Ambitious Cedar Monkey - Chainlink oracle min/max answer is wrongly used

[sherlock-admin4]

Ambitious Cedar Monkey

Medium

Chainlink oracle min/max answer is wrongly used

Summary

nuAssetToEthRoundUp() can cause a DOS even when valid prices are returned from the oracle

Root Cause

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-12-numa-audit/blob/main/Numa/contracts/libraries/OracleUtils.sol#L74-L78

File: nuAssetManager.sol
179:     function nuAssetToEthRoundUp(
180:         address _nuAsset,
181:         uint256 _amount
182:     ) public view returns (uint256 EthValue) {
183:         require(contains(_nuAsset), "bad nuAsset");
184:         nuAssetInfo memory info = getNuAssetInfo(_nuAsset);
185:         (address priceFeed, uint128 heartbeat) = (info.feed, info.heartbeat);
186:         return
187:    @>       tokenToEthRoundUp(


File: OracleUtils.sol
211:     function tokenToEthRoundUp(
212:         uint256 _amount,
213:         address _pricefeed,
214:         uint128 _chainlink_heartbeat,
215:         uint256 _decimals
216:     ) public view checkSequencerActive returns (uint256 EthValue) {
217:         (
218:             uint80 roundID,
219:             int256 price,

/// ...........
234:         );
235:         require(
236:    @>       ((price > int256(aggregator.minAnswer())) && 
237:                 (price < int256(aggregator.maxAnswer()))),
238:             "min/max reached"
239:         );

The problem is that the DEV wrongly assumes the minimum and maximum prices returned form the oracle are invalid and as such when the aggregator.minAnswer()/maxAnswer() are returned from the oracle, the function reverts

Internal pre-conditions

No response

External pre-conditions

No response

Attack Path

No response

Impact

This can lead to a DOS

PoC

No response

Mitigation

Consider includoing the min and max prices