the businesses if we had not purchased them.
另外依GAAP会计原则要求收购Scott Fetzer采用购买法会计处理，在合并财务报表上所显示的数字是依照GAAP会计原则所编制，但就我们看来，这个数字对于经理人与投资人来说并不见得有意义，因此下表所显示的是购买法会计调整前的数字，事实上如果我们没有购买它们，这才是这家公司原本的收益状况.
A discussion of our reasons for preferring this form of presentation is in the Appendix to this letter. This Appendix will never substitute for a steamy novel and definitely is not required reading. However, I know that among our 6,000 shareholders there are those who are thrilled by my essays on accounting - and I hope that both of you enjoy the Appendix.
本信的附录中有关于我们选择这种形式的原因的讨论。这个附录永远不能代替色情小说，也绝对不是必须阅读的。然而，我知道，在我们的6000名股东中，有一些人对我的会计文章感到兴奋——我希望你们都喜欢附录。
In the Business Segment Data on pages 41-43 and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 45-49, you will find much additional information about our businesses. I urge you to read those sections, as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 50.
在第41-43页的业务部门数据和第45-49页的管理层讨论部分，您可以找到有关我们业务的更多信息。我强烈建议你们阅读这些章节，以及查理·芒格给韦斯科银行股东的信，信中描述了这家子公司的各种业务，从第50页开始。
| Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益(伯克希尔应占) |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益(伯克希尔应占) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) | 1986 | 1985 | 1986 | 1985 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益来源: |
||||
| Insurance Group 保险集团: |
||||
| Underwriting 承保收益 |
$ (55,844) | $ (44,230) | $ (29,864) | $ (23,569) |
| Net investment income 净投资收益 |
107,143 | 95,217 | 96,440 | 79,716 |
| Buffalo News 布法罗新闻 |
34,736 | 29,921 | 16,918 | 14,580 |
| Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86) 费区海默兄弟公司（于1986/6/3被收购） |
8,400 | --- | 3,792 | --- |
| Kirby 柯比吸尘器 |
20,218 | --- | 10,508 | --- |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart 内布拉斯家具城 |
17,685 | 12,686 | 7,192 | 5,181 |
| Scott Fetzer - Diversified Mfg. 斯科特·费泽尔制造集团 |
25,358 | --- | 13,354 | --- |
| See’s Candies 喜诗糖果 |
30,347 | 28,989 | 15,176 | 14,558 |
| Wesco - other than insurance 除去保险业务的西科金融 |
5,542 | 16,018 | 5,550 | 9,684 |
| World Book 世界图书 |
21,978 | --- | 11,670 | --- |
| Amortization of Goodwill 商誉摊销 |
(2,555) | (1,475) | (2,555) | (1,475) |
| Other purchase-price accounting charges 购买法会计-其他费用 |
(10,033) | --- | (11,031) | --- |
| Interest on Debt and Pre-Payment penalty 利息费用 |
(23,891) | (14,415) | (12,213) | (7,288) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠 |
(3,997) | (4,006) | (2,158) | (2,164) |
| Other 其他 |
20,770 | 6,744 | 8,685 | 3,725 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益合计 |
195,857 | 125,449 | 131,464 | 92,948 |
| Special General Foods Distribution 通用食品特别股息 |
--- | 4,127 | --- | 3,779 |
| Special Washington Post Distribution 华盛顿邮报特别股息 |
--- | 14,877 | --- | 13,851 |
| Sales of Securities 出售资产和已实现证券收益 |
216,242 | 468,903 | 150,897 | 325,237 |
| Total Earnings - all entities 所有实体-收益合计 |
$ 412,099 | $ 613,356 | $ 282,361 | $ 435,815 |
As you can see, operating earnings substantially improved during 1986. Some of the improvement came from the insurance operation, whose results I will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer also will be discussed separately. Our other major businesses performed as follows:
如你所见在1986年经营收益显著提高，一些改善来自保险业务，后面将单独讨论，费区海默公司也将详细说明。我们的其他主要业务表现如下：
Operating results at The Buffalo News continue to reflect a truly superb managerial job by Stan Lipsey. For the third year in a row, man-hours worked fell significantly and other costs were closely controlled. Consequently, our operating margins improved materially in 1986, even though our advertising rate increases were well below those of most major newspapers.
布法罗新闻(The Buffalo News)的经营业绩反映出Stan Lipsey出色的管理能力，连续三年，工时大幅下降，其他成本受到严格控制，尽管我们的广告增长率远低于同业，但经营收益仍然大幅增加。
Our cost-control efforts have in no way reduced our commitment to news. We continue to deliver a 50% "news hole" (the portion of the total space in the paper devoted to news), a higher percentage, we believe, than exists at any dominant newspaper in this country of our size or larger.
我们控制成本的努力并不代表我们在新闻品质上有所退让，我们的新闻量(新闻版面占整体版面的比例)持续维持在50%以上，这一比例高于这个国家任何规模或更大的主流报纸。
The average news hole at papers comparable to the News is about 40%. The difference between 40% and 50% is more important than it might first seem: a paper with 30 pages of ads and a 40% news hole delivers 20 pages of news a day, whereas our paper matches 30 pages of ads with 30 pages of news. Therefore, given ad pages equal in number, we end up delivering our readers no less than 50% more news.
一般同业的水准约只有40%。各位可不要小看这10%的差距，同样30页的广告量，40%代表报纸每天提供约20页新闻，而我们50%则是每天提供约30页的新闻，一比一的新闻与广告量是我们坚持的原则。
We believe this heavy commitment to news is one of the reasons The Buffalo News has the highest weekday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper’s primary marketing area purchasing it each day) among any of the top 50 papers in the country. Our Sunday penetration, where we are also number one, is even more impressive. Ten years ago, the only Sunday paper serving Buffalo (the Courier-Express) had circulation of 271,000 and a penetration ratio of about 63%. The Courier-Express had served the area for many decades and its penetration ratio - which was similar to those existing in many metropolitan markets - was thought to be a "natural" one, accurately reflecting the local citizenry’s appetite for a Sunday product.
我们认为，对新闻量的这种态度是我们能在全美前50家报纸中拥有最高日报渗透率的重要原因之一(订户数占当地家庭户数的比率)。其中周日版的渗透率更令人印象深刻，十年前，布法罗唯一的周日版报纸Courier-Express已经为该地区服务超过十年，发行量为27.1万份，渗透率约63%，与全美其它大城市相当，这在当时已被视为是自然的上限，能准确地反映了当地居民对周日版的胃口。
Our Sunday paper was started in late 1977. It now has a penetration ratio of 83% and sells about 100,000 copies more each Sunday than did the Courier-Express ten years ago - even though population in our market area has declined during the decade. In recent history, no other city that has long had a local Sunday paper has experienced a penetration gain anywhere close to Buffalo’s.
从1977年我们开始发行周日版，渗透率为83%，发行量超过十年前信使快报(Courier-Express)10万份，虽然这十年该地区人口数不增反减。在最近的历史中，没有一家发行周末版的城市经历过我们的渗透率增长。
Despite our exceptional market acceptance, our operating margins almost certainly have peaked. A major newsprint price increase took effect at the end of 1986, and our advertising rate increases in 1987 will again be moderate compared to those of the industry. However, even if margins should materially shrink, we would not reduce our news-hole ratio.
虽然拥有超高的市场接受度，却也代表经营收益几乎肯定已达顶峰，1986年底新闻纸价格大幅上涨，1987年的广告费涨幅相比同业亦属温和，然而，即使利润率缩水，我们仍坚持新闻比率不降低。
As I write this, it has been exactly ten years since we purchased The News. The financial rewards it has brought us have far exceeded our expectations and so, too, have the non-financial rewards. Our respect for the News - high when we bought it - has grown consistently ever since the purchase, as has our respect and admiration for Murray Light, the editor who turns out the product that receives such extraordinary community acceptance. The efforts of Murray and Stan, which were crucial to the News during its dark days of financial reversals and litigation, have not in the least been lessened by prosperity. Charlie and I are grateful to them.
今年已是我们买下布法罗报纸十个年头了，它带给我们的投资回报远远超过我们的预期，精神上的收获也是如此，我们对于布法罗报纸的敬仰从买下它开始与日俱增，及其经营者Murray Light的敬仰亦是如此。Murray是一位编辑，是他让这份报纸拥有超高的社区认同度，Murray和Stan在报纸面临财务困难与诉讼的黑暗时期所展现的努力至关重要，而且并未随着日后的繁荣有所减弱，查理与我在此对他们表示由衷的感谢。
The amazing Blumkins continue to perform business miracles at Nebraska Furniture Mart. Competitors come and go (mostly go), but Mrs. B. and her progeny roll on. In 1986 net sales increased 10.2% to $132 million. Ten years ago sales were $44 million and, even then, NFM appeared to be doing just about all of the business available in the Greater Omaha Area. Given NFM’s remarkable dominance, Omaha’s slow growth in population and the modest inflation rates that have applied to the goods NFM sells, how can this operation continue to rack up such large sales gains? The only logical explanation is that the marketing territory of NFM’s one-and-only store continues to widen because of its ever-growing reputation for rock-bottom everyday prices and the broadest of selections. In preparation for further gains, NFM is expanding the capacity of its warehouse, located a few hundred yards from the store, by about one-third.
内布拉斯加家具店的Blumkins家族持续创造商业史上的奇迹，竞争者来来去去(主要是去)，但B夫人跟她的家族却仍屹立不倒。1986年净销售额增长10.2%达到1.32亿美元，是10年前的三倍，即使在当年，该店便已独霸整个奥马哈地区，若再考量本地缓慢的人口增长率以及家具商品温和的通货膨胀率，这种成绩更是难能可贵，而惟一可以解释的理由就是，随着内布拉斯加家具店价廉物美、样式齐全的声名远播，其市场范围持续扩大，而为了应付日后的成长，该店已着手将仓库扩大三分之一。
Mrs. B, Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, continues at age 93 to outsell and out-hustle any manager I’ve ever seen. She’s at the store seven days a week, from opening to close. Competing with her represents a triumph of courage over judgment.
93岁高龄的B夫人技压群雄，展现超高的销售能力与耐力，超过我见过的任何经理人。一周工作七天，每天从开店到打烊，想要跟她竞争需要无比的勇气。
It’s easy to overlook what I consider to be the critical lesson of the Mrs. B saga: at 93, Omaha based Board Chairmen have yet to reach their peak. Please file this fact away to consult before you mark your ballot at the 2024 annual meeting of Berkshire.
大家可能很容易就忽略B夫人传奇，不过没关系93岁的她还未抵达巅峰，等到2024年伯克希尔股东会召开时，请大家拭目以待。
At See’s, sales trends improved somewhat from those of recent years. Total pounds sold rose about 2%. (For you chocaholics who like to fantasize, one statistic: we sell over 12,000 tons annually.) Same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In the previous six years, same store poundage fell, and we gained or maintained poundage volume only by adding stores. But a particularly strong Christmas season in 1986 stemmed the decline. By stabilizing same-store volume and making a major effort to control costs, See’s was able to maintain its excellent profit margin in 1986 though it put through only minimal price increases. We have Chuck Huggins, our long-time manager at See’s, to thank for this significant achievement.
喜诗糖果近几年的销售趋势有所改善，总磅数增加约2%，(若你是巧克力的爱好者，告诉你一个惊人的数字，我们一年的销售量是1.2万吨)。以磅计同店销售金额几乎没有变化，但过去六年单店销售磅数持续下滑，使得我们只有靠增加店面数量来增加或维持销售量的下滑，但1986年拜圣诞节销售火爆所赐销量没有下降。通过大力控制成本和稳定的单店销量，尽管价格实现最低限度上涨，该公司仍然保持优异的利润率，我们要感谢长期经理人Chuck Huggins取得的这一重大成就。
See’s has a one-of-a-kind product "personality" produced by a combination of its candy’s delicious taste and moderate price, the company’s total control of the distribution process, and the exceptional service provided by store employees. Chuck rightfully measures his success by the satisfaction of our customers, and his attitude permeates the organization. Few major retailing companies have been able to sustain such a customer-oriented spirit, and we owe Chuck a great deal for keeping it alive and well at See’s.
喜诗糖果是一种独一无二的个性化商品，甜美的糖果加上适中的价格，且该公司完全掌握销售渠道并由店员提供贴心的服务，Chuck的成就反应在客户的满意度上，并进而感染到整个公司，很少有大型零售企业能够保持这种以客户为导向的精神，我们非常感谢Chuck让这种精神在喜诗保持生机勃勃。
See’s profits should stay at about their present level. We will continue to increase prices very modestly, merely matching prospective cost increases.
展望未来喜诗的利润应该可以维持在现有状态，我们仍会持续温和地提高价格，以反映增加的成本。
World Book is the largest of 17 Scott Fetzer operations that joined Berkshire at the beginning of 1986. Last year I reported to you enthusiastically about the businesses of Scott Fetzer and about Ralph Schey, its manager. A year’s experience has added to my enthusiasm for both. Ralph is a superb businessman and a straight shooter. He also brings exceptional versatility and energy to his job: despite the wide array of businesses that he manages, he is on top of the operations, opportunities and problems of each. And, like our other managers, Ralph is a real pleasure to work with. Our good fortune continues.
世界图书公司是1986年加入我们的Scott Fetzer旗下17个业务部门中最大的一个。去年我很高兴地跟各位报告了Scott Fetzer的业务及其经理人拉尔夫·谢伊(Ralph Schey)，一年后我更加开心地向大家报告，Ralph真是个优秀的经理人，圆满地达成目标，虽然要管理各式各样的产品，并面对不同的机会问题与挑战，Ralph却使得他的工作更加精彩更多元化，而且更重要的是我们合作愉快，看来我们的好运持续不断。
World Book’s unit volume increased for the fourth consecutive year, with encyclopedia sales up 7% over 1985 and 45% over 1982. Childcraft’s unit sales also grew significantly.
世界图书的销量连续第四年增长，百科全书的销量比1985年增长了7%，比1982年增长了45%，称霸于直销市场。儿童读物的单位销售额也大幅增长。
World Book continues to dominate the U.S. direct-sales encyclopedia market - and for good reasons. Extraordinarily well-edited and priced at under 5 cents per page, these books are a bargain for youngster and adult alike. You may find one editing technique interesting: World Book ranks over 44,000 words by difficulty. Longer entries in the encyclopedia include only the most easily comprehended words in the opening sections, with the difficulty of the material gradually escalating as the exposition proceeds. As a result, youngsters can easily and profitably read to the point at which subject matter gets too difficult, instead of immediately having to deal with a discussion that mixes up words requiring college-level comprehension with others of fourth-grade level.
世界图书继续主导着美国的直销百科全书市场——这是有充分理由的。其不但编排精美，且平均每页不到五毛钱，可谓老少咸宜，有一数字相当有趣，那就是书中有高达四万多个困难字，入门部分由简单的生字组成，慢慢地加入难度更高的单字，如此使得年轻的读者能够循序渐进，最后轻易的便能运用大学程度以上的单字。
Selling World Book is a calling. Over one-half of our active salespeople are teachers or former teachers, and another 5% have had experience as librarians. They correctly think of themselves as educators, and they do a terrific job. If you don’t have a World Book set in your house, I recommend one.
推销百科全书是项神圣的天职，我们超过半数以上的销售人员是现职或是退休的老师，有些则是图书馆员，他们将自己视为教育工作者，而且做的有声有色，如果你家中还没有一套《世界百科全书》，那么我建议你赶快去买一套放在家里。
Kirby likewise recorded its fourth straight year of unit volume gains. Worldwide, unit sales grew 4% from 1985 and 33% from 1982. While the Kirby product is more expensive than most cleaners, it performs in a manner that leaves cheaper units far behind ("in the dust," so to speak). Many 30- and 40-year-old Kirby cleaners are still in active duty. If you want the best, you buy a Kirby.
柯比吸尘器同样维持连续四年的成长，全球的销售数量共成长了33%，虽然其产品价格要比同类型吸尘器贵许多，但它的性能却将其它品牌远远拋在后面，有许多产品经过了三、四十年还很耐用，想要最好的，就买柯比！
Some companies that historically have had great success in direct sales have stumbled in recent years. Certainly the era of the working woman has created new challenges for direct sales organizations. So far, the record shows that both Kirby and World Book have responded most successfully.
许多靠直销销售其产品的公司，近年来纷纷倒闭，主要是由于上班族妇女越来越多所致，不过到目前为止，柯比吸尘器与世界图书公司的表现算是可圈可点。
The businesses described above, along with the insurance operation and Fechheimer, constitute our major business units. The brevity of our descriptions is in no way meant to diminish the importance of these businesses to us. All have been discussed in past annual reports and, because of the tendency of Berkshire owners to stay in the fold (about 98% of the stock at the end of each year is owned by people who were owners at the start of the year), we want to avoid undue repetition of basic facts. You can be sure that we will immediately report to you in detail if the underlying economics or competitive position of any of these businesses should materially change. In general, the businesses described in this section can be characterized as having very strong market positions, very high returns on capital employed, and the best of operating managements.
以上企业再加上保险业务和费区海默构成了我们主要的业务部门，简单地描述并不意味着它们对我们不具重要性，所有的这些在过去的年报都已详细的报告过，由于我们的股东结构非常稳定(每年约有98%的股东会选择继续持有本公司)，所以我们不必花太多时间重复赘述。当然若是这些企业的基本经济因素或竞争地位发生重大变化，我们一定会立即向您详细报告，总的来说，前面所提的公司都有非常强大的市场竞争力，非常高的资本回报率和最佳的管理层。
Every year in Berkshire’s annual report I include a description of the kind of business that we would like to buy. This "ad" paid off in 1986.
每年在伯克希尔的年度报告中，我都会重述我们想购买的业务，这则广告今年终于有了回报。
On January 15th of last year I received a letter from Bob Heldman of Cincinnati, a shareholder for many years and also Chairman of Fechheimer Bros. Until I read the letter, however, I did not know of either Bob or Fechheimer. Bob wrote that he ran a company that met our tests and suggested that we get together, which we did in Omaha after their results for 1985 were compiled.
去年的1月15日我收到一位辛辛那提的资深股东鲍勃·海德曼(Bob Heldman)的来信，他是费区海默公司的董事长，在此之前我并不知道Bob或费区海默公司。他在信中提到他经营的公司应该符合我们的条件，并提议大家碰个面，于是等到该公司1985年报出炉后我们相约在奥马哈。
He filled me in on a little history: Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business, began operations in 1842. Warren Heldman, Bob’s father, became involved in the business in 1941 and his sons, Bob and George (now President), along with their sons, subsequently joined the company. Under the Heldmans’ management, the business was highly successful.
他向我介绍了公司的历史，这是一家专门制造与销售面向警察，消防，邮局，学校等服务性行业的老牌制服公司，成立于1842年，Bob的父亲Warren Heldman于1941年接手，跟着他的儿子Bob与George(现任总裁)以及他们的儿子也加入该公司，在该家族的带领下，公司的业绩蒸蒸日上。
In 1981 Fechheimer was sold to a group of venture capitalists in a leveraged buy out (an LBO), with management retaining an equity interest. The new company, as is the case with all LBOS, started with an exceptionally high debt/equity ratio. After the buy out, however, operations continued to be very successful. So by the start of last year debt had been paid down substantially and the value of the equity had increased dramatically. For a variety of reasons, the venture capitalists wished to sell and Bob, having dutifully read Berkshire’s annual reports, thought of us.
1981年该公司被一家专门从事杠杆收购(LBO)的投资集团买下，但现有管理层保留了股权。与所有杠杆收购一样，这家新公司一开始的债务/股权比率极高。所幸由于公司营运稳健，直到去年年初，债务已被大幅清偿，公司的价值大幅增加。基于某些原因，当初的风险投资集团想要把股权卖掉，这时仔细读过伯克希尔年报的Bob立刻就想到我们。
Fechheimer is exactly the sort of business we like to buy. Its economic record is superb; its managers are talented, high-grade, and love what they do; and the Heldman family wanted to continue its financial interest in partnership with us. Therefore, we quickly purchased about 84% of the stock for a price that was based upon a $55 million valuation for the entire business.
事实上费区海默正是我们想要买的公司类型：它的经济记录极好；管理层才华出众，高水准的管理能力，并且热爱他们的事业；海德曼家族希望与我们合作，并继续保持其股份。因此，我们很快地就决定以整个公司5500万美元的估值买下该其中84%的股权(4600万美元)。
The circumstances of this acquisition were similar to those prevailing in our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart: most of the shares were held by people who wished to employ funds elsewhere; family members who enjoyed running their business wanted to continue both as owners and managers; several generations of the family were active in the business, providing management for as far as the eye can see; and the managing family wanted a purchaser who would not re-sell, regardless of price, and who would let the business be run in the future as it had been in the past. Both Fechheimer and NFM were right for us, and we were right for them.
这与我们当初买下内布拉斯加家具商场的情况很类似，持有股权的大股东有其他资金上的需求；家族成员热爱经营企业并希望继续担任管理者和股东；家族的几代人都投身于这项事业，并尽可能地持续提供管理；管理层家族希望有一位买家，无论价格如何，都不会转售，并让企业在未来照旧运营。这两家公司真正是我门所想要投资的类型，而他们也确实适得其所。
You may be amused to know that neither Charlie nor I have been to Cincinnati, headquarters for Fechheimer, to see their operation. (And, incidentally, it works both ways: Chuck Huggins, who has been running See’s for 15 years, has never been to Omaha.) If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble. Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining. Fechheimer was a standout in both respects. In addition to Bob and George Heldman, who are in their mid-60s - spring chickens by our standards - there are three members of the next generation, Gary, Roger and Fred, to insure continuity.
说来你可能不敢相信，事实上查理和我甚至根本就从未去过费区海默位于辛辛那提的企业总部，(这种情况是双向的，经营喜诗糖果已15年之久的Chuck Huggins，也从未来过奥马哈伯克希尔的企业总部)，所以说若伯克希尔的成功是建立在不断地视察工厂的话，现在我们可能早就要面临一大堆问题了，因此在从事并购公司时，我们试着去评估业务的经济特性，竞争优势与劣势，以及管理层的能力与水准。费区海默在这两个方面都很杰出，而Bob与George正值60多岁的壮年期(以我们的标准而言)，而且还有三位下一代Gary、Roger和Fred继承衣钵。
As a prototype for acquisitions, Fechheimer has only one drawback: size. We hope our next acquisition is at least several times as large but a carbon copy in all other respects. Our threshold for minimum annual after-tax earnings of potential acquisitions has been moved up to $10 million from the $5 million level that prevailed when Bob wrote to me.
作为并购的最佳代表，该公司只有一个缺点，那就是它的规模不够大，我们希望下一次有机会能遇到各方面条件都与费区海默一样，但规模至少是好几倍大的公司，目前我们对于并购对象年度税后利润的基本门槛已由每年的500万美元，提高到1000万美元。
Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a business that fits, call me or, preferably, write.
并购成功喜悦之余，我们还是要重复一下我们的广告，假若你有一家公司符合以下我们所列的条件，请尽快和我们联络。
Here’s what we’re looking for:
以下是我们寻求公司所需满足的条件：
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到1000万美元，
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turn-around" situations),
表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣，
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt.
企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE，
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理，
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知，
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行敌意并购，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复我们是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向采取现金交易，除非我们所换得的企业内在价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则绝不考虑发行股份。我们欢迎可能的卖方向那些过去与我们合作过的伙伴打听，对于那些好的公司与好的管理层，我们绝对可以提供一个好的归属。
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.
当然我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问电话，包括新创企业、扭亏企业、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案(那些通常会说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的)。在此重申我们对这类型案件一点兴趣都没有。
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.
除了以上买下整家公司的并购案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部分不具控制权的股份，就像我们在大都会这个例子一样，当然这需要我们对于该事业与管理层都感到认同时才有可能，而且是要够大笔的交易，我想最少也要在五千万美金以上，当然是越多越好。
We present our usual table of industry figures, expanded this year to include data about incurred losses and the GNP inflation index. The contrast in 1986 between the growth in premiums and growth in incurred losses will show you why underwriting results for the year improved materially:
下表是我们固定提供的保险业统计数字，今年起多加了发生损失与GNP通膨指数两项，保费成长与损失比率与1986年差异，可用来解释为何整年度的承保表现能够大幅改善的原因：
| Year 年度 |
Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) 保费收入增长率 |
Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends 综合比率 |
Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) 损失赔付增长率 |
Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) 通货膨胀率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.7 |
| 1982 | 4.4 | 109.8 | 8.4 | 6.4 |
| 1983 | 4.6 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.9 |
| 1984 | 9.2 | 117.9 | 16.9 | 3.8 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.5 | 16.1 | 3.3 |
| 1986 (Est.) | 22.6 | 108.5 | 15.5 | 2.6 |
Source: Best’s Insurance Management Reports
来源：最佳保险管理报告
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-112 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合比率代表保险总成本(发生损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，若比率低于一百，表示承保有收益，反之则会有损失，若将保险公司从保户那边收到的保费(又称浮存金)，运用在投资所赚取的收益列入考虑后(扣除股东权益部分)，比率在107-112间会是损益平衡点。
The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. This is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues must grow at close to 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running only 2% - 4%.
保险业务经营的逻辑，若用以下列简表来说明，其实一点都不复杂，当保费收入年增长率只能在4%到5%游移时，承保损失一定会增加，这不是因为意外、火灾、暴风等意外灾害发生更频繁，也不是因为通货膨胀的关系，主要的祸首在于社会与司法成本的膨胀，一方面是因为司法诉讼案件大幅增加，一方面是因为法官与陪审团倾向超越原先保单上所订的条款，扩大保险理赔的范围，若这两种情况在未来没有好转，则可以预见的是，保费收入年增长必须达到10%以上才有可能损益两平，即使目前一般通货膨胀的水准维持在2%到4%之间也一样。
In 1986, as noted, the industry’s premium volume soared even faster than loss costs. Consequently, the underwriting loss of the industry fell dramatically. In last year’s report we predicted this sharp improvement but also predicted that prosperity would be fleeting. Alas, this second prediction is already proving accurate. The rate of gain in the industry’s premium volume has slowed significantly (from an estimated 27.1% in 1986’s first quarter, to 23.5% in the second, to 21.8% in the third, to 18.7% in the fourth), and we expect further slowing in 1987. Indeed, the rate of gain may well fall below my 10% "equilibrium" figure by the third quarter.
如表上所示，保险业保费收入增长的速度甚至高于理赔损失增加的速度，因此承保损失大幅下降，去年的年报我们就已预先报告可能会有这种情形发生，同时还判断这样的荣景只是短暂的，很不幸的再一次我们一语中的，今年保费增长的速度已大幅减缓，从第一季的27.1%一路下滑到第四季的18.7%，而且我们预期还会进一步下滑，最后很有可能会落到10%的损益两平点之下。
Nevertheless, underwriting results in 1987, assuming they are not dragged down by a major natural catastrophe, will again improve materially because price increases are recognized in revenues on a lagged basis. In effect, the good news in earnings follows the good news in prices by six to twelve months. But the improving trend in earnings will probably end by late 1988 or early 1989. Thereafter the industry is likely to head south in a hurry.
但尽管如此，只要1987年没有发生什么重大的灾难，由于保费调整的递延性，承保结果还是能够改善，通常在保费调整的半年到一年后，效果会反应到公司的收益之上，但好景通常不易维持，过不了多久一切又会回到原点。
Pricing behavior in the insurance industry continues to be exactly what can be expected in a commodity-type business. Only under shortage conditions are high profits achieved, and such conditions don’t last long. When the profit sun begins to shine, long-established insurers shower investors with new shares in order to build capital. In addition, newly-formed insurers rush to sell shares at the advantageous prices available in the new-issue market (prices advantageous, that is, to the insiders promoting the company but rarely to the new shareholders). These moves guarantee future trouble: capacity soars, competitive juices flow, and prices fade.
保险商品的定价行为与一般商品的定价模式几乎一模一样，唯有在供给短缺时价格才会上来，但偏偏这种光景维持不了多久，当获利旭日东升时，马上就有人会进来泼冷水，增加投入资金抢食大饼(老牌保险公司会向投资者大量投放新股，以增加资本。此外，新成立的保险公司，急于以新发行市场的有利价格出售股票)，结果，当然会埋下不少后遗症：供给增加，代表价格下跌，跟着获利剧减。
It’s interesting to observe insurance leaders beseech their colleagues to behave in a more "statesmanlike" manner when pricing policies. "Why," they ask, "can’t we learn from history, even out the peaks and valleys, and consistently price to make reasonable profits?" What they wish, of course, is pricing that resembles, say, that of The Wall Street journal, whose prices are ample to start with and rise consistently each year.
当保险业龙头在要求他们的同业在定价时要维持同行之谊，我们可以观察到一个有趣的现象，他们会问为什么我们不能从历史经验中学到教训，不管景气低潮或高峰，都能够合理的定价以维持适当的获利呢？他们当然希望保险费能够像华尔街日报一样，一开始定价就很高，同时又能够每年持续稳定的调涨价格。
Such calls for improved behavior have all of the efficacy of those made by a Nebraska corn grower asking his fellow growers, worldwide, to market their corn with more statesmanship. What’s needed is not more statesmen, but less corn. By raising large amounts of capital in the last two years, the insurance industry has, to continue our metaphor, vastly expanded its plantings of corn. The resulting increase in "crop" - i.e., the proliferation of insurance capacity - will have the same effect on prices and profits that surplus crops have had since time immemorial.
但这种诉求得到的效果，就像内布拉斯加州种植玉米的农夫，要求全世界其它种植玉米的农夫一起遵守道德规范一样有限，事实上道德诉求的效果极其有限，重点是如何让玉米的产量变少，最近两年来保险同业从资本市场上所募集的资金，导致保险能力激增，就好象是新进耕种的玉米田一样，结果是更多更多的玉米产量，只会使市场价格进一步滑落。
Our own insurance operation did well in 1986 and is also likely to do well in 1987. We have benefited significantly from industry conditions. But much of our prosperity arises from the efforts and ability of Mike Goldberg, manager of all insurance operations.
我们自己本身的保险业务在1986年的表现还算不错，展望明年一样乐观，虽然市场的状况让我们获益不少，但真正要感谢的却是旗下经理人优异的能力与表现。
Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) fell from 111 in 1985 to 103 in 1986. In addition, our premium growth has been exceptional: although final figures aren’t available, I believe that over the past two years we were the fastest growing company among the country’s top 100 insurers. Some of our growth, it is true, came from our large quota-share contract with Fireman’s Fund, described in last year’s report and updated in Charlie’s letter on page 54. But even if the premiums from that contract are excluded from the calculation, we probably still ranked first in growth.
我们的综合比率从1985年的111减少到1986年的103，此外我们的保费增长亦是出色，虽然最后的数字现在还无从得知，但我确信我们是前100强保险公司中成长最快的，诚然有一部分的成长来自于我们与消防人员退休基金的巨额合约，但即使扣除这部分，我们仍能维持第一。
Interestingly, we were the slowest-growing large insurer in the years immediately preceding 1985. In fact, we shrank - and we will do so again from time to time in the future. Our large swings in volume do not mean that we come and go from the insurance marketplace. Indeed, we are its most steadfast participant, always standing ready, at prices we believe adequate, to write a wide variety of high-limit coverages. The swings in our volume arise instead from the here-today, gone-tomorrow behavior of other insurers. When most insurers are "gone," because their capital is inadequate or they have been frightened by losses, insureds rush to us and find us ready to do business. But when hordes of insurers are "here," and are slashing prices far below expectable costs, many customers naturally leave us in order to take advantage of the bargains temporarily being offered by our competition.
有趣的是在1985年我们是所有保险业者中成长最慢的一家，事实上我们是不增反减，而只要市场情况不佳时，我们仍会维持这样的做法，我们保费收入忽上忽下并不代表我们在这个市场来来去去，事实上我们是这个市场最稳定的参与者，随时作好准备，只要价格合理，我们愿意不计上限签下任何高额的保单，不像其它业者"今天还在，明天就不干了"。所以当其它同业因资金不足或慑于巨大的损失退出市场时，保户会大量涌向我们，且会发现我们早已作好准备，反之当所有业者抢进市场，大幅杀价甚至低于合理成本时，客户又会受到便宜的价格所吸引，离开我们投入竞争对手的怀抱。
Our firmness on prices works no hardship on the consumer: he is being bombarded by attractively priced insurance offers at those times when we are doing little business. And it works no hardship on our employees: we don’t engage in layoffs when we experience a cyclical slowdown at one of our generally-profitable insurance operations. This no-layoff practice is in our self-interest. Employees who fear that large layoffs will accompany sizable reductions in premium volume will understandably produce scads of business through thick and thin (mostly thin).
我们对于价格的坚持，对客户来说一点困扰也没有，当他发现有更便宜的价格时，随时可以离去，同样地对我们的员工也不会造成困扰，我们不会因为景气循环一时的低潮就大幅裁员。我们奉行不裁员的政策，事实上这也是为了公司好，否则担心业务量减少而被裁员的员工，可能会想尽办法不顾一切地创造大量无效业务。
The trends in National Indemnity’s traditional business - the writing of commercial auto and general liability policies through general agents - suggest how gun-shy other insurers became for a while and how brave they are now getting. In the last quarter of 1984, NICO’s monthly volume averaged $5 million, about what it had been running for several years. By the first quarter of 1986, monthly volume had climbed to about $35 million. In recent months, a sharp decline has set in. Monthly volume is currently about $20 million and will continue to fall as new competitors surface and prices are cut. Ironically, the managers of certain major new competitors are the very same managers that just a few years ago bankrupted insurers that were our old competitors. Through state-mandated guaranty funds, we must pay some of the losses these managers left unpaid, and now we find them writing the same sort of business under a new name. C’est la guerre.
这在国民保险公司所从事的汽车保险与一般责任保险最可以看出，同业是如何一会儿贪生怕死，一会儿又勇往前进。在1984年的最后一季，该公司平均月保费收入是500万美元，大约维持在正常的水准，但到了1986年的第一季，却大幅攀升至3,500万美元，之后又很快地减少到每月2,000万元的水准。相信只要竞争者持续加入市场，并杀价竞争，该公司的业务量还会继续减少。讽刺的是，部分新成立的保险公司的经理人，正是几年前跟我们竞争并破产倒闭的保险公司那批原班人马。不可思议的是我们竟然还要通过政府强制的担保基金机制，来分摊他们部分的损失。现在我们发现他们用一个新名字承保了同样的业务，这简直是战争贩子。
The business we call "large risks" expanded significantly during 1986, and will be important to us in the future. In this operation, we regularly write policies with annual premiums of $1 - $3 million, or even higher. This business will necessarily be highly volatile - both in volume and profitability - but our premier capital position and willingness to write large net lines make us a very strong force in the market when prices are right. On the other hand, our structured settlement business has become near-dormant because present prices make no sense to us.
这种我们称之为巨灾再保险的险种(Super-Catastrophe)在1986年大幅成长，且在未来也会扮演相当重要的角色，通常一次所收取的保费就可能超过100-300万美元，有的甚至还更高，当然这项业务会高度波动，不管是保费收入或是承保获利，但我们雄厚的财务实力与高度的承保意愿(只要价格合理)使我们在市场上相当有竞争力。另一方面，我们在结构清偿业务则因为现在的价格不理想而接近停摆。
The 1986 loss reserve development of our insurance group is chronicled on page 46. The figures show the amount of error in our yearend 1985 liabilities that a year of settlements and further evaluation has revealed. As you can see, what I told you last year about our loss liabilities was far from true - and that makes three years in a row of error. If the physiological rules that applied to Pinocchio were to apply to me, my nose would now draw crowds.
1986年损失准备的变动详附表，数字显示我们在1985年底所犯的估计错误，在今年已渐渐浮现，就像去年我提醒各位的，我们所提的负债准备与事实有很大的出入，而造成连续三年一连串的错误，若照木偶奇遇记的标准，我的鼻子可能早已能够吸引众人的目光。
When insurance executives belatedly establish proper reserves, they often speak of "reserve strengthening," a term that has a rather noble ring to it. They almost make it sound as if they are adding extra layers of strength to an already-solid balance sheet. That’s not the case: instead the term is a euphemism for what should more properly be called "correction of previous untruths" (albeit non-intentional ones).
当保险公司主管事后补提适当的损失准备，他们通常会解释成损失准备"加强"，以冠上合理的说法，理直气壮地好象的是真要在已经健全的财务报表上再多加一层保障，事实上并非如此，这只是修正以前所犯错误的婉转说法而已(虽然可能是无心的)。
We made a special effort at the end of 1986 to reserve accurately. However, we tried just as hard at the end of 1985. Only time will tell whether we have finally succeeded in correctly estimating our insurance liabilities.
在1986年我们特别花了一番功夫在这上面做调整，但只有时间能告诉我们先前所作的损失准备预测是否正确。
Despite the difficulties we have had in reserving and the commodity economics of the industry, we expect our insurance business to both grow and make significant amounts of money - but progress will be distinctly irregular and there will be major unpleasant surprises from time to time. It’s a treacherous business and a wary attitude is essential. We must heed Woody Allen: "While the lamb may lie down with the lion, the lamb shouldn’t count on getting a whole lot of sleep."
而尽管在预测损失与产品营销上我们遭遇极大的挑战，我们仍乐观地预期我们的业务量能够成长并获取不少利润，只是前进的步伐可能会不太规则，甚至有时还会出现令人不太愉快的结果发生，这是一个变化多端的行业，所以必须更加小心谨慎，我们时时谨记伍迪艾伦所讲的，一只羊大可以躺在狮子的旁边，但你千万不要妄想好好地睡一觉。
In our insurance operations we have an advantage in attitude, we have an advantage in capital, and we are developing an advantage in personnel. Additionally, I like to think we have some long-term edge in investing the float developed from policyholder funds. The nature of the business suggests that we will need all of these advantages in order to prosper.
在保险业我们拥有的优势是我们的心态与资本，同时在人员素质上也渐入佳境，此外，利用收得保费产生的浮存金进行投资方面，更是我们竞争的长期优势。在这个产业也唯有多方条件配合，才有机会成功。
GEICO Corporation, 41% owned by Berkshire, had an outstanding year in 1986. Industrywide, underwriting experience in personal lines did not improve nearly as much as it did in commercial lines. But GEICO, writing personal lines almost exclusively, improved its combined ratio to 96.9 and recorded a 16% gain in premium volume. GEICO also continued to repurchase its own shares and ended the year with 5.5% fewer shares outstanding than it had at the start of the year. Our share of GEICO’s premium volume is over $500 million, close to double that of only three years ago. GEICO’s book of business is one of the best in the world of insurance, far better indeed than Berkshire’s own book.
由伯克希尔持有41%股权的GEICO保险公司，在1986年表现相当突出，就整个产业而言，个人险种的承保表现一般来说不如商业险种，但以个人险种为主要业务的GEICO保险其综合比率却降低到96.9，同时保费收入亦增长了16%，另外该公司也持续买回自家公司的股份，总计一年下来流通在外的股份减少了5.5%，我们依投资比例所分得的保费收入已超过五亿美元，大约较三年前增加一倍。GEICO保险的帐目是全世界保险公司中最好的，甚至比伯克希尔本身都还要好。
The most important ingredient in GEICO’s success is rock-bottom operating costs, which set the company apart from literally hundreds of competitors that offer auto insurance. The total of GEICO’s underwriting expense and loss adjustment expense in 1986 was only 23.5% of premiums. Many major companies show percentages 15 points higher than that. Even such huge direct writers as Allstate and State Farm incur appreciably higher costs than does GEICO.
GEICO保险之所以能够成功的重要因素，在于该公司从头到脚彻底地精简营运成本，使得它把其它所有车险公司远远拋在脑后，该公司去年的成本费用和损失调整费用占保费收入的比例只有23.5%，许多大公司的比例甚至比GEICO保险还要多出15%，即使是像好事达保险(Allstate)与州立农业保险(StateFarm)等车险直销业者成本也比GEICO保险高出许多。
The difference between GEICO’s costs and those of its competitors is a kind of moat that protects a valuable and much-sought-after business castle. No one understands this moat-around-the-castle concept better than Bill Snyder, Chairman of GEICO. He continually widens the moat by driving down costs still more, thereby defending and strengthening the economic franchise. Between 1985 and 1986, GEICO’s total expense ratio dropped from 24.1% to the 23.5% mentioned earlier and, under Bill’s leadership, the ratio is almost certain to drop further. If it does - and if GEICO maintains its service and underwriting standards - the company’s future will be brilliant indeed.
若说GEICO保险是一座价值不菲且众所仰望的商业城堡，那么其与同业间的成本与费用差异就是它的护城河，没有人比Bill，也就是GEICO保险的主席，更懂得如何去保护这座城堡，靠着持续降低成本开支，他不断地将这个护城河加大，使得这城堡更加稳固，过去两年间，GEICO保险创造了23.5%超低成本率，下降0.6%。展望未来，这项比率仍将持续下降，若能够同时再兼顾产品品质与客户服务的话，这家公司的前途将无可限量。
The second stage of the GEICO rocket is fueled by Lou Simpson, Vice Chairman, who has run the company’s investments since late 1979. Indeed, it’s a little embarrassing for me, the fellow responsible for investments at Berkshire, to chronicle Lou’s performance at GEICO. Only my ownership of a controlling block of Berkshire stock makes me secure enough to give you the following figures, comparing the overall return of the equity portfolio at GEICO to that of the Standard & Poor’s 500:
另外GEICO保险这一飞冲天的火箭，其第二阶段动力由负责投资部门的副主席路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)提供，比起辛普森于1979年接掌该公司投资部门后的绩效，身为母公司伯克希尔投资主管的我，实在觉得有点汗颜，而也因为我们拥有这家公司大部分的股权，使我在向各位报告以下数字时，能够稍微心安理得一些：
| Year 年度 |
GEICO’s Equities 盖可的投资业绩 |
S&P 500 标普500指数 |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 | 23.7% | 32.3% |
| 1981 | 5.4 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 45.8 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 36.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 21.8 | 6.2 |
| 1985 | 45.8 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 38.7 | 18.6 |
These are not only terrific figures but, fully as important, they have been achieved in the right way. Lou has consistently invested in undervalued common stocks that, individually, were unlikely to present him with a permanent loss and that, collectively, were close to risk-free.
必须再次强调的是以上的数字不但是漂亮极了，更由于其稳定成长的态势，辛普森能够不断地找到价值被低估的股票加以投资，所以风险相对很低，也很少会产生损失。
In sum, GEICO is an exceptional business run by exceptional managers. We are fortunate to be associated with them.
总而言之GEICO保险是一家由好的经理人经营的好公司，我们很荣幸能与他们一起共事。
During 1986, our insurance companies purchased about $700 million of tax-exempt bonds, most having a maturity of 8 to 12 years. You might think that this commitment indicates a considerable enthusiasm for such bonds. Unfortunately, that’s not so: at best, the bonds are mediocre investments. They simply seemed the least objectionable alternative at the time we bought them, and still seem so. (Currently liking neither stocks nor bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she declared: "I like only two kinds of men - foreign and domestic.")
在去年我们的保险公司总计买近了七亿美元的免税政府公债，到期日分别在8-12年之间，或许你会觉得这样的投入表示我们对于债券情有独钟，不幸的是事实并非如此，债券充其量券只不过是个平庸的投资工具，它们不过是选择投资标的时看起来最不碍眼的投资替代品，虽然现在看起来也是，我突然发现我与好莱坞演员MaeWest的喜好完全相反，她曾说："我只爱两种男人，本国人或是外国人"，现在的我对股票与债券皆不感兴趣。
We must, of necessity, hold marketable securities in our insurance companies and, as money comes in, we have only five directions to go: (1) long-term common stock investments; (2) long-term fixed-income securities; (3) medium-term fixed-income securities; (4) short-term cash equivalents; and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
在保险公司随着资金持续涌入，我们当然必须将有价证券列入投资组合，一般来说我们只有五种选择：(1)长期股票投资，(2)长期固定收益债券，(3)中期固定收益债券，(4)短期现金替代品，(5)短期套利交易。
Common stocks, of course, are the most fun. When conditions are right that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea - and never have had - whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.
在其中股票算是最有乐趣的，当状况好时，我是说找到管理经营得当，良好经济特性但价值被低估的公司，很有机会你会挥出大满贯的全垒打，不过很不幸的是，目前我们根本找不到类似这样的标的。这不代表我们要预测未来的股市，事实上我们从来就不知道股市接下来到底是会涨还是会跌。
What we do know, however, is that occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.
不过我们确知的是，贪婪与恐惧这两种传染病在股市投资世界里，会不断地反复上演，只是发生的时点很难准确预期，而市场波动程度与状况一样不可捉摸，所以我们要做的事很简单，当众人都很贪心大作时，尽量试着让自己觉得害怕；反之当众人感到害怕时，尽量让自己贪心一点。(别人贪婪我恐惧，别人恐惧我贪婪)
As this is written, little fear is visible in Wall Street. Instead, euphoria prevails - and why not? What could be more exhilarating than to participate in a bull market in which the rewards to owners of businesses become gloriously uncoupled from the plodding performances of the businesses themselves. Unfortunately, however, stocks can’t outperform businesses indefinitely.
而当我在写这段文章时，整个华尔街几乎嗅不到一丝的恐惧，反而到处充满了欢乐的气氛，没有理由不这样啊？有什么能够比在牛市中，股东因股票大涨赚取比公司本身获利更多的报酬而感到更高兴的事，只是我必须很不幸的说，股票的表现不可能永远超过公司本身的获利表现。
Indeed, because of the heavy transaction and investment management costs they bear, stockholders as a whole and over the long term must inevitably underperform the companies they own. If American business, in aggregate, earns about 12% on equity annually, investors must end up earning significantly less. Bull markets can obscure mathematical laws, but they cannot repeal them.
反倒是股票频繁的交易成本与投资管理费用，将使得投资人所获得的报酬无可避免地远低于其所投资公司本身的获利，以美国企业来说，平均投资回报率为12%，这表示其投资人平均所能获得的报酬将低于此数，牛市可以暂时模糊数学算术，但却无法推翻它。
The second category of investments open to our insurance companies is long-term bonds. These are unlikely to be of interest to us except in very special situations, such as the Washington Public Power Supply System #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. (At yearend, we owned WPPSS issues having an amortized cost of $218 million and a market value of $310 million, paying us $31.7 million in annual tax-exempt income.) Our aversion to long-term bonds relates to our fear that we will see much higher rates of inflation within the next decade. Over time, the behavior of our currency will be determined by the behavior of our legislators. This relationship poses a continuing threat to currency stability - and a corresponding threat to the owners of long-term bonds.
第二种投资选择是长期债券，除非在特殊情况下，就像是我们在1984年年报曾提到的华盛顿公用电力系统所发行的公司债，(截至年底我们拥有该公司债券的未摊销成本为二亿一千万美元，市价则为三亿一千万美元)，否则债券这种投资标的实在很难引起我们的兴趣。我们对于长期债券没有兴趣的原因在于对于未来十几年通货膨胀可能再度肆虐的潜在恐惧，长期而言，汇率的演变将取决于立法诸公的态度，这会威胁到汇率的稳定，进而影响到长期债券投资人的收益。
We continue to periodically employ money in the arbitrage field. However, unlike most arbitrageurs, who purchase dozens of securities each year, we purchase only a few. We restrict ourselves to large deals that have been announced publicly and do not bet on the come. Therefore, our potential profits are apt to be small; but, with luck, our disappointments will also be few.
我们持续将资金运用在套利之上，然而不像其它套利客，每年从事几十个案子，我们只锁定在少数几个个案，我们限制自己只专注在几个已经公布消息的大案子，避开尚未明朗化的，虽然这样会让我们的获利空间减小，但相对的只要运气不要太差，我们预期落空的机率也会减少许多。
Our yearend portfolio shown below includes one arbitrage commitment, Lear-Siegler. Our balance sheet also includes a receivable for $145 million, representing the money owed us (and paid a few days later) by Unilever, then in the process of purchasing Chesebrough-Ponds, another of our arbitrage holdings. Arbitrage is an alternative to Treasury Bills as a short-term parking place for money - a choice that combines potentially higher returns with higher risks. To date, our returns from the funds committed to arbitrage have been many times higher than they would have been had we left those funds in Treasury Bills. Nonetheless, one bad experience could change the scorecard markedly.
到年底为止，手上只有一个套利案子(Lear-Siegler)。另外还有一笔1.45亿美元的应收款项，这是联合利华用来买下庞氏公司(Chesebrough-Ponds)所欠我们的款项。套利是除了政府债券以外，短期资金运用的替代品，但风险与报酬相对都比较高，到目前为止，这些套利投资的报酬确实比政府债券要来的好的多，不过即便如此，一次惨痛的经历将使总成绩猪羊变色。
We also, though it takes some straining, currently view medium-term tax-exempt bonds as an alternative to short-term Treasury holdings. Buying these bonds, we run a risk of significant loss if, as seems probable, we sell many of them well before maturity. However, we believe this risk is more than counter-balanced first, by the much higher after-tax returns currently realizable from these securities as compared to Treasury Bills and second, by the possibility that sales will produce an overall profit rather than a loss. Our expectation of a higher total return, after allowing for the possibility of loss and after taking into account all tax effects, is a relatively close call and could well be wrong. Even if we sell our bonds at a fairly large loss, however, we may end up reaping a higher after-tax return than we would have realized by repeatedly rolling over Treasury Bills.
另外虽然有些不情愿，我们也将目光摆在中期的免税债券之上，买下这类债券我们将承担巨额损失的风险，若可能的话我们在到期之前就会把它们卖掉，当然这样的风险也提供我们相对的报酬，到目前为止未实现的获利还是比短期债券要来的好的多，不过这种高报酬在扣除可能承担损失的风险与额外的税负，其实报酬好不了多少，更何况还有可能估计错误，不过即便我们真的发生损失，其程度还是比我们不断在短期债券上打滚来的好。
In any event, you should know that our expectations for both the stocks and bonds we now hold are exceptionally modest, given current market levels. Probably the best thing that could happen to us is a market in which we would choose to sell many of our bond holdings at a significant loss in order to re-allocate funds to the far-better equity values then very likely to exist. The bond losses I am talking about would occur if high interest rates came along; the same rates would probably depress common stocks considerably more than medium-term bonds.
大家必须有个体认那就是以目前的市场状况，我们在债券或股票的预期报酬都不会太高，目前我们可以做的，顶多是认赔处分一些债券，然后重新将资金投入到未来可能好一点的股票投资上，债券会发生损失的原因在于利率高涨，当然这同样也会压缩股票的价格。
We show below our 1986 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value of over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholdings of Wesco Financial Corp. and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.
下表是我们截至1986年底金额超过2500万以上股票的投资组合，不包含Wesco金融与内布拉斯加家具店的少数股东权益。
| No of Shares 股份数量 |
Company 公司名称 |
Cost 成本(000s omitted) |
Market 市值(000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2,990,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 大都会/美国广播公司 |
$ 515,775 | $ 801,694 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation 盖可保险 |
45,713 | 674,725 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman 多元制造 |
27,318 | 46,989 |
| 489,300 | Lear Siegler, Inc. 利尔公司（购买是为套利） |
44,064 | 44,587 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company 华盛顿邮报 |
9,731 | 269,531 |
| 642,601 | 1,837,526 | ||
| All Other Common Stockholdings 所有其他控股公司 |
12,763 | 36,507 | |
| Total Common Stocks 全部权益 |
$ 655,364 | $ 1,874,033 |
We should note that we expect to keep permanently our three primary holdings, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post. Even if these securities were to appear significantly overpriced, we would not anticipate selling them, just as we would not sell See’s or Buffalo Evening News if someone were to offer us a price far above what we believe those businesses are worth.
大家要特别注意的是我们会将三项投资列为永久的投资组合，分别是大都会/ABC、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报，即便这些股票目前的价格看起来有些高估，我们也不打算把它们卖掉，就像即使有人出再高的价格，我们也不打算卖喜诗糖果或布法罗报纸一样。
This attitude may seem old-fashioned in a corporate world in which activity has become the order of the day. The modern manager refers to his "portfolio" of businesses - meaning that all of them are candidates for "restructuring" whenever such a move is dictated by Wall Street preferences, operating conditions or a new corporate "concept." (Restructuring is defined narrowly, however: it extends only to dumping offending businesses, not to dumping the officers and directors who bought the businesses in the first place. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is a theology as popular with the Fortune 500 as it is with the Salvation Army.)
这种态度现今看起来有点老套过时，现在当红的基金经理人所谓的企业组合意味着，每当华尔街的偏好、经营条件或新的企业"概念"决定了企业的重组时，所有这些企业都是"重组"的候选者，（奇怪的是重组的定义范围却只限于拋弃让人不快的企业，但却不包含最初购买企业的经理人与负责人本身，憎恨罪恶却深爱犯罪者，这种理论在财富500强中和救世军一样受欢迎。）
Investment managers are even more hyperkinetic: their behavior during trading hours makes whirling dervishes appear sedated by comparison. Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mudwrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."
基金经理人更是肾上腺素分泌过多，他们交易时间的行为让不断念经的苦行僧看起来显得安静许多，事实上机构投资人这个名词已成为自相矛盾的修饰名词，可以跟超级大虾米、女士泥巴摔角手、廉价律师相媲美。
Despite the enthusiasm for activity that has swept business and financial America, we will stick with our ‘til-death-do-us-part policy. It’s the only one with which Charlie and I are comfortable, it produces decent results, and it lets our managers and those of our investees run their businesses free of distractions.
尽管这种对于并购案的乐衷横扫整个美国金融界与企业界，但我们还是坚持这种"至死做自己"的策略，这是查理跟我唯一能够感到自在的方式，事实证明这种方式长期下来让我们有不错的获利，也让我们的经理人与被投资公司专注于本业之上而免于分心。
Last year we paid $23.7 million for about 50% of NHP, Inc., a developer, syndicator, owner and manager of multi-family rental housing. Should all executive stock options that have been authorized be granted and exercised, our equity interest will decline to slightly over 45%.
去年我们投资了2300万购买NHP公司50%股权，这是一家公寓租赁发展与整合商，不过若所有主管股票认股权都行使的话，我们的权益大概会降到45%左右。
NHP, Inc. has a most unusual genealogy. In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission of business and civic leaders, led by Edgar Kaiser, to study ways to increase the supply of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income tenants. Certain members of the commission subsequently formed and promoted two business entities to foster this goal. Both are now owned by NHP, Inc. and one operates under unusual ground rules: three of its directors must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it is also required by law to submit an annual report to the President.
该公司有段非凡的历史血统，1967年美国约翰逊总统指定埃德加·凯撒(Edgar Kaiser)带领一个由民间与企业领袖所组成特别小组，研究如何增加面向低收入和中等收入租户的多家庭公寓住宅供应。委员会的某些成员随后组建并推动了两个公司，以促进这一目标实现。两者现在都归NHP所有，其中一个按独特的基本规则运作：其三名董事必须由总统根据参议院的建议和同意任命，并且法律还要求向总统提交年度报告。
Over 260 major corporations, motivated more by the idea of public service than profit, invested $42 million in the two original entities, which promptly began, through partnerships, to develop government-subsidized rental property. The typical partnership owned a single property and was largely financed by a non-recourse mortgage. Most of the equity money for each partnership was supplied by a group of limited partners who were primarily attracted by the large tax deductions that went with the investment. NHP acted as general partner and also purchased a small portion of each partnership’s equity.
超过260个美国大企业，以非营利为出发点，集资4200万成立两个合伙公司，通过与房屋使用者合伙形式，由政府补助开发租赁公寓。典型的合伙公司是持有独立的房地产单位，附带一个抵押贷款，大部分的资金来源系由一群有租税减免需求的有限合伙人LP提供，NHP担任普通合伙人GP，并买下所有合伙事业一小部分的出资权。
The Government’s housing policy has, of course, shifted and NHP has necessarily broadened its activities to include non-subsidized apartments commanding market-rate rents. In addition, a subsidiary of NHP builds single-family homes in the Washington, D.C. area, realizing revenues of about $50 million annually.
后来政府房屋计划政策有所转向，所以NHP有必要转型，扩展其经营范围到主流市场，即以市场价格租金运营的非补助公寓。此外NHP的一个子公司也在华盛顿特区建造独户住宅，年营业收入5000万美元。
NHP now oversees about 500 partnership properties that are located in 40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and that include about 80,000 housing units. The cost of these properties was more than $2.5 billion and they have been well maintained. NHP directly manages about 55,000 of the housing units and supervises the management of the rest. The company’s revenues from management are about $16 million annually, and growing.
NHP目前管理500处合伙房产，遍布全美40个州、哥伦比亚特区与波多黎各，总计有8万套房产。这些房产的总值超过25亿美元，同时维护相当良好。NHP直接管理其中5.5万套，其余通过监督方式进行管理，公司每年的管理费收入约1600万美元，而且还在持续成长中。
In addition to the equity interests it purchased upon the formation of each partnership, NHP owns varying residual interests that come into play when properties are disposed of and distributions are made to the limited partners. The residuals on many of NHP’s "deep subsidy" properties are unlikely to be of much value. But residuals on certain other properties could prove quite valuable, particularly if inflation should heat up.
除了公司成立时所投资的部分合伙权益外，NHP在产业处分后也可分得部分收益，虽然部分补助较多的产业无利可图，但有些的利润还不错，尤其当通货膨胀高涨时。
The tax-oriented syndication of properties to individuals has been halted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the main, NHP is currently trying to develop equity positions or significant residual interests in non-subsidized rental properties of quality and size (typically 200 to 500 units). In projects of this kind, NHP usually works with one or more large institutional investors or lenders. NHP will continue to seek ways to develop low- and moderate-income apartment housing, but will not likely meet success unless government policy changes.
1986年通过的《税收改革法案》取消有限合伙人这些以税收为目的的个人财产联合。NHP目前正试图高质量、大规模地(通常为200-500套)在非补贴租赁物业中获得股权或重大剩余权益，在此类项目中，NHP通常与一个或多个大型机构投资者或贷方合作。NHP将继续寻求开发低收入和中等收入公寓住房的方法，但除非政府政策改变，否则不太可能取得成功。
Besides ourselves, the large shareholders in NHP are Weyerhauser (whose interest is about 25%) and a management group led by Rod Heller, chief executive of NHP. About 60 major corporations also continue to hold small interests, none larger than 2%.
除了我们以外，NHP的大股东还有惠好公司(Weyerhauser)持有25%的股权和由NHP CEO罗德·海勒(Rod Heller)领导的管理集团。还有大约60家大公司也继续持有少量股权，但没有一家大于2%的。
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.
1986年通过的《税收改革法案》对我们旗下许多业务产生了重要而不同的影响。尽管我们在该法案中发现了许多值得称赞的地方，但伯克希尔的净财务效应是负面的：在新法案下，我们的企业价值增长速度会适度放缓。对我们股东的净效应更为负面：假设每股账面价值每增加1美元，伯克希尔股票的市值也会增加1美元，那么我们的股东将获得72美分的税后收益，而不是原来的80美分，主要是因为个人资本利得的上限税率由20%调高到28%的缘故。
Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:
兹将对伯克希尔所有影响列示如下：
The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC and The Washington Post Company.
企业一般收入的税率由46%减少到34%，这个变化对我们的影响颇为正面，同时包含我们三个主要的被投资业务中的两个：大都会/ABC与华盛顿邮报。
I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument, of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase. Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not help profits but will instead flow through, leading to correspondingly lower prices for consumers.
之所以这样说，是因为多年来在不同政党间一直存在的争论：到底是企业或是消费者在支付所得税？这种争论最后通常导致企业税负增加而不是减少，反对调涨税率的一派认为，不管税率有高，企业总是有办法将税负成本转嫁到消费者身上，导致产品价格调高，以弥补税负上的支出，反之调降税率并不会增加企业的获利，而是会使产品价格下跌。
Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.
另一派则认为企业不但要支付税负，同时还要吸收调涨的税负成本，所以对消费者来说一点影响都没有。
What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an important question for investors and managers, as well as for policymakers.
事实到底是怎样呢？当企业税率减少，伯克希尔、华盛顿邮报或是大都会公司他们自己是将所有获利放到自己口袋，还是通过降价将利益转移给消费者？这对投资人、经理人或是政策制定者来说，都是一个很重要的问题。
Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of that franchise is regulated.
最后我们自己得到的结论是，部分企业会将减税的利益全部或是大部交到企业与其股东的手上，另一部分的企业则是将利益完全或者大部分转移到消费者身上，决定的关键在于，企业本身的竞争优势(特许经营权)以及该竞争优势的获利能力是否受到政府管制。
For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut, prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.
举例来说，当特性经营权很强的企业如电力事业，其获利程度受到法规管制，税率调降将直接立即反应在电力价格而非电力公司获利数字之上，反之亦然，当税收增加时，价格会上涨，尽管上涨往往没有那么迅速。
A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market "regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect, performs much the same function in dealing with the price-competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore, tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.
在价格竞争激烈的产业中，会出现类似的结果。这类型的企业通常竞争优势薄弱，不得不通过自由竞争市场慢慢地将税后变化反应到产品价格之上，这种市场价格反应机制与前面所提的公用电力事业相类似，税负减少对价格的影响，远大于对获利的影响。
In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down prices.
然而，拥有强大特许经营权且较不受政府管制的企业，情况就完全不同了。企业与其背后的股东将会是最大的受益者，这些公司从减税中受益，就像电力公司缺乏监管机构来强制压低价格一样。
Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise, think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?
许多我们全资拥有或部分拥有的业务都拥有这样的特许经营权。所有降税的好处最后都落到我们而非消费者的口袋里，虽然这样讲有点冒昧，却很难加以否认。若你一时无法接受这项事实，看看你所在地区最有能力的脑外科医生或律师，难道你会认为这些专业人士(也算是个人专业中的当地"特许经营持有人")会因为个人所得税率从50%减少到28%，而调降其收费标准吗？
Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number of our operating businesses and investees should be severely tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988 tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say, five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us to see both.
不过对于上述结论大家不要高兴的太早，因为预计在1988年实施的减税方案对我们一点来说有点不太切实际，因为可以预期的是这些减税方案将会造成未来华府的财政困难，进而对物价稳定有严重影响，所以可预期的在未来五年之内，高税率或是高通膨将会再现，且很有可能两者都会同时发生。
Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from 28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to arise from capital gains. For example, our three major investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to eventually deliver us capital gains.
企业资本利得税率从1987年起将从原来的28%调高到34%，这种改变对于伯克希尔来说将有重大影响，因为我们预计，未来我们的业务价值增长中，很大一部分将来自于资本收益，就像过去一样。例如我们主要的三大投资：大都会/ABC、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报，年末总市值已高达17亿美元，约占伯克希尔账面价值的75%，但每年反应在公司帐上的收益却只有900万美元，相反，这三家公司都保留了很高比例的收益，我们预计这最终将为我们带来资本收益。
The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.
新法案提高了所有未实现收益的资本利得税负，包含过去新法修正之前已存在的未实现收益，到年底为止，我们帐上有高达12亿未实现股票投资利得，新法律对我们资产负债表的影响将被推迟，因为GAAP规定，适用于未实现收益的递延税务责任应按去年的28%税率而不是目前的34%税率列报。预计这条GAAP规则很快就会改变。一旦这样改变，将会使得公司账面价值减少7300万美元，并被添加到递延税款账户上了。
Dividend and interest income received by our insurance companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law. First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual 80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds: interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will only be 85% tax-exempt.
保险业务收到的股利与利息收入的税负将比过去更重，首先企业从国内公司收到的股利税率将从15%增加到20%，第二是有关财产意外险业者剩下的80%的股利，若股票是在1986年8月7日以后取得的，还要再加课15%的所得税，第三也是与财产意外险业者相关，也就是在1986年8月7日以后取得的免税债券，将只有85%的比例可以免税。
The last two changes are very important. They mean that our income from the investments we make in future years will be significantly lower than would have been the case under the old law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least 10% from what we could previously have expected.
后面两项的变动非常重要，代表我们在以后年度，投资所得将会比旧法律来的少，我个人估计，这些变化最终将使我们的保险业务的盈利能力降低约10%。
The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income. Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.
新税法也会大幅影响财产意外险公司支付税负的时点，新规定要求我们在报税时将所提列的损失准备折现，这一变化将减少扣除额并增加应税收入。另一项规则，将在六年内分阶段实施，要求我们将未赚取的保费准备金的20%纳入应税收入。
Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning 21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you died.
虽然两者并不影响报表中应付所得税的数字，但却都会大幅加速我们支付税金的时点，意味着以前递延的税收现在将会提前缴纳，这对我们的获利能力将有相当大的影响。这好比当你21岁成年时，便被要求要对你一生所能赚得的收入预先课税，则你的终生财富将会比原来你死时再课税要来的少的多。
Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say. Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.
细心的读者可能会发现一项与我们先前所说不一致的地方，刚刚提到在价格竞争激烈的产业，我们认为税负的增减，只会将变化移转到客户的身上，对公司的获利影响有限，不过以目前正处在激烈竞争的财产意外险业来说，税负的增加直接影响的却是公司的获利能力。
The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major players will generally contend with similar tax equations.
这个行业可能是一个例外，原因是，不是所有的主要保险公司将工作与相同的税收方程式。存在重大差异的原因有几个：新的替代性最低税收将对一些公司产生实质性影响，但对其他公司没有影响；某些大型保险公司有巨额亏损结转，这将在很大程度上保护它们的收入在至少几年内不受重大税收的影响；一些大型保险公司的业绩将纳入非保险业务公司的综合收益。这些不同的条件将导致财产意外险的边际税率差异很大。然而，在铝、汽车和百货公司等大多数其他价格竞争性行业，情况并非如此，在这些行业，主要参与者通常会面临类似的税收方式。
The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.
税负成本基础不一，导致差异无法像在典型的价格竞争性行业那样完全转移到客户的身上，保险公司本身必须吸收大部分的税务负担。
A partial offset to these burdens is a "fresh start" adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31, 1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however, reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past - undiscounted except in special cases such as structured settlements.) The net effect of the "fresh start" is to give us a double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and earlier years.
另外部分负担可被1987年1月1日发生的"重新开始"调整所抵免，虽然当我们在1986年12月31日提列的损失准备，依照新税法规定，在1987年认列时将被打折，(当然在给各位的财务报告上的数字仍维持不变)，不过"重新开始"的净效应是给我们一个双重扣抵：我们将在1987年和未来几年获得部分已发生但未支付的保险损失的税收减免，这些损失已在1986年及更早年份已完全扣除为成本。
The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the $30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in important respects, will become more severe as time passes.
这一变化产生的账面价值增加尚未反应在年度的资产负债表上，依照现行的GAAP原则，这项影响数将会陆续反应在未来的损益表的减税利益上，我们预期这项重新的调整将会使得公司账面价值增加3000-4000万美元，不过须特别注意的是，这种优惠只是一次性的，而其它不利的税负增加却是永久的。
The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be - shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all. My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.
公用事业原则在新税法实施后将被废除，意思是说在1987年以后，对于企业的清算将双重征税，一个是在企业层面，一个是在股东个人层面。在过去企业层面的税负可通过适当方法予以规避，举例来说，假设今天我们把伯克希尔清算，(当然这是不可能的事)，在新制之下，公司股东从我们物业的销售中获得的收益，将比过去旧制时代少了很多，假设出售价格相同。虽然这只是假设，但事实上却影响到许多准备清算的公司，同样也会影响我们对投资标的的评估，如石油业、媒体业、或不动产业等等。虽然公司实际经营状况并没有多大改变，但其处分价值却因税法的修订而有极大的变动。个人认为，一般投资人或基金经理人可能尚未完全了解其严重性。
This section of our report has been longer and more complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law are many and important, particularly for property/casualty insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with any precision.
我们报告的这一部分比我所希望的要长和复杂，但法律的变化是多方面的，也是重要的，特别是对财产意外保险公司而言。正如我所指出的，新法律将损害伯克希尔的业绩，但其负面影响无法以任何精确度量化。
We bought a corporate jet last year. What you have heard about such planes is true: they are very expensive and a luxury in situations like ours where little travel to out-of-the-way places is required. And planes not only cost a lot to operate, they cost a lot just to look at. Pre-tax, cost of capital plus depreciation on a new $15 million plane probably runs $3 million annually. On our own plane, bought for $850,000 used, such costs run close to $200,000 annually.
去年公司新添购了一架飞机，没错一架对很少到远处旅行的我们来说，算是相当昂贵且豪华的飞机，这架飞机不仅所费不贷，还要花许多钱在保养之上，一架1,500万美元的新飞机，每年光是帐上的资金成本与折旧提列就要300万美金，比起先前那架85万美元二手飞机，每年只会产生20万美元的费用，确实有极大的差别。
Cognizant of such figures, your Chairman, unfortunately, has in the past made a number of rather intemperate remarks about corporate jets. Accordingly, prior to our purchase, I was forced into my Galileo mode. I promptly experienced the necessary "counter-revelation" and travel is now considerably easier - and considerably costlier - than in the past. Whether Berkshire will get its money’s worth from the plane is an open question, but I will work at achieving some business triumph that I can (no matter how dubiously) attribute to it. I’m afraid Ben Franklin had my number. Said he: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
虽然充分了解其中的差异，不幸的是你们的主席还是对于企业专用飞机发表了许多不当的言论，因此在购买之前，我不得已暂时变身成为伽利略，突然间得到一项反启示，原来旅行可以比过去来的容易多了，只是也变得比过去更贵了，到底伯克希尔会不会因为这架飞机而受益，目前尚无定论，但我个人一定会将部分企业的成功因素归诸于它(不管别人如何地怀疑)，我很害怕富兰克林打电话告诉我说：没错！人类身为一种有理性的动物实在是太方便了，只要他想要做的，随时可以找一个理由来解释它。
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1986 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,934 charities were recipients.
大约有97%的股东参加了去年的股东指定捐赠计划，通过这项计划去年我们总共捐出了400万美元给1,934个不同的慈善团体机构，
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 58 and 59. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1987 will be ineligible for the 1987 program.
我们促请新加入的股东赶快看一看相关的计划，若你在未来年度也想要参加，务必确认将股份登记在自己而非信托公司的名下。
Last year almost 450 people attended our shareholders’ meeting, up from about 250 the year before (and from about a dozen ten years ago). I hope you can join us on May 19th in Omaha. Charlie and I like to answer owner-related questions and I can promise you that our shareholders will pose many good ones. Finishing up the questions may take quite a while - we had about 65 last year so you should feel free to leave once your own have been answered.
去年总计有450位股东参加股东年会，(前年约有250位，十年前则只有十几位)，我很期望各位在5月19日都能到奥马哈来参加今年的股东会，查理与我会很乐意为各位回答所有有关公司经营的问题，去年所有股东总共提了65个问题，其中有许多相当好的意见。
Last year, after the meeting, one shareholder from New Jersey and another from New York went to the Furniture Mart, where each purchased a $5,000 Oriental rug from Mrs. B. (To be precise, they purchased rugs that might cost $10,000 elsewhere for which they were charged about $5,000.) Mrs. B was pleased - but not satisfied - and she will be looking for you at the store after this year’s meeting. Unless our shareholders top last year’s record, I’ll be in trouble. So do me (and yourself) a favor, and go see her.
去年股东会结束后，两位分别来自纽泽西与纽约的股东到内布拉斯加家具店花了5千元向B夫人各买了一套市价1万元的地毯，B夫人相当高兴但却不甚满意，所以今年股东会后，B夫人将在店内等待各位，希望各位能够打败去年的记录，否则我可能会有麻烦，所以各位请帮帮忙，不要忘了顺道去看看她。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事长
February 27, 1987
1987.02.27
First a short quiz: below are abbreviated 1986 statements of earnings for two companies. Which business is the more valuable?
首先是一个简短的测验：以下是两家公司1986年的简要损益表。哪个公司更有价值？
| (000s Omitted) | Company O 公司 O |
Company N 公司 N |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues 收入 |
$ 677,240 | $ 677,240 |
| Costs of Goods Sold 销售成本: |
||
| Historical costs, excluding depreciation 历史成本，不包括折旧 |
$ 341,170 | $ 341,170 |
| Special non-cash inventory costs 特殊非现金存货成本 |
4,979 (1) | |
| Depreciation of plant and equipment 厂房和设备折旧 |
8,301 | 13,355 (2) |
| 349,471 | 359,504 | |
| Gross Profit 毛利润 |
$ 327,769 | $ 317,736 |
| Selling & Admin. Expense 销售和管理费用 |
$ 260,286 | $ 260,286 |
| Amortization of Goodwill 商誉摊销 |
595 (3) | |
| 260,286 | 260,881 | |
| Operating Profit 营业利润 |
$ 67,483 | $ 56,855 |
| Other Income, Net 其他净收入 |
4,135 | 4,135 |
| Pre-Tax Income 税前利润 |
$ 71,618 | $ 60,990 |
| Applicable Income Tax 适用所得税: |
||
| Historical deferred and current tax 历史递延和当期税款 |
$ 31,387 | $ 31,387 |
| Non-Cash Inter-period Allocation Adjustment 非现金跨期分配调整 |
998 (4) | |
| 31,387 | 32,385 | |
| Net Income 净利润 |
$ 40,231 | $ 28,605 |
(Numbers (1) through (4) designate items discussed later in this section.)
（数字(1)到(4)表示本节稍后讨论的项。）
As you've probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the "O" (for "old") column we have shown what the company's 1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the "N" (for "new") column we have shown Scott Fetzer's GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire.
正如你可能已经猜到的那样，公司O和公司N是同一家公司：Scott Fetzer。 公司「O」代表旧公司，指的是假设我们在1986年没有购买该公司，按照GAAP会计准则编制的损益表，公司「N」代表新公司，指的是在1986年伯克希尔收购该公司后，按照GAAP会计准则编制的损益表。
It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both "companies" generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.
应该强调的是，这两家公司描述了同一个经济现实，就是营收、薪资、税收等相同。并且两个公司贡献给股东的现金流也一样，唯一不同的就是适用的会计规则。
So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?
那么，各位专家们，哪一份报表才是事实？管理者和投资者应该关注哪一份报表？
Before we tackle those questions, let's look at what produces the disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.
在处理这些问题之前，让我们先看看这两家之间到底有哪些差异。我们将试着在某些方面简化讨论，当然简化不会导致错误的分析或结论。
The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Scott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by "purchase-price adjustments." In Scott Fetzer's case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So we paid a premium of $142.6 million.
新公司N和旧公司O之间的差异是因为我们购买Scott Fetzer支付的金额与其会计公布的账面价值不同。根据GAAP会计准则，这种差异(溢价或折价)必须计入「购买法差异调整」来说明。就本例而言，我们支付了3.15亿美元买下账面价值1.724亿美元的资产，中间产生1.426亿美元的溢价。
The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current values. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer's inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount from current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.
会计原则规定处理支付溢价的第一步是将流动资产的账面价值调整为现在价值。在实务中，这一要求通常受影响的是存货等资产，可立即变现的应收账款则不受影响。由于存货计价方式采用后进先出法和其他复杂的会计核算，Scott Fetzer的2290万美元早期存货的帐列价值比市价折让3730万美元。因此，第一个会计举措就是将1.426亿美元溢价中的3730万美元用来调整存货的账面价值。
Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate.
假设调整流动资产后还有溢价，下一步就是调整固定资产为现在价值。在我们的案例中，我们还需要一些会计技巧处理相关的递延所得税。由于这只是简单的讨论，我将跳过细节并直接给你结果：固定资产部分增加了6800万美元现值，又从递延所得税负债科目中扣除了1300万美元。合计进行了8100万美元的固定资产项目的调整后，还剩下2430万美元的溢价需要分配。
Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded pension liabilities. In Scott Fetzer's case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.
如果有必要，接下来通常需要采取两个步骤：一个是将商誉以外的无形资产调整为当前公允价值，一个是将负债重述为当前公允价值，通常影响长期债务和无准备金的养老金负债。然而，在Scott Fetzer的案例中，这些步骤都不需要。
The final accounting adjustment we needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as "excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired"). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet of Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.
在调整所有的资产和负债为公允市场价值后，我们需要进行的最后一项会计调整是将剩余溢价分配给商誉这个科目(专业解释为"取得成本超过所收购净资产公允价值的部分")。这笔剩余金额为2,430万美元。因此，收购前的Scott Fetzer公司O的资产负债表，并购交易之后，转换为公司N的资产负债表。实际上，两个资产负债表都描述了同一家公司的资产和负债。但是，如你所见，某些科目差异巨大。
| (000s Omitted) | Company O 公司 O |
Company N 公司 N |
|---|---|---|
| Assets |
||
| Cash and Cash Equivalents 现金及现金等价物 |
$ 3,593 | $ 3,593 |
| Receivables, net 应收账款净额 |
90,919 | 90,919 |
| Inventories 存货净额 |
77,489 | 114,764 |
| Other 其他 |
5,954 | 5,954 |
| Total Current Assets 流动资产总额 |
177,955 | 215,230 |
| Property, Plant, and Equipment, net 固定资产净额 |
80,967 | 148,960 |
| Investments in and Advances to Unconsolidated Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures 对未合并子公司以及合资企业的投资和垫资 |
93,589 | 93,589 |
| Other Assets, including Goodwill 其他资产，包括商誉 |
9,836 | 34,210 |
| $ 362,347 | $ 491,989 | |
| Liabilities 资产总额 |
||
| Notes Payable and Current Portion of Long-term Debt 应付票据和长期债务的当期部分 |
$ 4,650 | $ 4,650 |
| Accounts Payable 应付账款 |
39,003 | 39,003 |
| Accrued Liabilities 应计负债 |
84,939 | 84,939 |
| Total Current Liabilities 流动负债总额 |
128,592 | 128,592 |
| Long-term Debt and Capitalized Leases 长期债务和资本化租赁 |
34,669 | 34,669 |
| Deferred Income Taxes 递延所得税 |
17,052 | 4,075 |
| Other Deferred Credits 其他递延项目 |
9,657 | 9,657 |
| Total Liabilities 负债总额 |
189,970 | 176,993 |
| Shareholders' Equity 股东权益 |
172,377 | 314,996 |
| $ 362,347 | $ 491,989 |
The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of the earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed to the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:
公司N利润数字比公司O低了很多，这是因为资产负债表中的某些资产必须减值或者定期折旧或摊销所致。帐列资产数额越高，每年折旧或摊销的费用就越高。资产负债表减计而流入损益表的费用在前面损益表中进行了编号注释：
1. $4,979,000 for non-cash inventory costs resulting, primarily, from reductions that Scott Fetzer made in its inventories during 1986; charges of this kind are apt to be small or non-existent in future years.
497.9万美元存货跌价损失，主要是由于Scott Fetzer在1986年期间减少存货所致，此类费用在未来几年将会变小或消失。
2. $5,054,000 for extra depreciation attributable to the write-up of fixed assets; a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.
505.4万美元由于固定资产减值产生的额外折旧，在接下来的12年的金额与此数相当。
3. $595,000 for amortization of Goodwill; this charge will be made annually for 39 more years in a slightly larger amount because our purchase was made on January 6 and, therefore, the 1986 figure applies to only 98% of the year.
59.5万美元用于商誉的摊销，该费用还要持续39年。由于我们的购买是在1986年1月6日进行的，应占当年摊销的98%，因此以后每年的金额会略高。
4. $998,000 for deferred-tax acrobatics that are beyond my ability to explain briefly (or perhaps even non-briefly); a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.
99.8万美元递延所得税摊销，这部分处理非常复杂超出了我简要解释的能力，总之该费用还会持续12年以上。
It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The "new" Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the "old" Scott Fetzer would have, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the "old" and "new" company might differ widely.
有一点很重要，这些新增的总计1160万美元会计摊销成本是不能抵扣所得税的。所以新公司缴纳所得税与旧公司完全相同，尽管依照GAAP会计准则这两个公司的损益表差异很大，就净利润而言，未来也是如此。当然，万一Scott Fetzer出售其部分业务，两者的税负影响就会有不同。
By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the "old" and "new" Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the higher inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.
到1986年底，通过扣除1160万美元的摊销成本后，新旧两家公司的净资产之间的差额已从1.426亿美元减少到1.310亿美元。随着时间的流逝，类似的摊销费用将导致大部分收购溢价消失，两个公司的资产负债表将趋于一致，然而土地或存货的向上重估必须等到这些资产出售后才会消失。
What does all this mean for owners? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth some given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day?
这一切对股东意味着什么？伯克希尔的股东是购买了一家在1986年盈利4020万美元的公司，还是买了一家年盈利2860万美元的公司？这1160 万美元的新成本对我们来说是真正的经济成本吗？投资者是否应该付出更多的代价买旧公司呢？而且，如果一家企业的价值是某个固定的市盈率倍数，那么Scott Fetzer在我们购买它的前一天是否比第二天更值钱呢？
If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called "owner earnings." These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N's items (1) and (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)
如果能想通这些问题，我们就能明白所谓的「股东盈余」。它代表(a)报告收益，加上(b)折旧、损耗、摊销和某些其他非现金成本(例如新公司N的1-4项目)，减去(c)为充分保持其长期竞争地位和规模，企业必须为厂房、设备等年均资本化支出。(如果企业需要额外的营运资本来维持其产能和竞争地位，这部分增量也应包括在(c)中。但是，如果营收规模没有变化，存货计价采用LIFO后入先出法的企业通常不需要额外的营运资本。)
Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since( c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figure, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes's observation: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong."
我们的「股东盈余」公式与GAAP会计准则报告的精确收益数字并不会完全相同，因为(c)本身是一个估计值，而且有时很难精确估量。尽管存在这个问题，我们认为股东盈余比GAAP数字，对于购买股票的投资者和购买整个企业的经理人来说，用来评估企业价值很有意义。我们同意凯恩斯的观点："我宁要模糊的正确也不要精确的错误。"
The approach we have outlined produces "owner earnings" for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you should be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because( c) is necessarily the same in both cases.
用我们的方法评估旧公司O和新公司N会得出相同的「股东盈余」，这意味两者的评估价值也相同，正如常识告诉你的那样。之所以得到这个结果是因为(a)和(b)的总和在O和N中相同，至于(c)两种情况下本来就相同。
And what do Charlie and I, as owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe ( c) is very close to the "old" company's (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the "new" company's (b) number of $19.9 million. Therefore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.
作为股东和管理者，查理和我认为Scott Fetzer「股东盈余」的正确数字是多少呢？在当前情况下，我们认为(c)项非常接近旧公司O的(b)项830万美元，远低于新公司N的(b)项1,990万美元。因此，我们认为O列中账面收益比N列中的账面收益更接近「股东盈余」。换句话说，我们认为Scott Fetzer的「股东盈余」远大于我们GAAP报告的数据。
That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when ( c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.
这显然是一种令人高兴的结果。但此类计算通常不会带来如此好的消息。大多数管理者可能会承认，长期而言，他们需要在业务上花费比(b)更多的资本，才能维持既有产能和竞争地位。当这种观念存在时，也就是(c)远超过(b)时，那么也代表GAAP报告的收益过分高估了「股东盈余」，而且高估程度非常惊人。近年来，石油工业就是一个显著的例子，如果大多数大型石油公司每年只花费(b)的资金，那他们的报告业绩将大幅萎缩。
All of this points up the absurdity of the "cash flow" numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract ( c) . Most sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations were to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.
所有这些充分表明了华尔街报告中经常提到的「现金流」数字的荒谬性。这些数字通常只包括(a)+(b)，却不减去(c)。大多数投资银行家的销售手册也使用类似欺骗性的陈述。这意味着所推介的公司就像商业世界里的金字塔——永远先进，无需更换、改进或翻新。事实上，如果全美企业正如这些投资银行所描述的，那么政府对这些工厂和设备支出的预测(采购经理人指数PMI)将不得不削减90%。
"Cash Flow", true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But "cash flow" is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, ( c) is always significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.
「现金流」的概念，在评估某些最初支出巨大，而后期支出却很小的企业是合适的，比如某些房地产企业，比如一家仅持有桥梁或极长寿命油气田的企业等，但在制造业、零售业、采掘业和公用事业等企业中毫无意义，因为对他们来说必须持续投入(c)的金额是巨大的。可以肯定的是，此类企业在特定年份内可以推迟重大的资本支出，但长期从5-10年时间段来看，他们不得不进行投资，否则企业必然走向衰败。
Why, then, are "cash flow" numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to justify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn't add (b) without subtracting ( c) : though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they'll go away, the same is not true for ( c) . The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring ( c) is headed for certain trouble.
那么，为什么「现金流」概念在今天如此流行？作为回答，我们承认我们存在偏见：我们相信这些数字经常是那些企业和证券的营销人员，企图将一些烂公司粉饰包装出售所惯用的手法。当(a)项GAAP的账面收益看起来不足以偿还其垃圾债券的债务或维持其愚蠢的股价的时候，销售人员就会顺理成章的专注于(a)+(b)这个好看的数字上，但是你加上(b)就必须要减去(c)。虽然有些牙医会告诉你，如果你能忘记牙痛的痛楚，那么它们就等于不存在，但对于(c)来说并不会消失。一家经理人或投资人在评估一个企业的偿债能力或股权价值时，只注意(a)+(b)而忽略(c)，麻烦一定会找上门来。
To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to ( c) . (The two items are not identical, of course. For example, at See's we annually make capitalized expenditures that exceed depreciation by $500,000 to $1 million, simply to hold our ground competitively.) Our conviction about this point is the reason we show our amortization and other purchase-price adjustment items separately in the table on page 8 and is also our reason for viewing the earnings of the individual businesses as reported there as much more closely approximating owner earnings than the GAAP figures.
总而言之：对于Scott Fetzer和我们其他业务而言，在扣除无形资产摊销和购买法价格调整数后，我们认为(b)在历史成本的基础上应当接近于(c)。举例来说，在喜诗糖果我们每年为了维持既有竞争力作出的资本化支出约超过折旧50-100万美元。这也是为什么我们在前面表格中分别列示了摊销项目和其他购买价格调整项目。同时我们认为，与GAAP相比，我们旗下个别企业的收益数字更接近真实「股东盈余」。
Questioning GAAP figures may seem impious to some. After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the "truth" about our business. But the accountants' job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.
或许某些人会觉得我们竟然胆敢对GAAP会计准则的报告收益提出质疑。但毕竟如果会计上不能告知我们企业的"真相"，我们为什么还要付钱给他们呢？当然会计师的工作是记录，而不是评估，评估工作还是要落在投资者和企业家的肩上。
Accounting numbers, of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.
当然，会计数字是商业的语言，因此对任何想要评估企业价值和跟踪其进展的人都有很大帮助。如果没有这些会计数字，查理和我会迷失方向：它们总是我们评估自己和他人业务的起点。然而，管理者和所有者需要记住，会计只是商业思维的一种辅助工具，绝不是完全代替品。