原文信息：
- 标题：1994 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1995-03-07
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Vito
- 校译：Vito
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.
本公司1994年的账面价值增加14.5亿美元，或增长了13.9%（标普1.3%）1，自现任管理层接手的30年以来，每股账面价值由当初的19美元增长到目前的10083美元，年复合增长率约为23%。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past.
伯克希尔副主席兼我的合伙人查理·芒格跟我本身很少做预测，不过有一点我们倒是很确定，那就是伯克希尔未来的表现将很难再像过去那样的辉煌。
The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula —— the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people —— is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, therefore, to keep on doing well.
问题不在于过去有效的方法将来会失效，相反，我们认为我们的成功方式：以合理的价格买进具有产业竞争优势同时由诚实有才干的人经营的企业，在将来同样能够获得合理的回报。因此，我们期望未来继续表现良好。
A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.
然而资本规模太大却是卓越投资成果的大敌，目前伯克希尔的账面价值已高达119亿美元，当初查理跟我开始经营这家公司时，公司的账面价值只有2,200万美元。虽然像往常一样依然有许多好公司，但相比伯克希尔的资本规模，很难再找到规模足够大的收购对象（就像是查理常常说的：如果一件事情不值得去做，那就不值得做好）。现在我们只考虑买进至少一亿美元以上的投资，在这样的高门槛下，伯克希尔的投资范围一下子缩小了许多。
Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."2
尽管如此，我们还是会秉持让我们成功的方法，绝对不会放松原有的标准，泰德·威廉姆斯（Ted Williams）在《我一生的故事》中写道：“我个人的看法是，如果你想成为一个优秀的击球手，首先得等到一个好球再去击打。这是教科书里的第一课。如果我强迫自己对最拿手区域以外的球击打，我将不会成为打击率 .344的优秀击球手。而可能只是个打击率 .250的普通击球手。”查理和我都同意这样的看法，因此我们将努力等待进入我们自己击球区域的机会。2
We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.
我们将继续无视任何政治和经济预测，这对许多投资者和商业人士来说是一种代价昂贵的干扰。三十年来，没有人能够正确地预测到越战会持续扩大、工资与价格管制、两次石油危机、总统的辞职下台以及苏联的解体、道琼斯指数在黑色周一大跌22.6%或508点，或者是国债收益率会在2.8-17.4%之间巨幅波动。
But, surprise —— none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
不过令人惊讶的是，这些曾经轰动一时的重大事件却从未对本杰明·格雷厄姆的投资哲学造成丝毫的影响，也从没有让以合理的价格买进优良的企业看起来有任何的不妥。想象一下，若是我们因为那些未知的恐惧而推迟或改变我们的资本配置，将会使我们付出多大的代价。事实上，我们曾经的那些最好投资的买入时机，通常都出现在对某些宏观事件的悲观气氛达到顶峰时。恐惧虽然是墙头草的敌人，但却是价值信徒的朋友。
A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.
未来30年一定还会有一连串令人震惊的事件发生，我们不会妄想要去预测它或是从中获利。如果我们还能够像过去那样买中类似的优质企业，那么那些外在的意外冲击对我们的长期业绩几乎不会有影响。
What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.
而就像我们曾经承诺过的——除了盈利没办法像以前那么好之外——你们持有伯克希尔股权所享受到的待遇将会与查理和我完全一致。如果你们亏钱，我们也不会好过；如果我们吃香的，那么你们也会同样喝辣的。而且，我们绝对不会做任何占股东便宜的事去破坏这样美好的合伙关系。
We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.
此外我们也向大家进一步保证我绝大部分的个人财富将继续集中在伯克希尔的股份之上：我们不会在要求各位与我们一同投资时，却把自己的钱投向别处。此外，巴菲特家族大部分成员，以及在1960年代查理和我经营合伙公司时期的大部分老朋友，他们的资产也绝大部分集中于伯克希尔的股份。为不负所托而竭尽全力，再也没有比这些更好的激励了。
Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest expense.
值得庆幸的是，我们可以在一个很好的基础上努力打拼。十年前，也就是在1984年，伯克希尔的保险子公司持有价值17亿美元的股票投资组合，每股约当有1,500美元的投资。扣除这部分的收益与资本利得不算，伯克希尔当年的税前利润只有大约600万美元。没错，虽然我们在制造、零售以及服务业务方面依然有不错的利润，但是大部分的收益都被保险业务的承保损失、经营费用以及利息支出所抵消掉了。
Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters).
时至今日，我们持有的股票投资组合价值超过180亿美元，每股约15,000美元。若是我们再次将这些股票投资所产生的收益扣除的话，我们在1994年的税前收益是3.84亿美元。十年来，雇佣的员工人数从原来的5,000人增加到22,000人（包含总部的11人在内）。
We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.
之所以能有这样的成果，要归功于旗下这群特别的经理人，在他们的经营之下，那些资质平平的普通生意才结出了不凡的硕果。Casey Stengel将管理一支棒球队形容为：靠着别人打出全垒打获得回报。这也是我在伯克希尔的讨巧之处。
The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.
我们持有少数股权企业的贡献，对伯克希尔来说也功不可没。从一些统计数字中，可以看出他们的重要性：1994年可口可乐总计卖出2,800亿罐八盎司饮料，每罐大概能赚一美分。不过积沙成塔。若按伯克希尔拥有7.8%可口可乐的股权比例，我们大概可以分配到210亿罐，总计光是软饮料贡献给我们的收益就有二亿美元。同样的，通过对吉列的持股，伯克希尔大概可以分得全世界刮胡刀7%的市场份额（以营收而非销量计算），约为2.5亿美元的销售额。另外在拥有530亿美元资产的富国银行，我们持有13%的股权大概就等于是一家拥有70亿美元资产的伯克希尔银行，它每年盈利大约一亿美元。
It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.
我们宁愿拥有希望之钻的一部分，也不愿拥有水钻的100%，而刚刚提到的那些公司都可堪称稀有宝石。重要的是我们不仅限于少数的这几个，以后还会收集更多。
Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.
股票价格仍会持续波动，有时是剧烈波动，同时经济景气的周期也会起起落落。然而就长期而言，我们相信伯克希尔所拥有的这类优良企业的价值很大可能还会继续以令人满意的速度成长。
We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.
我们会定期报告每股的帐面价值，虽然它的用处不大，但这是个比较容易计算的数字。我们一再提醒各位，真正重要的是内在价值，这是一个无法精确计算但必须估算出的数字。
For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid."
例如我们可以很准确地告诉大家1964年每股的帐面价值是19.46美元，不过这个数字很明显高于其内在价值，因为公司的所有资产都集中于盈利能力不佳的纺织事业上。我们的纺织资产既没有持续经营价值也没有同帐面价值匹配的清算价值。所以任何想要了解1964年伯克希尔资产负债表健全性的人士，得到的答案跟恶名昭彰的好莱坞大亨可能给你的答案一样："放心好了，负债表如假包换！"
Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also.
如今伯克希尔的情况已完全逆转，我们许多控股企业的内在价值远远超过其帐面价值。（我们不控股的那些公司，如可口可乐或吉列刮胡刀则是以目前市价列示。）不过我们仍继续向各位报告帐面价值的数字，因为，尽管被低估，但它们是伯克希尔内在价值的一项粗略跟踪指标。事实上，去年这两项指标颇为一致：帐面价值增加了13.9%，与内在价值增速相仿。
We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.
我们将内在价值定义为一家企业在其生命周期内所能产生现金流量的折现值。任何计算内在价值的人都会得到一个高度主观的数字，随着未来现金流量估计的修正与利率的变动，这个数字会不断变化。虽然模糊难辨，但内在价值却是最重要的，也是评估投资标的与企业相对吸引力的「唯一合乎逻辑」的方法。
To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
为了理解历史投入的帐面价值与未来产出的内在价值会有怎样不同的演变，让我们看看另一种投资形式：大学教育。将教育成本视为其帐面价值。为尽量准确估计，还要包含学生因上大学而放弃工作收入的机会成本。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
在这里，我们暂不考虑非经济效益而只专注于经济效益。首先，我们必须先估计这位毕业生终其一生的职业生涯所能获得的全部收入，然后再扣除要是他没有接受这项教育，原本可以得到的全部收入的估计值。从而我们可以得到因为这项教育投资，他可以获得的超额收入，然后以一个适当的利率加以折现，得到截至毕业日止的折现值。这个结果也就是这项教育投资所能够带来的内在经济价值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
有些毕业生发现，其教育成本可能远高于计算出来的内在价值，这就代表着不值得他去接受这样的教育；而另有一些是接受教育所产生的内在价值远高于投入的教育成本，那么代表他接受教育是明智的选择。显而易见的是，不管哪种情况下，账面价值作为内在价值的指标都毫无意义。
Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner.
现在就让我们少一点学究气，来看看伯克希尔实际投资的ScottFetzer这个具体的例证。在这里我们不但可以解释帐面价值与内在价值之间如何变化，同时可以藉此替大家上一课期待已久的会计学。当然这次我选择说明的对象是一个相当成功的并购投资案。
Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well.
伯克希尔在1986年初收购了ScottFetzer。当时这家公司拥有22项不同的事业，时至今日我们没有新增，也没有出售其中任何一项。他主要的营运集中在世界百科全书、Kirby吸尘器与Campbell Hausfeld空压机，当然其余的事业也是收入的重要组成部分。
We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double its book value.
当时我们斥资3.152亿美元买下Scott Fetzer1.726亿美元的帐面价值资产。溢价部分的1.426亿美元，代表我们认为这家公司的内在价值大概是其帐面价值的两倍。
In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.
下表列示自我们买下ScottFetzer后，历年来的帐面价值以及它的利润与股息：
| Year | Beginning Book Value (1) (In $ Millions) | Earnings (2) (In $ Millions) | Dividends (3) (In $ Millions) | Ending Book Value (4)=(1)+(2)-(3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | $ 172.6 | $ 40.3 | $ 125.0 | $ 87.9 |
| 1987 | 87.9 | 48.6 | 41.0 | 95.5 |
| 1988 | 95.5 | 58.0 | 35.0 | 118.6 |
| 1989 | 118.6 | 58.5 | 71.5 | 105.5 |
| 1990 | 105.5 | 61.3 | 33.5 | 133.3 |
| 1991 | 133.3 | 61.4 | 74.0 | 120.7 |
| 1992 | 120.7 | 70.5 | 80.0 | 111.2 |
| 1993 | 111.2 | 77.5 | 98.0 | 90.7 |
| 1994 | 90.7 | 79.3 | 76.0 | 94.0 |
Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in 1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.
因为在达成交易当年，公司现金充裕，所以虽然ScottFetzer在1986年的盈利只有4,030万美元，但却能够支付伯克希尔1.25亿美元的股息。另外还有一点我必须强调的是，我们并没有在收购后对其资产负债表加杠杆3。事实上，在我们并购之初公司已经从有限的负债变成几无债务（除了下属金融子公司的必要负债）。我们也没有把工厂售后回租或是出售应收帐款之类的举动。在我们买下的这几年，该公司的资本运作一直相当保守并且维持很高的流动性。
As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500, a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.
大家可以看到，公司的收益在我们买下之后持续稳定的增加，不过于此同时账面价值却未呈等比例的增加。也因此在我们买下该公司时，就已经有相当不错的股东权益回报率，到现在又变得更加出色。将ScottFetzer的表现与财富500强公司的表现进行比较，更说明了它的非凡之处：如果它是一家独立的公司，它完全有资格进入这个名单。
Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest available for inspection - the company's return on equity would have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth.
以最新的1993年财富500强名单来说，该公司的股东权益回报率排名第四。故事还没完。前三名分别是Insilco、LTV与Gaylord，全部都是因为当年在破产程序中获得的债务免除而致使账面利润暴增，但扣除这些之后并没有什么实质性的盈利。因此撇开这些非经营性意外之财，ScottFetzer的股东权益回报率足以名列500强首位，且远远领先第二名，甚至是第十名的两倍之多。
You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.
或许你会期待该公司的成功只能用收益周期的高峰、垄断地位或是财务杠杆来解释，不过全都不对，这家公司真正成功的原因在于CEO拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）优异的经营技能，这点在后面我们还会详加报告。
First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer, that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet. I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings statement.
接下来是之前说过的会计课，我们支付的超过ScottFetzer帐面价值1.426亿美元的溢价，将会被记录在伯克希尔的资产负债表上，详细的细节我在此省略（伯克希尔1986年致股东信的附录部分有详细解释），直奔主题：这些溢价在入账之后，不管怎样都必须当作成本按年摊销，并计入每年的损益表内。
The following table shows, first, the annual charges Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay, and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott Fetzer actually employs in its business.
下表列示，第一栏是伯克希尔每年必须慢慢摊销的收购ScottFetzer所产生的溢价的金额，第二栏是摊销后账面商誉的余额4。这些费用对公司现金或税负支出都不会有影响，同时就我们的观点而言，也没有任何实质的经济意义（虽然很多会计师可能不同意我们的看法）。这不过是让我们的帐列投资成本能够慢慢减少，到最后终与ScottFetzer帐列的账面价值一致的方法而已。
| Year | Beginning Purchase Premium (In $ Millions) | Purchase-Premium Charge to Berkshire Earnings (In $ Millions) | Ending Purchase Premium (In $ Millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | $ 142.6 | $ 11.6 | $ 131.0 |
| 1987 | 131.0 | 7.1 | 123.9 |
| 1988 | 123.9 | 7.9 | 115.9 |
| 1989 | 115.9 | 7.0 | 108.9 |
| 1990 | 108.9 | 7.1 | 101.9 |
| 1991 | 101.9 | 6.9 | 95.0 |
| 1992 | 95.0 | 7.7 | 87.2 |
| 1993 | 87.2 | 28.1 | 59.1 |
| 1994 | 59.1 | 4.9 | 54.2 |
Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to $54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year-end book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have just as consistently marked down its carrying value through purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and net worth.
大家可能注意到，截至1994年底为止，帐列的溢价还剩下5420万美元（已摊销8840万）。这个数字若再加上ScottFetzer当年底的账面价值9400万美元的话，就等于伯克希尔帐上持有的该公司的投资成本1.482亿美元。这个数字甚至不到当初我们买下它时的一半。然而，ScottFetzer现在每年所赚的钱，却是当时的两倍。很明显的，其内在价值一直都在成长，然而，因为按照会计规则，最初的收购溢价必须逐步摊销，这使得ScottFetzer在伯克希尔资产负债表上的帐列价值一再向下调整，这种情况，最终导致伯克希尔的账面利润和净值向下失真。5
The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart and high-grade manager.
ScottFetzer内在价值与其在伯克希尔帐上的帐面价值的差异是巨大的，如同先前我曾经提到的，如今也很高兴再重申一次，这种令人愉悦的不对称现象完全应归功于Ralph Schey——一位专业专注、聪明过人的高级经理人。
The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important.
Ralph之所以能够成功的原因并不复杂，我的老师格雷厄姆45年前就告诉我：在投资中，没有必要把事情搞得锣鼓震天来谋求非凡的结果。而后在我的投资生涯中，我惊讶地发现，这道理也适用在企业管理之上。经理人真正应该做的是做好基本工作而不三心二意。这正是Ralph的行事方法。设立好正确的目标，然后毫不犹豫放手去做。私底下，Ralph是个很好共事的人。他对问题直言不讳，自信而不自大。
He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.
他经验丰富。虽然我不知道Ralph今年真正的岁数，但我确信他跟我们旗下其它许多经理人一样老早就过了65岁。在伯克希尔，我们注重的是绩效，而不是年资。查理今年71岁，而我64岁，我们都把拳王George Foreman（拳击史上年龄最大的世界重量级拳王）的照片摆在桌上。你可以记下，我们对于强制退休年龄的反感程度将会逐年增加。
Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares - it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.
理解内在价值，对经营者和投资者一样重要。当经理人做出资金配置决策时——也包含是否回购股份——至关重要的是，这些决策必须能够增加公司的内在价值，而不是减损。这些原则看来理所当然，但是违反的情况却屡见不鲜。当错误的资本配置发生，股东权益就会受到损害。
For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
举例来说，在筹划企业合并交易时，许多经理人都会将重点置于每股收益是会被稀释还是反稀释（在金融机构则按每股帐面价值）。过分强调这点是相当危险的。回到我们先前所举大学教育的例子，假设一位25岁MBA一年级的学生，考虑将他个人未来的经济利益与另一位25岁的工人合并。你会发现，一个无收入的MBA学生与工人以股换股合并的话，会立刻提高近几年的收入（而且是明显地立即提高）。但是对MBA学生来说，还有什么交易比这更愚蠢的呢？
In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
在公司交易中，对于潜在买主来说，只关注当前收益，却不管潜在的卖方拥有不同的业务前景、不一样的非经营性资产或不同的资本结构，是一件很愚蠢的事。在伯克希尔，我们拒绝了许多本可以让当前收益美观但有损每股内在价值的投资机会。相反，我们的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的建议：“紧盯冰球要到达的地方而不是它现在的位置。”因此，比起运用一般的投资标准，我们的股东现在多赚了好几十亿美元。
The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."
很遗憾的是，大部分的并购交易案都很不公平：对于被并购方来说，算是得到解脱；并购一方的管理层名利双收；双方的投资银行家与专业顾问也都能跟着大捞一笔。只不过真正受害的却是并购方背后的全体股东，他们损失惨重。原因在于并购公司放弃的内在价值通常多于获得的内在价值。如果这种事做的太多，就像是Wachovia美联银行已退休的领导人JohnMedlin说的那样：“你们会自食其果。”6
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.
就长期而言，公司经营者配置资本的能力将会对企业的价值产生很大的影响。我们认为，一家好公司所能产出的现金，比其本身内部所需投入的，要多的多（至少是在早期成长期以后）。当然，公司可以通过分配股利或回购股份的方式将资本返还给股东。但是，通常企业的CEO们会咨询公司战略规划部门、顾问或是投资银行家们，搞那么一两次并购是否有利可图。这样的做法就好象是问你的室内设计师，你是否需要一张价值五万美元的地毯。
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.
并购问题又因为隐藏其后的生物本能而变本加厉：许多CEO之所以能终临高位，部分的原因正是在于他们极富动物精神与野望。如果一位经理人颇具这类特质——当然我们必须承认，有时这也是种优势——然而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失。而这样的CEO被其顾问们鼓励去进行并购交易时，他的反应就会像一位十几岁的孩子被父亲鼓励去过成人的性生活一样。这样的做法是强人所难。7
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
几年前，我的一位CEO朋友半开玩笑地在无意间透露出许多大型交易的病态过程。这位CEO当时管理着一家意外和财产险公司，在董事会上，他向董事会成员解释为何公司必须要收购一家人寿保险公司。在对此次收购的经济和战略上的理由喋喋不休之后，他突然停止了演说，带着顽皮的表情说道：“好吧！伙计们，谁叫其它财产险公司也都有一家寿险公司呢。”
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.
在伯克希尔，我们的经理人们不断地通过看似平凡普通的业务，赚取惊人的回报。这些经理人们会首先在自身业务中寻找可以有效配置其利润的去处，之后再把多余的资本交回给查理跟我，然后我们会努力为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出更多的内在价值。我们的目标，是收购我们熟悉了解的、有持续竞争力且由我们喜爱的、由受人尊敬和值得信任的经理人所经营的公司的一部分或全部所有权。
At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging?
在伯克希尔，对经理人的薪酬待遇，我们努力做到与配置资本一样合情合理。举例来说，我们付给Ralph的薪酬是基于ScottFetzer的业绩，而非伯克希尔。这样的方式再合理不过了。因为他负责的是单一部门而非整个伯克希尔的营运。若是将他的薪酬跟伯克希尔挂钩，对Ralph来说将不公平。比如他在ScottFetzer击出全垒打但查理跟我却在伯克希尔把事情给搞砸了，这相当于否定了他的功劳；而如果伯克希尔其他部门大放异彩，ScottFetzer却表现平平，那么Ralph分享伯克希尔的盈利与奖金也不合理。
In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.
在设定薪酬待遇的标准时，我们希望兑现高薪的承诺，但要确保各个经理人的薪酬与其负责经营的业绩直接挂钩。当经理要对某项业务投入大笔资金时，我们会向经理人使用的增量资本收取很高的费率（14-17%）8，并以同样高的费率对待返还的资本。
The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his business.
这种资本有价的游戏规则，在ScottFetzer的经营中再清楚也不过了。如果Ralph可以运用增量资金创造出高额回报，那么他这么做是值得的：当增量资本的回报超过我们设定的标准时，他所获得的奖金也会跟着水涨船高。但我们奖金的计算是对应的：当增量资金的回报低于我们设定的标准时，对Ralph个人和伯克希尔来说，这种差额的代价同样高昂。这种双向安排的结果是，当Ralph在业务中不能有效利用资本时，直接送回奥马哈同样获利丰厚。
It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of "heads I win, tails you lose."
上市公司流行强调每一项薪酬计划中管理层的利益与股东是相一致的。在我们看来，「相一致」意味着无论顺风还是逆风，管理层都和股东同担盈亏，而不仅仅是公司营运顺利时才分享利益。许多公司所谓"一致"的薪酬计划在我们的测试标准中都不及格，实质上是一种"赚钱是我的功劳，赔钱由你们承担"的欺诈游戏。
A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.
这种错位的情况最常见的莫过于员工期权计划了，因为购股权的认购价格并没有定期调整，以补偿留存收益正在增加公司财富的事实。假设一家公司给予员工十年的购股权，又假如该公司股利发放的比例很低，由于留存资金的复利作用，经理人可能混混日子便能得到丰厚的回报。计较一点的人甚至会发现，每年支付给股东的利益越少，期权计划中的经理人得到的利益便会越多。到目前为止，在任何公司要求股东批准期权计划的委托书中，我还没有看到阐明这极重要的一点。
I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.
我忍不住要提到我们与ScottFetzer总裁RalphSchey之间的薪资协议，在我们正式买下公司之后，只花了五分钟就达成了这项协议，这中间也没有律师或薪酬顾问的"助攻"。协议仅仅包含了几个简单的条款，跟薪酬顾问为了高额账单而提出的复杂条款完全不同，当然每年还须定期检视以决定是否有修正的必要。我们与Ralph的协议到目前为止从未更动过。当初在1986年我们双方认为公平合理的，至今仍然如此。同样，我们与旗下事业其它经理人的协议也都相当简单，尽管每个协议的条款都有所不同，以适应相关业务的经济特点，以及在某些情况下经理人持有该业务部分所有权等等情况。
In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.
在所有个案中，我们追求的都是公平合理。当然，经理人对于高的不合理，或是名不符实的回报通常都来者不拒，必竟没有人会拒绝免费彩票的。但是这类的安排，对于公司的资源来说是一种浪费，同时也会导致经理人忘记他真正的职责所在。此外，母公司的非理性激励政策也会间接鼓励旗下子公司起而效尤。
At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need.
在伯克希尔，只有查理跟我对整个公司的经营负责。因此我们两人是唯二应该以公司的整体表现作为薪资回报依据的人。即便如此，这也不是我们真正想要的薪酬方式。我们倾心塑造了我们的公司和工作模式，好让我们可以与我们欣赏的人一起做我们喜欢的事。同样重要的是，我们可以不用被迫去做太多无聊或是不想做的工作。当这些物质与精神的回报流向伯克希尔总部时，我们是最大的受惠者。在这种田园诗般的工作环境中，我们不期望股东们再额外给予更多我们根本不需要的回报。9
Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."
事实上，就算不领薪水，查理和我都会为我们所拥有的这份“钱多事少离家近”的工作心满意足。基本上，我们赞同Ronald Reagan里根总统的信条：“辛勤工作不太可能要了一个人的命，但如果你非要亲自验证一下，那就有点犯傻了。”10
The table on the next page shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表列示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。就像我们在前面对ScottFetzer的分析中所讨论的类型一样，下表中被投资公司的收购溢价单独分离出来汇总列示。之所以这样做，是为了让旗下各事业的收益状况，不因被我们收购而有所影响。在我们看来，这样的表述方式对投资者或经理人来说比GAAP的方式更有帮助，因为GAAP要求按业务逐笔摊销收购溢价。当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与GAAP的数字一致。
| Pre-Tax Earnings | Pre-Tax Earnings | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) | 1994 | 1993 | 1994 | 1993 |
| Operating Earnings: | ||||
| Insurance Group: | ||||
| Underwriting | $ 129,926 | $ 30,876 | $ 80,860 | $ 20,156 |
| Net investment income | 419,422 | 375,946 | 350,453 | 321,321 |
| Buffalo News | 54,238 | 50,962 | 31,685 | 29,696 |
| Fechheimer | 14,260 | 13,442 | 7,107 | 6,931 |
| Finance Businesses | 21,568 | 22,695 | 14,293 | 14,161 |
| Kirby | 42,349 | 39,147 | 27,719 | 25,056 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart | 17,356 | 21,540 | 8,652 | 10,398 |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group | 39,435 | 38,196 | 24,909 | 23,809 |
| See’s Candies | 47,539 | 41,150 | 28,247 | 24,367 |
| Shoe Group | 85,503 | 44,025* | 55,750 | 28,829 |
| World Book | 24,662 | 19,915 | 17,275 | 13,537 |
| Purchase-Price Premium Charges | (22,595) | (17,033) | (19,355) | (13,996) |
| Interest Expense** | (60,111) | (56,545) | (37,264) | (35,614) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (10,419) | (9,448) | (6,668) | (5,994) |
| Other | 36,232 | 28,428 | 22,576 | 15,094 |
| Operating Earnings | 839,365 | 643,296 | 606,239 | 477,751 |
| Sales of Securities | 91,332 | 546,422 | 61,138 | 356,702 |
| Decline in Value of USAir Preferred Stock | (268,500) | --- | (172,579) | --- |
| Tax Accruals Caused by New Accounting Rules | --- | --- | --- | (146,332) |
| Total Earnings - All Entities | $ 662,197 | $ 1,189,718 | $ 494,798 | $ 688,121 |
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired, November 7, 1993.
**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
第37-48页上载有这些业务的大量信息，你可以从中看到依据GAAP标准编制的分部利润信息。除此之外，第53-59页，我们以非GAAP标准将伯克希尔的财务数据重列为4个部分，重列原则按照的是查理跟我看待业务本质的方式。我们报告的原则是，假如我们角色互换，你们是经营者而我们是投资者，我们向你们的提供的财务信息，与我们作为投资者要求你们作为经营者提供的信息是一致的。
In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges.
过去的年报中我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，我们认为它比GAAP数字更能反应伯克希尔真实的盈利状况。其主要的组成是（1）前段报告中的运营利润，加上（2）按GAAP会计原则未反映在我们利润中的，主要被投资公司的留存收益，减去（3）若这些未反映的收益分配给我们时，将要支付的所得税估计值。在这里，我们所谓的“运营利润”，应扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业重组等支出。
If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%, our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85 billion.
长期而言，如果我们的内在价值想要以每年15%的幅度增长的话，那么透视盈余每年也必须以这个幅度增长。几年前我第一次提到这个概念时曾表示，若要实现15%的增长目标，我们需要在2000年之前达到18亿美元以上的透视盈余。而由于1993年我们又发行了约3%新股（购买Dexter）11，所以现在的门槛提高到了18.5亿美元。
We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target but that, of course, is no sure thing.
我们现在稍微超越目标进度，这在很大程度上是因为我们的巨灾险近年来的表现远超预期（下一节再详加叙述）。扣除这项非经常部分，我们依旧符合当初预期，但这仍不能保证一定实现目标。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表列示了我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数字有点粗糙。（被投资公司所分配的股利收入列在第12页的运营利润部分，大部分在保险业务的净投资收益项下。）
| Berkshire's Major Investees | Berkshire's Approximate Ownership at Yearend | Berkshire's Approximate Ownership at Yearend | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings | Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (in millions) | 1994 | 1993 | 1994 | 1993 |
| American Express Company | 5.5% | 2.4% | $ 25(2) | $ 16 |
| Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | 13.0% | 13.0% | 85 | 83(2) |
| The Coca-Cola Company | 7.8% | 7.2% | 116(2) | 94 |
| Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. | 6.3%(1) | 6.8%(1) | 47(2) | 41(2) |
| Gannett Co., Inc. | 4.9% | --- | 4(2) | --- |
| GEICO Corp. | 50.2% | 48.4% | 63(3) | 76(3) |
| The Gillette Company | 10.8% | 10.9% | 51 | 44 |
| PNC Bank Corp. | 8.3% | --- | 10(2) | --- |
| The Washington Post Company | 15.2% | 14.8% | 18 | 15 |
| Wells Fargo & Company | 13.3% | 12.2% | 73 | 53(2) |
| Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees | $ 492 | $ 422 | ||
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(4) | (68) | (59) | ||
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire | 606 | 478 | ||
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire | $ 1,030 | $ 841 |
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest at Wesco
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
正如我们在之前的年报中跟各位解释过的，我们保险业务中最重要的，第一是浮存金的新增规模，第二是浮存金的获取成本。浮存金是我们持有但不拥有的钱。保险业务营运中存在浮存金是因为，大部分的保单都要求保户预付保费，更重要的是，在实际支付理赔款之前，保险公司往往会经历一段不短的时间，才会收到和处理索赔要求。
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.
通常，保险公司实际收到的保费并不足以覆盖发生的索赔损失与运营费用，这就是承保损失，也就是浮存金的成本。
An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
长期而言，保险公司的浮存金成本若能低于其它资金获取渠道所需的成本，则随着时间的推移，保险业务就是有利可图的。相反，若浮存金成本长期高于市场利率的话，保险业务就没有什么价值。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
如同下表中的数字所显示的，伯克希尔的保险业务大获全胜。对于该表，浮存金是将损失准备金、损失调整准备金，再保险假设准备金和未到期责任准备金加总后，再减去应付保险代理成本、预付购置成本，预付税款及递延费用。相对于我们的保费数量而言，我们产生了非常多的浮存金，而浮存金的成本则取决于承保的损失或利润。比如过去两年我们取得了承保盈利，我们的浮存金成本就是负值。我们通过将承保利润与浮存金投资收益相加来确定我们的保险业务收益。
| Year | Underwriting Loss (1) (In $ Millions) | Average Float (2) (In $ Millions) | Approximate Cost of Funds (Ratio of 1 to 2) | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit | $ 17.3 | less than zero | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | 19.9 | less than zero | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | 23.4 | less than zero | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $ 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | 52.5 | less than zero | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | 69.5 | less than zero | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | 73.3 | less than zero | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | 102.6 | less than zero | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | 139.0 | less than zero | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | 190.4 | less than zero | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | 227.3 | less than zero | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | 237.0 | less than zero | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | 228.4 | less than zero | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | profit | 2,624.7 | less than zero | 6.35% |
| 1994 | profit | 3,056.6 | less than zero | 7.88% |
Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently looks.
查理跟我对于1994年的浮存金能够继续增长都感到相当高兴，更高兴的是这些资金是完全免费的。但是我们还是要像去年那样再强调一次，尽管我们的保险业务还不错，但实际并不如目前看起来的那么好。
The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat" business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995 Kobe earthquake.
我们之所以一再强调这一点，原因在于我们的巨灾再保险业务（super-catastrophe是专门出售给保险公司与再保公司规避重大自然灾害风险的保单）今年再度赚了大钱。由于真正重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的巨灾险业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然遭受一次重大损失。换句话说，我们这项巨灾险业务可能要花上好几年才有办法看得清楚是盈还是亏。当然，1994年绝对是相当好的一年。唯一的重大理赔是一月所发生的加州大地震。另外，在这里我要特别声明，1995年初发生的神户大地震对我们造成的损失并不大。
Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous.
巨灾险保单有数量少、金额大且非标准化的特性。因此，要承接这类业务必须依赖相当专业的判断能力，而不像一般的汽车保险有庞大的数据库可供参考。就这点而言，伯克希尔拥有一张王牌：阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain），他是我们巨灾险业务的经理人，拥有最好的承保技巧，他可以说是我们的无价之宝。
In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-cat business because of our towering financial strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.
此外，于巨灾险业务，伯克希尔还拥有一项特殊的优势，那就是我们雄厚的财务实力，这对我们有相当大的帮助。首先，一家谨慎小心的保险公司都会希望自己能够防范真正的特大灾害，比如造成500亿美元损失的纽约长岛飓风或加州大地震。但是保险公司也相当清楚，这类依赖大型保险赔付的灾难同样也会导致许多再保险公司自顾不暇而破产，所以它们不太可能笨到向无法兑现的承诺支付再保险费。因此，伯克希尔可以确保在不可预期的天灾发生时，既有偿付能力又有流动性，就是我们最大的竞争优势。
The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for their own account.
我们资本实力的第二个好处是，我们可以签下别人想都不敢想的巨额保单。举例来说，1994年，有一家保险业者临时想要买一张保额高达4亿美元的加州地震险保单，我们二话不说立刻接了下来。我们敢说，全世界除了我们以外，可能没有保险公司敢独立接下4亿美元，或者类似金额的这么大的单一保单。
Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.
一般来说，保险经纪人通常倾向将大额的保单拆成数张小额的保单以分散承保，但是这类保单会耗费大量时间。在寻找分保人的时间内，希望通过再保险分散风险的公司将承担那些其本身不希望承担的风险，进而危及那些保险公司自身的安危。相对地，在伯克希尔，我们对单日内单一保单的投保上限最高可以到达5亿美元，这是其它同业所做不到的。
By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.
虽然接下这类大额保单，会使得伯克希尔的经营成果变得很不稳定，但我们完全愿意接受这样的结果。通常保险同业（其实其它的行业也一样）为了平滑业绩总是倾向采取次优策略。但我们愿意选择接受波动性，以期获取比前景确定的方式更高的长期投资回报。
Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our "worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.
考虑到我们承受的风险，阿吉特跟我总是会将关注点放在最坏的状况下。虽然我们知道实在是很难去衡量这种风险。大家可以想象如果长岛飓风、加州地震以及损失更大的自然灾害发生在同一年时会是怎样的一个光景。此外，保险损失也可能会伴随非保险的麻烦。例如，假设我们因为加州大地震而承受大量的巨灾险损失，而此时股市很可能也会大跌，此举将会使得我们在喜诗糖果、富国银行与房利美的持股价值大减。
All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega-catastrophe.
在考虑过所有的状况之后，我们认为在最坏的情况下承保巨灾险最高损失大约在税后6亿美元左右，稍稍超过伯克希尔其它事业的利润。如果你对于这样的风险感到不舒服，那么现在是你卖出伯克希尔股份的最佳时机，而不是等到这种难以避免的大灾难发生。
Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in 1995.
我们巨灾险的业务量在1995年很有可能会下滑，因为常规保单价格正在下滑，原因是几年前新进入再保险市场的资本正以不合理的价格竞逐保单。尽管如此，我们还是和一些重要客户群保持了良好合作关系，可以稳定地贡献我们1995年业绩。
Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.
伯克希尔其它保险业务1994年的营运表现皆相当杰出。由Rod Eldred领导的住宅保险业务（Home-State）、Brad Kinstler带领的工伤赔偿保险业务、Kizer家族经营的信用卡违约险业务，以及由Don Wurster所领导的国民保险所从事的商用汽车与一般责任险业务，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保利润，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。
We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
总而言之，我们可以得出与去年同样的结论：我们拥有第一流的保险业务。虽然他们的经营成果波动相当的大，但是其内在价值却远远超过其帐面价值，事实上，比伯克希尔其它业务的超过比例都更大。
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过3亿美元以上的普通股投资，一小部分的投资属于伯克希尔非完全控股企业所持有。
| Shares | Company | Cost 12/31/94 (000s omitted) | Market 12/31/94 (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27,759,941 | American Express Company | $ 723,919 | $ 818,918 |
| 20,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | 345,000 | 1,705,000 |
| 100,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 1,298,888 | 5,150,000 |
| 12,761,200 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac") | 270,468 | 644,441 |
| 6,854,500 | Gannett Co., Inc. | 335,216 | 365,002 |
| 34,250,000 | GEICO Corp. | 45,713 | 1,678,250 |
| 24,000,000 | The Gillette Company | 600,000 | 1,797,000 |
| 19,453,300 | PNC Bank Corporation | 503,046 | 410,951 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | 9,731 | 418,983 |
| 6,791,218 | Wells Fargo & Company | 423,680 | 984,727 |
Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).
我们的投资仍然很集中，理念也很简单：最佳投资点子三言两语就能说清。我们偏爱具有持久竞争优势并且由德才兼备、股东利益优先的经理人所经营的优质企业。只要目标企业确实拥有这些特质，而且我们能够以合理的价格买进，投资就很难出错（这正是我们一直不断要克服的挑战）。
Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.
投资者应该记住，评估投资成绩并不会像奥林匹克跳水比赛那样考虑难度系数。有的企业，其价值很大程度上取决于某个单一的关键因素，而且这个因素容易理解又经久不衰；但有的企业，其价值受很多不断变化、复杂的因素影响。只要你对企业价值的分析和评估是正确的，你的投资收益并不会因为企业价值的评估难度提高而变得更高。12
We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess?
买入决策时，我们只关注价格而不择时。我们认为，因为对经济或股市的短期担忧而放弃买进一家长期前景可合理预期的好公司是一件很愚蠢的事，为什么会因为短期不可知的担忧就放弃一个明智的投资决策呢？
We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market?
我们分别在1967年买下国民保险公司（保险业周期低谷）、1972年买下喜诗糖果（接班人无心经营）、1977年买下布法罗新闻报（恶性竞争）、1983年买下内布拉斯加家具商场（避免后代争夺）、1986年买下斯科特费泽（杠杆并购）13，而我们都是趁它们难得出售时才得以买进，当然也因为它们的开价可以接受。当初在评估每个决定时，我们都在思考企业未来可能会怎样，而不是道琼斯指数、美联储或经济未来可能会怎样。如果我们觉得这样的方式适用于买下整家公司的话，那么每当我们决定要通过股市买进一些优质公司的一部分股权时，为什么要改变策略呢？
Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.
在寻找新的投资标的之前，我们会优先考虑增加已有投资的仓位。如果一家企业曾经好到让我们愿意买进，那么重复这一过程可能会很划算。若是有可能我们很愿意再增加在喜诗糖果或是斯科特费泽的持股，但已经持股100%想要再增加已经不可能了。然而在股票市场中，投资者常常有很多的机会可以加大他了解并喜欢的公司持股。去年我们就增加了我们在可口可乐（2.75亿）与美国运通（4.24亿）的仓位。
Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents. It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.
我们投资美国运通的历史（色拉油丑闻）可以追溯到1965年，而事实上这也符合从个人过去的公司名单中挖掘投资机会的模式。例如在1951年，当时我还是年仅20岁的股票推销员，350股GEICO保险占我个人投资组合的70%，同时它也是我第一次卖掉的股票，我将其中的100股卖给我的姑妈Alice，基本上只要是我建议的她都照单全收。25年后趁着GEICO面临倒闭的危机（为了成长不计成本扩张），伯克希尔买下其一大部分的股份。另一个例子就是华盛顿邮报（水门事件）。1940年代，我的初始投资资金有一半是来自派送该报纸的收入。三十年后，伯克希尔趁该公司上市两年后遭遇的危机（报道水门事件被政治打压以及工会罢工）引发的股价低档买下一大部分的股权。至于可口可乐（盲目多元化），可以算得上是我生平从事的第一笔商业交易，1930年代当我还是个小孩子的时候，我花了25美分买了半打的可乐，然后再以每罐5美分分售出去。而直到50年后，我才终于搞懂真正有赚头的还是那糖水。
My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)
我个人在美国运通的投资历史包含好几段插曲，在1960年代中期，趁着该公司为色拉油丑闻遭受重创时，我们将巴菲特合伙公司40%的资金压在这只股票上，这是合伙公司有史以来最大的一笔投资，总计花了1,300万美元买进该公司5%的股份。时至今日，我们在美国运通的持股将近10%，但帐列成本却高达13.6亿美元，（美国运通1964年的盈利为1,250万美元，1994年则增加至14亿美元）
My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1 through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.
我对美国运通IDS金融部门的投资可以追溯更早，该部门目前占公司整体收益来源的三分之一。我在1953年第一次买进成长快速的IDS股份，当时只有三倍市盈率（在那个年代低垂的果子唾手可得）。为此我甚至还特别写了一篇长篇报告（不过印象中我好象没有写过短的），并在华尔街日报刊登广告，报价1美元公开出售。
Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.
显然，美国运通与IDS（最近已更名为美国运通财务顾问）今日的营运与过去已有很大的不同。然而，我发现长期熟悉一家公司及其产品通常有助于对其进行评估。
Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie. But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow.
错误通常在做决策时就已经造成，但我们只能在其显出原形时才给予“颁奖”。照这种标准，1994年可算是竞争激烈的一年。在这里我必须特别指出以下大部分的错误都是查理造成的。不过每当我用这种方式解释时，我的鼻子就会跟着变长（意指撒谎）。
And the nominees are . . .
获得提名的有...
Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5 million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in 1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.
1993年底，我以每股63美元卖出1,000万股大都会股份（参加股份回购计划），不幸的是到了1994年底，该公司股价变成85.25美元，如果你心痛到不愿去算的话，我可以直接告诉各位我们损失了2.225亿美元的差价。而当我们在1986年以每股17.25美元（1拆10后）买进该公司股份时，就曾经向各位报告，我之前曾在1978-1980年间以每股4.3美元卖掉该公司股份，并强调对于个人这样的行为感到心痛。没想到现在我却又明知故犯，也许是时候找个监护人来好好监管我一下了。
Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September. In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an "unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large.
更不幸的是，大都会只能得到一个银牌，金牌荣誉要归于我在五年前就犯下的一项错误，但直到1994年才爆发出来：我们以3.58亿美元购买了全美航空优先股，去年9月，该公司宣布停止发放优先股股息。早在1990年，我就很准确地形容这项交易属于非受迫性的失误，意思是说，没有人强迫我投资，同时也没有人误导我。相反，这是一个草率分析的案例，这一失误可能是因为我们购买的是一家高等级证券，或是因为自大傲慢。不论如何，这是一项重大的错误。
Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high.
在做这项投资之前，我竟然没有把注意力集中到一直为航空业深深所苦、居高不下的成本问题之上。早年这些致命的高成本还不致构成重大的威胁，因为当时航空业受到监管的保护免受竞争影响，航空业者可以将高额成本通过高票价转嫁给消费者。
When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded.
在放松管制的初期，情况并没有立即改变：低成本航空公司的运力还很小，以至于高成本线路在很大程度上可以维持其现有的票价结构。不过随着业者无视长期问题任其发酵，毫无竞争力的高成本问题早已积重难返。
As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious to your Chairman, but I missed it.
随着低成本营运业者座位容量的大幅扩增，超低的票价迫使那些高成本的老牌航空公司也不得不降价，然而额外资金的注入（比如我们在全美航空的那笔投资）延迟了这些老牌航空公司正视问题的时机。最终基本的经济规则占了上风：在一个没有管制的商品标准化产业，一家公司要么通过降低成本增加竞争力，要么关门倒闭。这道理对于身为公司负责人的我，可说是再清楚也不过了，但是我竟然忽视了。
Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear.
全美航空的总裁Seth Schofield一直致力于纠正公司历史成本问题，不过到目前为止，仍然未有改善。一部分的原因在于，他面对的是一个个不断变动的对手，某些航空业者幸运地取得劳资双方新协议，有些则受惠于破产法令的保护而有了一个全新出发的成本（1988年洛克比空难，最大的泛美航空(Pan Am)于1991年破产），就像西南航空的总裁Herb Kelleher所说的：进破产法庭对于航空公司来说，简直就像做SPA那么舒服。此外，对于那些在合约上受到保护得以获得高于市场水准薪资的劳工来说，只要他们发现自己的薪资支票仍能按时兑现，就会全力地抵制减薪的提议。
Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But it is far from sure that will happen.
尽管面临目前的困境，全美航空还是有可能完成降低成本的任务，以维持长期继续生存的能力。不过到目前为止，还很难确定一定能够成功。
Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5 million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it back the way that you lost it.
因此，在1994年底，我们将全美航空帐面的投资金额减值为8,950万美元，当初1美元的投资仅剩下25美分。这样的举动反应出将来我们的优先股有可能完全或大部分地恢复其价值，也有可能到最后变得一文不值。不论最后的结果为何，我们必须谨记一项投资的基本原则：不要因为想挽回局面而重蹈覆辙。
The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated. Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.
本次减计全美航空投资价值的会计影响有点复杂。根据GAAP会计规则的规定，保险公司在资产负债表上必须以市价列示所有股票。因此截至去年第三季末，我们在全美航空投资的帐面价值是8,950万美元，大概只有原始成本3.58亿美元的25%。换句话说，在当时我们的账面价值就已反应了这项调整。
But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the diminution of value had already been reflected.
但在第四季度，我们认为从会计角度来看，价值下降并非属于暂时性的，所以我们必须将这笔减值金额反应在损益表之上。然而第四季度不会对于本公司的账面价值再造成任何的影响，因为减值在第三季便已体现了。
Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.
在即将召开的全美航空年度股东会中，查理跟我决定不再续任董事，当然要是Seth总裁觉得有任何需要我们帮忙的地方，我们愿意提供任何咨询服务。
Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our gratitude.
去年，有两位对伯克希尔贡献卓著的经理人决定退休，分别是大都会/ABC的Dan Burke与富国银行的Carl Reichardt。Dan与Carl近年来在各自的产业都面临到相当大的挑战，但他们杰出的管理能力使得他们经营的事业在这段期间内仍能保有出色的收益，并赋予公司光明与璀璨的前景。此外，对于他们的离开，Dan与Carl都已作好准备，将公司交由能干的人才接手，我们对他们报以深深的敬意。
About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities were recipients.
大约有95.7%的有效股权参与1994年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,040万美元捐出的款项分配给3,300家慈善机构。
Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51.
每年都有一小部分的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计划，凡是不符合规定者，都不能参加这项计划。因此我们敦促不管是原有或新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报第50-51页上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容。
To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995 program.
想要参加这项计划者，请确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1995年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1995年的捐赠计划。
We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.
1994年我们只进行了一项小型的并购案，一家鞋业零售连锁店，然而对于寻找好的候选对象，我们的兴致与过去一样热烈，对于买进与并购标准请参阅附录。
Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.
去年春天，我们曾经对一家大型的家族企业提出并购的提议，交易的内容包含发行伯克希尔可转换优先股，虽然后来双方未能达成协议，但这次的经验提醒我们必须先取得伯克希尔股东们的同意，授权董事会发行，好让我们在合适的并购机会出现时，可以做出快速的响应，因此，在今年的股东会议案中，包含了一项授权董事会在适当的时机发行优先股的提案，当然大家可以百分之百地相信，除非我们认为所得到的内在价值跟我们所付出的相当，否则查理跟我绝对不会轻易地发行这些股份。
Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another 1,000 people.
查理跟我很希望各位都能够来参加今年的股东年会。由于去年参加人数稍微超过奥芬剧院（Orpheum）2750座位容量，因此今年股东会我们决定于1995年5月1日，周一早上9点30分在新的场地假日会议中心召开。新场地的大厅可以容纳3300人，若有必要，藉由视听器材的辅助，旁边还有一个可以容纳1000人的会议室。
Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications. All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate.
去年我们在会场上展示了一些伯克希尔的产品，结果总计卖出了800磅的糖果、507双鞋子以及价值超过12,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版物，今年这些商品会再度与会，虽然我们认为这次会议的意义主要在于精神层面，但我们不要忘记，即使是最神圣的宗教典礼，也包含奉献捐献的仪式。
Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate attire.
当然大家绝对不能错过的是1995年橘子杯的录像带。本人利用晚上的时间观看这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节。我们以今年封面的颜色表示对内布拉斯加美式足球队教练Tom Osborne以及其所带领的全美最佳队伍Cornhuskers队的敬意。我敦促大家一定要穿Huskers队的红色出席今年的股东会，而我也可以向各位保证伯克希尔的经营双人组会有50%以上穿著正确的服色出席。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the meeting and return after it ends.
由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订房间。想要住在市中心的人（距离会场约6英里）可以选择拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆Radisson Redick Tower，或是旁边较大一点的RedLion Hotel。会场附近还有Holiday Inn（403个房间）、Homewood Suites（118个房间）、Hampton Inn（136个房间）。另一个推荐的旅馆是位在奥马哈西区的Marriott，离波仙珠宝店约100码，距离会场约10分钟的车程。届时在那里将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会会场，出发时间是8:45 和 9:00。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，当天会场有相当大的停车场，住在Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites或Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路过来开会。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor.
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场。我希望大家特别能到内布拉斯加家具店参观，因为今年新开幕的超大卖场，贩卖各式家电、电子信息、CD唱片、摄影机与视听产品。自开幕以来，销售业绩惊人，到了现场之后，你绝对会对产品的多样与展示方式印象深刻。
The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that matter, an hour.
位于内布拉斯加家具店主馆旁边，占地64英亩的超级大卖场距离会场约2英里远，营业时间平日从早上10点到下午9点，周六从早上10点到下午6点，周日则从中午开到下午6点，到了那里记得向高龄101岁的B夫人打招呼，她每天都会到B夫人仓库工作，或者应该说是每个小时。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.
平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，在股东会当天会特别为股东与来宾开放，从中午开到下午6点，这天总是相当的特别。我们会试着让大家得到一些意外的惊喜，而通常那天也是该店全年营业额最高的一天，这也是查理跟我希望能在那里看到各位的主要原因之一。
On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will need plenty of vocal support.
在前一天，4月29日，周六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥马哈皇家队对布法罗水牛队的比赛，水牛队的老板是我的好朋友，Mindy跟Bob Rich, Jr.。我希望他们也能参加，若他们真的来了，我会引诱Bob与我在投手丘上来一场对决。Bob可以称得上是资本家的强森巨投，年轻、健壮且精力充沛。绝对是你在球季中不会想要遇到的对手。所以届时我希望大家都能到场给予我声援。
The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be all smoke.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票。去年大约有1400位股东出席这项盛会。当晚开赛前，我投出一只时速高达8英里的好球，只是许多球迷在当场并没有看到我不顾捕手的要求投出快速球的指示反而祭出我的上飘球，至于今年我要投出的球路至今仍然是个谜。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 7, 1995
Footnotes
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By Vito @20231006 括号内数据为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩
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By Vito @20231007
原文：
原先译文：Ted Williams在《我一生的故事》中写到："我个人的看法是，如果你想成为一个优秀的击球手，首先你必须有一个好的击球点。这是教科书里的第一课，如果强迫自己在舒适球区以外挥棒，我绝对无法成为安打率34.4%的全明星水平，而可能变成25%的普通击球手"。查理跟我都很同意这样的看法，所以我们宁愿静静的等待机会进入我们自己的舒适区。
采用了 Terrellchen 的译法。修改为：泰德·威廉姆斯（Ted Williams）在《我一生的故事》中写道：“我个人的看法是，如果你想成为一个优秀的击球手，首先得等到一个好球再去击打。这是教科书里的第一课。如果我强迫自己对最拿手区域以外的球击打，我将不会成为打击率 .344的优秀击球手。而可能只是个打击率 .250的普通击球手。”查理和我都同意这样的看法，因此我们将努力等待进入我们自己击球区域的机会。 ↩ ↩2
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By Vito @20231006 原译文是“该公司并没有运用任何的财务杠杆”。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 原译文是“下表显示，第一栏是伯克希尔每年必须慢慢地摊销购买ScottFetzer所产生的溢价的余额，第二栏是每年必须摊销的金额”。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 原译文是“很明显的，其内在价值一直都在成长，然而通过溢价摊销，伯克希尔帐上持有的投资成本却一再向下调整。” ↩
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By Vito @20231006 原译文是“就像是Wachovia美联银行已退休的领导人JohnMedlin说：这种事做太多，就好象是在反向运行连锁信一样。” ↩
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By Vito @20231006 原译文是“他的反应就像一位十几岁的孩子被父亲鼓励去过正常的性生活一样，这样的做法简直是拔苗助长。” ↩
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By Vito @20231006 括号内数据为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 原译文中加了一句“像为了钱结婚一样愚蠢”。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 此处采用了开源翻译小组成员RW的译法。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 括号内为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 此处采用 Ponge 的译法。 ↩
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By Vito @20231006 括号内为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩